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Policy Reform,  and Poverty  Reduction:
An Introduction
Deepak Bbattasali, Li Shantong, anzd Will Martin
China's  accession  to  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  was a  watershed
event  for  both  China  and the  WTO.  After  30 years  of  effective  isolation  from
the  world  economy,  and  close  to  a  quarter  century  of  autonomous  reforms,
China  joined  the  legal  framework  of the  world  trading  system.  In  doing  so
China  made  an  extraordinarily  wide-ranging  set  of commitments to  reform  of
its own  legal and administrative  system  and to thorough-going  liberalization  of
trade in goods  and services.
This issue contains five studies  from a inajor project  undertaken by the World
Bank  and  the  Development  Research  Centre  of  China's  State  Council.  A  key
objective  of the studies  was  to assess  the  impact of the reforms  associated with
WTO accession  on poverty  in China, particularly  in rural areas, which now lag
so  badly behind  urban  areas.
A key  underpinning  of  this  work was  an accurate  assessment  of the  distor-
tions  in  agricultural  prices  created  by  China's  opaque  system  of  pre-WTO
agricultural trade policies. The results of previous  studies were widely divergent,
with some  studies  suggesting  that China's  agriculture was highly protected  and
others  that  it  received  low  or  negative  protection.  Huang,  Rozelle,  and  Min
attempt  to  resolve  some  of  this  contradiction  by  conducting  detailed  price
comparisons  and  interviews  with  participants  in  key  markets.  They  conclude
that China's agricultural  protection  was generally  modest,  although some  com-
modities,  such as  sugar and  maize,  received  substantial protection.
Deepak  Bhattasali  is Lead  Econiomist  in PREMI  Sector  Department,  World  Bank  Country  Office,
Beijing.  His  e-mail  address  is dhhattasali@a)worldhank.org.  Li  Shantong  is Director-General,  Research
Department  of  Development  Strategy  and  Regionial  Econonmy,  Development  Research  Centre  of  State
Council, China;  her e-mail address  is shantong(adrc.gov.cn.  Will Martin is Lead Economist, Development
Research  Group  at the World  Bank;  e-miiail:  wnmar-tinl('worldhanik.org.  Particular thanks are due to  the
UK Department  for Internationial  Development  for genierous  support to  this project. A companion  hook.
including a  broader set of studies  undertaken  In  this project,  is forthcoming from  Oxford University  lPress
and  the World Bank (D.  Bhattasali,  Shantong  Li,  and  W.  Nlartin,  eds.,  China a,znl the WTO: Accessionl,
Policy Reforni,  anid Potertv Reduiction Strategies).
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lanchovichina  and Martin  draw  on the  estimates  of protection  provided  by
Huang,  Rozelle,  and  Min  and  their  own  estimates  of  liberalization  in other
sectors  to  assess  the  impacts  of  reform  on  key  economic  outcomes  such  as
wages,  prices,  and volumes  of output,  imports,  and  exports.  A  key  finding  is
the importance  of the abolition  of the  textile and clothing quota  system, which
will allow China to more fully exploit its comparative  advantage in this area.  In
undertaking  this analysis,  they built on the study by  Francois and Spinanger  of
adjustment  in the  motor vehicle sector-a  sector that was  highly protected  and
inefficient  before  accession.  Francois  and  Spinanger  conclude  that this  sector
will substantially  increase  its efficiency,  a result that has important implications
for the  economy  as  a whole,  as  well  as  for  this  sector's  ability  to  meet import
competition.
Ravallion and Chen draw on a survey of 85,000 Chinese households to assess
the impact  of the WTO  reforms on the distribution of income, particularly  for
the  poor.  They  find  negative  impacts  on  average  in  rural  areas,  where  the
overwhelming  majority  of China's poor  live,  and benefits on  average  in urban
areas.  While the average  losses to poor rural people are  small, impacts on some
types of households  and certain regions  are more substantial,  with implications
for  social  protection  policies  and  for  complementary  policies  to  raise  the
incomes  of poor families.
Messerlin examines  one of the controversial,  and potentially risky, aspects of
the agreement-the  provisions  on antidumping  and safeguards.  He  points out
that  China  is  particularly  vulnerable  to  antidumping  actions  because  of  its
export  product  mix  and  because  of the nonmarket  economy  provisions  that
other WTO members  are allowed  to apply to China for up to  15 years  from its
accession to  the  WTO.  Possibly even  more  troubling  are  the product-specific
safeguards  allowed  China's trading partners  for up to 12 years  from accession.
Offering  entirely new  protection, these  measures  involve  very lax triggers  that
could lead to a domino-effect  closing  of many markets for China's exports.Impacts of China's Accession to the
World Trade  Organization
Elena Ianchovichina and Will Martin
This article  presents  estimates of the impact  of China's  accession  to the World  Trade
Organization.  China  is  estimated  to  be  the  biggest  beneficiary  (US$31  billion  a  year
from trade  reforms  in preparation  for  accession  and additional  gains  of $10  billion  a
year  from  reforms  after  accession),  followed  by its  major  trading  partners  that  also
undertake  liberalization,  including  the economies  in  North America,  Western  Europe,
and Taiwan  (China).  Accession  will  boost manufacturing  sectors  in China,  especially
textiles  and  apparel,  which  will  benefit  directly  from  the removal  of export  quotas.
Developing economies  competing with China in third markets  may suffer small losses.
Accession will have important distributional consequences  for China, with the wages of
skilled and unskilled nonfarm workers rising in real terms and relative to those of farm
workers.  Possible policy changes, including  reductions in barriers to labor mobility and
improvements  in rural  education,  could  more  than  offset these  negative  impacts  and
facilitate the development  of China's economy.
Trade  policy reforms  such  as  those  flowing  from accession  to the World  Trade
Organization  (wTo) lead  directly to changes  in policy instruments, such as tariffs,
nontariff  barriers,  and  coverage  of  trade  rules.  The  main  policy  concerns,
however,  are  with  the  impacts  on  such  economic  variables  as  prices;  output,
employment,  and  trade  volumes;  factor  returns;  and  household  incomes.  This
article estimates the impacts on these key economic variables of China's accession
to  the  wro  as  a  guide  to  policy  and  as  a  basis  for  subsequent  analysis  at the
household  level.'  It is part of a joint World Bank-Development  Research  Centre
study reported  in full in Bhattasali  and others  (2004).
Elena lanchovichina  is Economist with  the Economic  Policy  Unit of the  Poverty Reduction  and Eco-
nomic Management  Network  at the World  Bank;  her e-mail  address  is eianchovichina@worldbank.org.
Will  Martin is Lead  Economist,  Development  Research  Group at the World  Bank;  his e-mail  address is
wmartinl@worldbank.org.  The  authors  thank  Kyym  Anderson,  Hana  Polackova  Brixi,  Louise  Fox,
Thomas  Hertel,  T. N.  Srinivasan,  Alan  Winters,  and  three  anonymous  reviewers  for  helpful comments
and  Prashant  Dave  and Zhi  Wang for  their generosity  in providing  data.
1. Because China's  accession  was a necessary condition  for that of Taiwan  and because of the strong
trade  linkages  between  the  two  economies,  the  impact  of  Taiwan's  accession  to  the  wro  is  also
considered.
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The obvious instrument for performing this type of analysis is the computable
general equilibrium model. Many such models now exist, and a cottage  industry
has  emerged  in  estimating  the impacts  of trade  reform  in  China  (Gilbert  and
Wahl  2001).2 The  availability  of  the  internationally  standard  database  of the
Global Trade  Analysis Project  (GTAP)  has facilitated  such modeling and reduced
the burden  involved  in  obtaining  estimates  of basic  information,  such as  trade
flows and patterns of production  and consumption.  What standard models such
as  GTAP  (Hertel  1997;  www.gtap.org)  do  not  do,  however,  is  incorporate  the
nonstandard  features  of  China's  partially  reformed  economy,  where  many
imports  enter duty-free  if used  in the production  of exports  and  labor  market
policies result in  serious barriers  between  urban  and rural areas.
Like  lanchovichina  and  Martin  (2001)  and Wang  (2003),  the  analysis  here
explicitly allows for the duty exemption  arrangements that result in close to half
of China's  imports entering  as  duty-free  inputs  into the production  of exports.
Recent  work  by  Sicular  and  Zhao  (2004)  is  drawn  on  to represent  imperfect
labor  mobility  and  labor  market  distortions.  This  article  extends  the  earlier
work  reported  in  lanchovichina  and  Martin  (2001)  by  moving  to  the  GTAP
version  5  database  (Dimaranan  and  McDougall  2002)  based  on  1997  data
rather  than  1995  data;  by  incorporating  improved  estimates  of protection  in
agriculture  (Huang  and  others  2004)3  and  services  (Francois  and  Spinanger
2004);  by  using  measures  of  liberalization  based  on  the  final,  multilateral
agreement;  by  taking  into  account  the  restructuring  of the  automobile  sector
(Francois  and  Spinanger  2004);  and by  simulating  the consequences  of major
labor market reform. This last issue is a particularly critical area for China, and
there  have been few  simulation  studies.4
This  article  first  discusses  the  methodology  and  then  the  policy  changes
associated with China's WTO  accession  and the results of the simulation analysis.
2.  Among  the  studies using  a  general  equilibrium  approach  to quantify the  impact of China's  WTO
accession  are  Lejour  (2000),  Zhai  and  Li  (2000),  Li  and  others  (2000),  McKihbin  and  Tang  (2000),
lanchovichina  and  Martin  (2001),  Walmsley  and  Hertel  (2001),  Deutsche  Bank  (2001),  Wang  (2002),
Zhai and Wang  (2002),  Walmsley  and others  (forthcoming),  and lanchovichina  and Walmslev  (2003).
3.  Huang  and  others  (2004)  find  that  nominal  rates  of  protection  on  important  agricultural  com-
modities  (rice,  vegetables  and fruits,  livestock  and meat)  were  negative  in 2001  and are likely to remain
unchanged  in the postaccession period.  Consequently,  the reduction  in agricultural  protection is  likely to
he  far less than presented  in earlier  studies.  Nonetheless, greater  scope for imports  is likely for a  range of
agricultural  products (wheat,  oilseeds, sugar, and  dairy products)  protected by tariffs that are scheduled
to  be reduced substantially and  for products (cotton  and feedgrains)  for which export subsidies are ruled
out. These  important  findings  were  not incorporated in earlier studies.
4.  The current treatment  differs  from that in Zhai and Wang (2002),  who represent  imperfect  labor
mobility  in  a  single-country  model  with  endogenous  urban  unemployment  but  do  not  differentiate
between  skilled  and  unskilled  labor  and  employ  a  low  level  of elasticity  of labor  mobility  between
rural and urban  areas  (0.25).  The results here  are similar to those  in Zhai  and Wang (2002)  in the case
of wro  accession  with  high  labor  mobility  (elasticity  of  labor  mobility  is  doubled)  and  fixed  urban
unemployment  (flexible  urban  wvage).lanchovichina and Martin  5
It then considers  some  possible complementary  policy actions, such as reducing
barriers  to rural  outmigration  and expanding  access  to education.
I.  METHODOLOGY
The standard  GTAP  model was adjusted to incorporate  China's important  export
processing  arrangements. 5 lanchovichina  (2003)  documents  the approach  used
and shows that failing to account for China's duty exemptions in analyzing wro
accession  overstates  the  increase  in China's  trade  flows  by 40 percent  and  the
increase in exports of selected sectors by 90 percent. The adjusted model (GTAP-DD)
also  incorporates  some  of  China's  key  labor  market  mechanisms  and  institu-
tions  that  related  research  has  shown  may  have  a  major  influence  on  the
impacts  of wro accession  (Sicular  and Zhao  2002, 2004).
Export Processing  Arrangements
Export processing  arrangements  in China take many forms.  Most arrangements
allow  firms producing goods for export to import intermediate  inputs at world
prices. These  arrangements  were incorporated  in the  GTAP-DD  model used  in this
study  by creating  two activities  for each  sector.  For sectors covered-or poten-
tially covered-by export  processing arrangements,  one  activity is specialized  in
production  for  export,  and  one  is  specialized  in  production  for  the domestic
market. This separation  is preferable to representations  based  on a single sector
producing  differentiated  products  for  domestic  and export  markets  because  it
allows the two sectors to use different input mixes, and it allows export-oriented
activities to use much more import-intensive  means of production. This provides
a reasonably realistic  depiction of China's trade regime in the 1990s,  when duty
exemptions  were  used  to  facilitate  exports  while  protection  in  the  rest  of the
economy  remained  fairly high.6
The tax arrangements  for export processing (duty and value-added  tax  [VAT]
exemptions  on  imported  intermediate  inputs and  VAT  refunds  on  exports)  dis-
couraged  export-oriented  firms from  using domestic intermediate  materials and
5.  GTAP  is  a  standard  global  applied  general  equilibrium  model  with  perfectly  competitive  markets
and constant  returns  to scale  technology.  The model  represents  consumer  demands  through  a constant
difference of elasticities functional  form and on the supply side  emphasizes  the role of intersectoral factor
mobility in the determination  of sectoral  output. Product differentiation  between imported and domestic
goods  and  among  imports  by  region  of  origin  allows  for  two-way  trade  in  each  product  category,
depending  on the  ease  of  substitution  between  products  from  different  regions.  Land,  capital,  skilled
and  unskilled labor,  and  in  some sectors  a natural resource  factor are  used  in production  and  are fully
employed.
6. In  a deterministic  world, a producer  of exports will always take advantage  of duty exemptions  or
rebates unless the administrative  costs are excessive,  which does not appear  to be the case in China. Many
studies  have  either  ignored  the  problem  or,  as  in  Lejour  (2000),  treated  duty  exemptions  as  simple
reductions  in  initial  tariffs  instead  of  exemptions  on  imports  used  specifically  in  the  production  of
exports.6  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  I8,  NO.  I
selling  in  the  local  market.  Furthermore,  the  vast  majority  of  exports  were
produced  using  imported  intermediates  that  were  either  exempt  from  duties
or  eligible for refunds  on taxes  paid.7 China customs  data for 2000  show that
60  percent  of imports  entered  duty-free,  41  percentage  points  of which  were
imports used for export processing,  13 percent were capital goods, and 6 percent
were  goods in  special  categories,  such  as materials  used  by research  institutes.
Rough  calculations  based  on input-output  information  from  the  GTAP  version
4 database  (McDougall and others 1998)  and data from China customs suggest
that 23  percent  of imports were  used  to produce  for the domestic market  and
only about  3  percent were  used to produce  ordinary exports.8
Intermediate  inputs for domestic  and export-oriented  activities were  initially
estimated by allocating them to each  sector in proportion to sales  in export and
domestic markets.  However,  this  yielded  unsatisfactory  results,  with  the  data-
base  showing much  less  use  of imported  inputs  in the  export  sector than  the
reported  imports  of  duty-free  intermediate  inputs  for  export  production
obtained  from  China  customs  (Li  Yan,  personal  communication).  To  deal
with  this,  increased  use  of imported  intermediates  was  allowed  for in  export
activities  in  accordance  with  the  price  changes  involved  in  providing  duty
exemptions, and the elasticities of substitution between domestic and intermedi-
ate goods  in  the  model.9 This  more  than doubled  the  import  intensity  of the
exporting  activities and reduced  that of the domestically  oriented  activities.
Labor Market Policies
Perhaps the central labor market issue  for the analysis  is the barriers to mobility
between  rural and urban  activities.  Taking  up employment  in an urban  area  is
inhibited by the need to obtain an urban residence  permit (hukou). In addition,
workers  tend to be reluctant  to permanently  cut their ties with the rural  sector
because  it  is not generally  possible to  sell  the  land to which  a rural family  has
usage  rights  (Hussain  2004).  Many  workers  move  temporarily  from  rural  to
urban  areas,  although  restrictions  are  frequently  imposed  on  such movements,
and  social  welfare  benefits  (such  as  health  care  and  schooling  for  children)
7. The  export  processing  arrangements  did  not  prevent  firms  producing  mainly  for  the  domestic
market  from  exporting.  These  firms  produced  exports,  known  as  "ordinary"  exports,  using  mainly
domestic  inputs and only a small portion of duty- or VAT-paid  imported materials  (lanchovichina  2003).
8.  According  to  GTAP  version  4,  14 percent  of imports  were  for  final consumption  and  according to
China's customs  40  percent  of imports  were  ordinary  imports  that were  not duty-exempt.  This  means
that about  26  percent  were  ordinary  imports  used  as  intermediates.  Also  according  to  GTAP  version 4,
China's firms exported  an average  of  10  percent  of their  output,  implying that  only  about 3  percent  of
imports  were  used for production  of ordinary  exports.
9.  The  GTAP  version  5  database  (Dimaranan  and  McDougall  2002)  is  the source  for the  elasticities
of  substitution  between  domestic  and  composite  imported  commodities  in  the  Armington  produc-
tion  structure  of a  sector.  The  values  for  these  elasticities  are  shown  in  column  1 of appendix  table
A.4  in  the  World  Bank  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  version  of  this  article,  available  online  at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/26864_wps3053.pdf.lanchovichina and Martin  7
enjoyed  by  urban  residents  are  typically  not available  to temporary  migrants.
Although  it is sometimes possible to overcome these  problems  by purchasing  an
urban residence permit, this  imposes an additional  cost on migrants from rural
to  urban  areas,  a  group  with  particularly  limited  access  to  capital.  As  in  all
countries,  rural-urban  labor  mobility  is  also  inhibited  by  the  sector-specific
nature of farmers'  human capital  and a reluctance  to cut family ties  by  migra-
tion to urban areas.
The per capita income  of agricultural workers  is only about one-third that of
urban workers  (World  Bank  2002). Not all  of this  difference  can  be attributed
to barriers  to mobility between  rural and urban areas, however.  Urban workers
typically  have  higher  skills,  work  more  intensively,  and  face  higher  costs  of
living than  rural workers  (Sicular  and Zhao  2004).
To  capture  the  effects  of  barriers  to  mobility,  the  model  allows  for  both
imperfect  transformation  between  unskilled  workers  in  agricultural  and
unskilled nonagricultural  employment,  and  an  implicit tax  on nonagricultural
employment.  The  imperfect transformation  is designed  to reflect the substantial
differences  in the  characteristics  of unskilled workers  in rural  and urban areas,
and the ability to transform (at a cost) agricultural  workers into nonagricultural
workers  through training,  experience,  and the  creation  of nonagricultural  jobs
in rural  areas.  The  tax  is  designed  to  reflect  the  pure  policy-induced  barriers
between  rural  and  urban  workers,  such  as  the  requirement  for  a  residence
permit  in  urban  areas  and  the  barriers  to  mobility  created  by the inability  to
sell  farm  land.  It is  specified  as  a  barrier that raises the  cost  of labor to urban
employers,  with  urban workers receiving the tax-inclusive  wage.
The  imperfect  transformation  between  agricultural  and  nonagricultural
workers  is  represented  using  a  constant  elasticity  of  transformation  between
workers  in  agriculture  and  workers  in  other  sectors  in  the  following  simple
manner:
(1)  LNF/LF =  OS(WNF/WF)'.
where  LNF is  the  number  of nonfarm  unskilled  workers,  LF  is  the  number  of
farm  unskilled workers,  a. is  a  constant  term,  WNF and  WF  are  nonfarm  and
farm wages,  and a  is the elasticity  of transformation.  The value of a was set at
1.32,  based on Sicular and Zhao's (2002) estimates  of this parameter.? 0 The  tax
10.  In  a more recent work Sicular  and Zhao  (2004)  estimate the  responsiveness  of rural labor supplv
to changes  in agricultural  returns.  They  present  two  "push"  elasticities-2.67  for  nonagricultural  wage
employment  and  0.24  for  nonagricultural  nonwage  employment.  Focusing  on  the  push elasticity  for
nonagricultural  wage  employment  and testing  the  sensitivity  of the  results bv  replacing  the  elasticity  of
1.32 used  in this  analysis with 2.67  leaves the  aggregate  results  largely  unchanged  (appendix table  A.7,
available  online  at  http://econ.worldbank.org/files/26864  wps3O53.pdf).  The  greater  responsiveness  of
labor movement  implied  by  the  larger elasticity  of transformation  (2.67)  translates  into  better poverty
and inequality outcomes  because  farm wages remain  nearly  unchanged and  an  additional  1 million  farm
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reflecting  pure  policy-induced  barriers  between  rural  and  urban  wages  was
estimated  at 34 percent  by Shi  (2002). Although  there is some  level of unem-
ployment  in  China,  particularly  associated  with  state  enterprise  reform  and
rural-urban  migration,  much  of this unemployment  is  transitional  because  of
the weakness of the social  safety  net (Hussain 2004).  Given the  long-run focus
of the analysis  here, total employment  is treated as exogenous.
II.  TRADE  POLICY  REFORMS
This section examines the implications of trade policy reforms in China and in
its trade  partners  in the years  leading up to accession.
Changes in China's Trade Policies
During the 1990s China made substantial  progress  in reducing the coverage of
nontariff barriers, lowering  tariffs, and abolishing  the trade  distortions created
by the exchange  rate regime.  Lardy  (2002)  estimates  that the number  of tariff
lines  subject to quotas and licenses  fell  from  1,247 in 1992 to 261  in 1999.  By
2001, 257 tariff lines were covered by a combination  of licenses and quotas and
47 by licenses  only, whereas  245  were subject  to designated trading  and 84 to
state  trading.  Tendering  and  other  registration  requirements,  primarily  for
machinery  and  electrical  products,  covered  an additional  120  tariff  lines.  By
2001, nontariff barriers  covered 664 tariff lines, or less than 10 percent of tariff
lines,'1 with over a third of these being subject to designated trading, one of the
less intrusive  forms  of quantitative  restriction  employed  in China.
Data on nontariff barriers  frequency alone may  be misleading because  of the
enormous variations in the importance  of tariff lines. To give some indication of
the potential  importance  of nontariff  barriers,  the  import coverage  of the  key
nontariff  barriers  was  calculated  using  data  on  nontariff  barrier  coverage  of
tariff lines and on import data by tariff line.
The import coverage  of all  nontariff barriers  in China  fell from  32.5 percent  in
1996 (World Bank 1997, p.  15) to 21.6 percent  in 2001  (see appendix table A.2).
Coverage  of  import  licensing  and  quotas  fell  from  18.5  percent  in  1996  to
12.8 percent in 2001, and coverage of state trading from 11 to 9.5 percent  (table 1).
The  import  coverage  of  tendering  requirements  fell  particularly  rapidly,  from
7.4 percent in 1996 to 2.7 percent in 2001.
Oil  was  by  far  the  most  important  import  subject  to  nontariff  barriers,
accounting  for almost half the value of imports subject  to any nontariff barriers
(appendix  table  A.3).  Ferrous  metals,  subject  to  designated  trading  arrange-
ments, were the second most important category.  Imports of oil and oil products
accounted for 84  percent of total imports subject to state  trading.
11.  See appendix table  A.1,  available  in  the World  Bank  Policy Research Working Paper version  of
this article,  accessible  online  at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/26864_wps3053.pdf.lanchovichina and Martin  9
TABLE  1.  Import Coverage of Nontariff  Barriers (%)
Barrier  1996  2001
Licenses  and quotas  18.5  12.8
Tendering  7.4  2.7
Licensing  only  22  0.5
State  trading  I 1.0  9.5
Designated  trading  7.3  6.2
Any  nontariff  barriers  32.5  21.6
No nontariff barriers  67.5  78.4
Total  100  100
Note: For  1996  nontariff  harriers  coverage,  the  trade  weights
used  were for  1992, whereas  for 2001  the trade  weights used were
for 2000.
Souirce: For  1996,  Lardy  (2002);  for  2001,  Mei  Zhen  of the
Ministry  of Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation  during  an
internship  at the World  Bank,  using data  from the  vTo.
The average protective  impact of the complete  set of nontariff barriers in China
was  estimated  (very  crudely)  to  be  9.3  percent  in the  mid-1990s  (World  Bank
1997),  with  most  of  the  protective  effect  arising  from  licensing  and  quota-
constrained  goods.  The  protective  effect  of  these  nontariff  barriers  has  clearly
declined since then because of a number of factors, including the progressive  phase-
out of nontariff barriers,  a standstill on new nontariff barriers during the accession
process, the general wro  prohibition against nontariff barriers  after accession,  and
a  likely reduction  in the  severity  with  which  many  of these  measures  have  been
administered. A simple rule of thumb that protection provided  by nontariff barriers
declines  with their import coverage would suggest that their  protective impact has
fallen to about 5 percent.  But given the large margin of uncertainty associated with
this measure, the analysis here focuses only on tariff liberalization,  implying that the
results  should be taken as a lower bound  to the overall  impact  of liberalization.
The pace  of tariff reform  in China was also rapid during the  1  990s. Although
average  tariffs  were  very  high  in  the  early  1990s,  they  fell sharply  after  1994
(table  2).  A  significant  tariff  reform  in  October  1997  reduced  average  tariffs
well  below 20  percent.  Three  subsequent  reductions  at the beginning  of  1999,
2000,  and  2001  further  reduced  tariffs  on  a  wide  range  of  items.  The  progres-
sive reductions  in tariffs between  1992 and 2001  lowered  average tariffs by two-
thirds,  with  larger  than  average  cuts  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  thereby
ensuring  that  the future  reductions  in  tariffs  required  under  the  WTO  accession
agreement  are  much  smaller  than  the  reductions  occurring  before  accession.
Another important feature of the reforms  has been a substantial reduction  in the
dispersion  of tariff rates-with the  standard deviation  falling from 32.1  percent
in  1992 to  10  percent  in 2001.
Examination of weighted average applied tariffs  for 1995  and 2001  and after
implementation  of the  final  tariff  bindings  agreed  in  the  accession  schedule
suggests  that  substantial  merchandise  trade  liberalization  occurred  in  China10  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  I  8,  NO  I
TABLE  2.  China's Average  Statutory  Tariff Rates (%)
All  products  Primary  products  Manufactures
Year  Simple  Weighted  Simple  Weighted  Simple  Weighted
1992  42.9  40.6  36.2  22.3  44.9  46.5
1993  39.9  38.4  33.3  20.9  41.8  44.0
1994  36.3  35.5  32.1  19.6  37.6  40.6
1996  23.6  22.6  25.4  20.0  23.1  23.2
1997  17.6  18.2  17.9  20.0  17.5  17.8
1998  17.5  18.7  17.9  20.0  17.4  18.5
1999  17.2  14.2  21.8  21.8  16.8  13.4
2000  17.0  14.1  22.4  19.5  16.6  13.3
2001  16.6  12.0  21.6  17.7  16.2  13.0
After  accession  9.8  6.8  13.2  3.6  9.5  6.9
Source: World Bank (1  999, p.  340) to 1998; authors'  calculations  for tariff lines with imports in
1999;  CDS  Consulting  for  protection  data  for  1999-2001;  and  after  accession  data  from  China's
WTO  final offer.  Trade  data come  from COMTRADE.
over the period 1995-2001  (table 3).  Weighted average tariffs dropped substan-
tially  for wheat,  beverages  and  tobacco,  textiles,  apparel,  light manufactures,
petrochemicals,  metals,  automobiles,  and  electronics.  Analysis  by  Huang  and
others  (2004)  suggests  that some  agricultural  commodities  (such  as vegetables
and  fruits,  livestock  and  meat,  and  rice)  faced  negative  protection  in  1995,
generally as a result of restrictions on exports. Protection  on these commodities
rose  (or  negative  protection  fell)  over  the  period  1995-2001.  Accession  is  not
expected  to  lead  to  a  significant  fall  in protection  on  most  agricultural  com-
modities  after  2001.  Import  protection  is  expected  to  remain  unchanged  for
most  commodities except  oilseeds,  sugar,  and dairy products.
Protection  will  continue  to fall  for  all  other  merchandise  commodities,  with
especially  big  cuts  for  processed  food,  beverages  and  tobacco,  automobiles,
electronics,  and  other  manufactures.  Francois  and  Spinanger  (2004)  conclude
that the automobile sector liberalization  will be accompanied  by massive restruc-
turing  to  realize  economies  of scale  and  improve  structural  efficiency,  perhaps
increasing  productivity by 20 percent  during the accession  period (2001-07).)
A key element of China's accession agreement is the abolition  of agricultural
export  subsidies.  This  required  some  significant  changes.  Huang  and  others
(2004) estimate  that there  was a 32 percent  export subsidy  on feedgrains  and
a  10 percent export subsidy  on plant-based  fibers  in 2001  (particularly cotton).
12.  Francois  and  Spinanger  base  their  estimate  of  the  20  percent  productivity  increase  on  the
distribution  of current  plants  in China  and  apply  the  formula  Aln(AC) = CDR  *  Aln(Q),  where  AC  is
average  cost, MC is marginal cost,  Q is the quantity produced, and CDR is the inverse elasticity of scale,
defined  as  CDR = -(AC -MC)/AC,  and  varies  between  0.125  and 0.135  (the  range  of values  found  in
engineering studies).  Then they calculate an average cost index for  the industry.  Assuming  that the index
is 100 at 350,000 units per plant, current plant structure  yields a  cost index  of roughly  120.lanchovichina and Martin  11
TABLE  3.  China's Import Protection  before  and after wro  Accession
(tariff or tariff  equivalent,  %)
China  Taiwan
Product  1995  2001  Postaccession'  1997  2001  Postaccessiona
Agriculture
Rice  -5.0  -3.3  -3.3  2.2  0.0  0.0
Wheat  25.0  12.0  12.0  6.5  6.5  6.5
Feedgrains  20.0  32.0  32.0  1.0  1.0  0.0
Vegetables  and  fruits  -10.0  -4.0  -4.0  35.7  36.9  16.0
Oilseeds  30.0  20.0  3.0  1.8  0.8  0.2
Sugar  44.0  40.0  20.0  21.9  25.8  22.7
Plant-based  fibers  20.0  17.0  20.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Livestock  and  meat  -20.0  -15.0  -15.0  7.5  6.5  4.0
Dairy  30.0  30.0  11.0  16.6  9.3  5.9
Total  4.8  7.6  3.6  9.1  6.9  4.6
Manufacturing
Processed  food  20.1  26.2  9.9  14.9  14.2  9.9
Beverages  and  tobacco  137.2  43.2  15.6  48.1  22.0  13.0
Extractive  industries  3.4  1.0  0.6  5.5  5.5  4.1
Textiles  56.0  21.6  8.9  6.1  6.3  5.6
Apparel  76.1  23.7  14.9  12.8  13.4  11.2
Light manufactures  32.3  12.3  8.4  4.0  4.1  3.4
Petrochemicals  20.2  12.8  7.1  4.2  4.2  2.9
Metals  17.4  8.9  5.7  4.0  3.8  1.5
Automobiles  123.1  28.9  13.8  23.9  21.5  13.3
Electronics  24.4  10.3  2.3  2.9  0.5  0.3
Other manufactures  22.0  12.9  6.6  4.4  3.3  2.1
Total  25.3  13.5  6.9  6.3  5.2  3.5
Total  merchandise  tradeb  24.3  13.3  6.8  6.5  5.2  3.6
Services
Trade  and transport  1.9  1.9  0.9  1.3  1.3  0.7
Construction  13.7  13.7  6.8  5.9  5.9  2.9
Communications  9.2  9.2  4.6  9.2  9.2  4.6
Commercial  services  29.4  29.4  14.7  3.7  3.7  1.9
Other services  24.5  24.5  12.7  7.1  7.1  3.5
Total  10.3  10.3  5.2  3.2  3.2  1.6
'Applied  rates at the end of the implementation  period were estimated as the lesser of the bindings
and 2001 applied rates.  In virtually all  cases the  bindings were  lower than the applied rates.
bEstimates are based  on trade weights  for the respective  years. If trade weights for 2000 at the six-
digit level of the harmonized  system are used, the total weighted  average tariffs in 2001  and 2007 are
12.2 percent in  2001 and 6.3 percent in 2007 for China and 4.5 percent and 3.1  percent  for Taiwan.
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on  agricultural  protection  data  from  Huang  and  others
(2002);  manufacturing  protection  data  from  GTAP  for  1995,  from  CDS  Consulting  for 2001,  and
from  China's  wTo  final  offer  for  protection  after  accession;  and  services  protection  data  from
Francois  and  Spinanger  (2004).
In  addition  to  China's  barriers  on merchandise  trade,  border  measures  and
domestic regulations on domestic service sectors  and trade in these services have
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to  open  its  services  sectors,'  and  critical  services  such  as  telecommunications,
logistics,  and  finance  are  likely  to  benefit  from  inward  foreign  direct investment
and  rising  productivity  as they  are  restructured.  Based  on work  by Francois  and
Spinanger  (2001)  reported  in  Francois and  Spinanger  (2004),  these measures  are
represented  here  as  barriers  to  trade  in  services  expressed  in  ad valorem  terms.
Following Francois and Spinanger  (2004), the impact of accession is represented as
halving the barriers to services trade. Efficiency improvements  in the services sectors
are not modeled because there were no reliable  estimates of the  likely productivity
gains at the time this research was conducted.  4
Chaniges in China's Trade Partizers' Policies
The arrangements  for textiles and clothing are  a particularly important element
of China's  accession.  Unlike  most  other developing  economy exporters,  China
was  excluded from the  liberalizing  elements  of the UJruguay  Round  Agreement
on  Textiles  and  Clothing.  This  means  that  prior  to  accession  China  did  not
benefit  from  the  integration  of textile  and clothing  products  into the  General
Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  (GAFT-)  or  from  the  increases  in quota  growth
rates  provided  for  under  this  agreement.  That  placed  upward  pressure  on the
prices of these quotas in China,  raising the costs of exporters just as  an equiva-
lent export tax would.l 5 Under its  accession agreement,  China  benefited  imme-
diately from the integration  of textiles and  clothing  into the  GATT,  leading to the
abolition of quotas and increases  in quota growth rates  that have occurred since
1994  (WTO  1994).  All quotas  are  to be  phased  out  by 2005.  Importing  econo-
mies  will  be  allowed  to  introduce  special  textile  safeguards  during  the  period
2005-07,  but these will  be effective  for only one  year  at a time.
The  accession  agreement includes  a transitional  product safeguard mechanism
that allows China's trading partners to take safeguard actions  under rules that are
more  permissive  of  protection  than  the  usual  WVTO  safeguard  rules  (Messerlin
2004).  These provisions  have the potential  for introducing  a new form of protec-
tion  against  China.  This potential  danger  needs  to  be  weighed  against  the  sub-
stantial  gains  to China from  her trading  partners  being required  to follow  WTO
rules  in implementing contingent  protection  measures  against China.  For simpli-
city, these gains and losses are assumed  to cancel each other out.
13.  Nlattoo (2004)  argues that  China's commiiitmenits  o*1  services  were  the most comprehensive  ever
made  in the \xTO.
14.  In  a  recent  paper  Mviai  and  others  (2003)  estimiiate  productivity  increases  over  10  years  of
1.8 percent  a year  for the strategic  manlufacturing  industries  and  2.7  percent a  year for  the services  sectors
as  reforms  take place  under \\'To accessioni.
15.  These  quotas are represented  in  the  analysis  as  an  export tax.  In some  cases  the proceeds of this
implicit export tax are  redistributed to quota holders, who may  he quite different from the producers and
exporters  of the  goods.  In  other  cases  the quotas  are  aUctioned,  with  the  quota  rents  accruing  to the
government.  In either case,  the marginal return  froni  additional output of textiles and apparel is net of the
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China's  accession  also triggered  a liberalization  of its partners'  trade policies
toward Taiwan (China) with average  tariffs estimated  to have  fallen  by almost
1.5 percentage points, from 4.5 percent  in 1997 to 3.1 percent in 2001. Taiwan
committed  to  tariff  reductions  on  thousands  of  industrial  and  agricultural
product  lines,  a  phase-out  of tariffs  on  a  number  of products  as  part  of the
Zero-for-Zero  program  of  the  Uruguay  Round,  and  reductions  in  tariffs  on
chemical products  as part of the  Chemical  Harmonization program.  Tariffs  on
the  vast  majority  of  products  related  to  information  technology  were  also
reduced  in  2000  and,  once  WTO  accession  commitments  are  implemented,  the
tariff on electronic products  will  fall to 0.3  percent  (see  table  3).
Taiwan,  China,  made  horizontal  and  sector-specific  commitments  in  the
following  service  sectors:  business,  communication,  construction,  engineering,
distribution,  education,  environmental,  financial,  health,  social,  transport  ser-
vices,  and  tourism  and  recreation.  Following  Francois  and  Spinanger  (2001),
Taiwan's  wTo  accession  commitments  are  represented  here  by  a  halving  of
nontariff barriers  to trade  in services.
III.  EXPERIMENTAL  DESIGN
The impact of accession is evaluated here in the dynamic context of the growth and
structural change expected in China and its trading partners during the period up to
2007, when almost all of the changes associated with accession will have come into
effect.  A baseline  scenario is constructed  under which the economies  of the world
grow and  experience  the  manifold  structural  changes  associated  with economic
growth  up to 2007 (table 4 and appendix table A.6). The GTAP  model includes key
elements,  such  as  changes  in  demand  patterns  as  incomes  rise,  changes  in  the
industrial  structure  associated  with  changes  in  the  stock  of  capital  per  worker,
and changes  in world  prices resulting from changes in world supply and demand,
that allow the model to capture key changes in the world economy over this period.
The  baseline  broadly replicates World Bank projections  for overall growth in each
region and uses projections of factor input growth and a residually determined level
of total factor productivity  growth to ensure consistency  between  the two.
The model considers the effects of the WTO  accession agreement  signed  at the
Doha Ministerial  Meeting  in November  2001  on protection prevailing in 2001.
In addition,  it separately  takes  into  account  the liberalization  in  China  during
1995-2001  because  much of the  liberalization  during the 1990s was influenced
by  China's  desire  to  prepare  for  the  type  of  trade  regime  needed  for  WTro
accession and to establish the credibility of its commitment to an open economy.
These  sharp  reductions  in  protection  are  unlikely  to  have  occurred  without
the  prospect  of  accession  to  wro,  and  they  have  been  locked  in  by  China's
wro  commitments.  Thus  results  are  presented  for  both  the  accession  period
(2001-07) and the entire liberalization  period  (1995-2007).
The analysis  starts with 1995  tariff levels  because  1995 was a  major turning
point  in the negotiations-the  closing  of the door on  China's  attempt to enter14  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  i 8,  NO.  I
TABLE  4.  Projected  Growth  in Factor Inputs and Total  Factor Productivity
in  China's Trading Partners  during  1997-2007  (percent)
Unskilled  Skilled  Manufacturing
Trading partner  Population  labor  labor  Capital  TFP'
North  America  11(1.05)  11(1.08)  12 (1.11)  49  (4.07)  High
Western  Europe  0  (0.03)  -1  (-0.08)  1(0.07)  30 (2.69)  High
Australia  and New  Zealand  10 (0.98)  12 (1.14)  10 (0.99)  55 (4.45)  High
Japan  1(0.06)  -2  (-0.19)  -7  (-0.71)  35  (3.02)  Medium
China  8 (0.81)  13  (1.26)  50 (4.15)  174 (10.62)  High
Taiwan,  China  9  (0.86)  11  (1.05)  14 (1.36)  96  (6.97)  High
Other  newly industrialized  10 (0.93)  -1  (-0.10)  55 (4.47)  88  (6.53)  Medium
countries  in  Asia
Indonesia  16  (1.50)  17  (1.59)  123  (8.36)  25 (2.27)  Low
Vietnam  15  (1.40)  32  (2.79)  36  (3.10)  111  (7.78)  Medium
Other  Southeast  Asia  18  (1.70)  22  (2.04)  134 (8.87)  60 (4.83)  Low
India  18  (1.67)  23  (2.10)  78  (5.92)  88  (6.54)  Medium
Other  South  Asia  25  (2.22)  30 (2.69)  80  (6.06)  72 (5.55)  Medium
Brazil  14 (1.31)  19 (1.77)  72 (5.60)  31  (2.75)  Medium
Other Latin  America  18  (1.68)  6  (0.57)  90  (6.65)  54  j4.42)  Low
Turkey  16 (1.47)  19  (1.75)  107 (7.55)  55  (4.46)  Low
Other  Middle  East  24 (2.16)  37  (3.23)  67 (5.24)  28  (2.50)  Low
and North  Africa
Economies  in transition  -1  (-0.11)  6  (0.56)  9  (0.90)  33  (2.88)  High
South  African  Customs Union  15  (1.39)  31(2.76)  47  (3.92)  34  (2.94)  Low
Other  Sub-Saharan  Africa  30  (2.65)  40  (3.42)  54  (4.42)  38  (3.26)  Medium
Rest  of world  18  (1.63)  23  (2.10)  35  (3.05)  68  (5.32)  Low
Note: Numbers  in  parentheses  are  annual  growth  rates.
a"Low"  corresponds  to average  annual growth  rates of 0.1  percent,  "medium"  to  1.0  percent,
and  "high"  to between  2  percent and 4  percent.  TFP =total  factor  productivity.
Souirce: World  Bank  and GTAP  data.
the world  trading  system  by  resuming  its  status  as  a  contracting  party  to the
GATT.  As  Long  (2000,  p.  43)  emphasized,  China  focused  more  strongly  on
commercial  considerations  after  1995 than  it had  previously-and  its trading
partners  also  strongly  emphasized  the  commercial  aspects  of the  negotiations.
To capture  the implications of WTO  accession,  1997 protection data for China in
the  benchmark  data  (GTAP  version  5)  are adjusted  to  1995  levels to  obtain the
initial  base.16 For Taiwan,  liberalization  is considered  to have  begun  in  1997,
the year  for which tariff data are available  in  GTAP  version  5.
Two experiments are conducted to evaluate the impact of WTO  accession.  The
first  assesses  the  impact of the  fall  in  tariffs  from  1995  to  2001  levels  and the
restructuring  of the automobile sector  accompanying the reductions  in tariffs  on
automobiles  and  automobile  parts during this period.  The  second  assesses  the
16.  This adjustment  was made  with ALTLRTAX  (Malcolm  1998),  so that the consistency  and the shares
in the  GTAP database  would  be  preserved.lanchovichina and Martin  15
impact  of  the  fall  in  tariffs  from  1995  to  postaccession  (2007)  tariff  levels,
liberalization  of the  services  sectors,  continued  restructuring  of the  automobile
sector, removal  of quotas on China's clothing and textiles exports,  and removal
of  China's  agricultural  export  subsidies.  The  productivity  shock  designed  to
capture  the restructuring of the automobile  sector  is proportionate to the  fall in
tariffs  on automobiles  in each  simulation.
The  same  macroeconomic  closure  is  used  for  all  experiments-full  employ-
ment,  I perfect mobility of skilled and  unskilled workers between nonagricultural
sectors,  and perfect mobility of unskilled workers within agriculture.  Based on the
working  assumption  of little  induced  change  in  net international  capital  flows,
trade balances as shares of gross domestic product  (CDP) were fixed for China and
Taiwan.  Although  trade  balances can  be  expected to  vary during the transition,
particularly  if there  are substantial  changes  in foreign  investment  levels,  foreign
investment levels are not determined  within the model. 18
Taxes  lost  because  of  trade  liberalization  are  assumed  to  be  replaced  by  a
uniform,  nondistortionary  consumption  tax affecting  both private  and  govern-
ment  final  consumption  of  all  goods  and  services.  This  hypothetical  tax  is
included  to  ensure  that  any  adverse  impacts  of  trade  reform  on  government
revenues,  and hence on the ability to provide income transfers or public  services,
are allowed  for in the analysis  of impacts of the reform  on households.  Because
the GTAP version  5 database appears  to represent the VAT on domestic production
as  an output  tax,  the  model generates  tax  losses from  the  contraction  of such
industries  as tobacco and alcohol.  These inward-oriented  industries have  higher
VAT  rates  than  export-oriented  sectors,  such  as  apparel,  because  exports  are
exempt  from the VAT.  When the export-oriented  sectors expand,  the net impact
of  WTO  accession  is  a  sharp  contraction  in  tax  revenues.  In  reality,  such  a
contraction  will not be  observed  because  VATS  of the same  magnitude  are levied
on  imports.  To  offset  this  impact,  particularly  in  the  poverty  analysis,  the
consumption  tax had to be adjusted  downward. This was done by first comput-
ing the  consumption  tax that compensates  for the loss in output taxes  (this tax
as a share of the total replacement  tax is equal to the share of the output tax loss
in the total tax losses)  and then adjusting the consumption  tax rate to eliminate
the component  due  to the  change  in output taxes.
To  reflect the  long-run  change  in  the stance  of trade policy,  phased  in  over
many  years,  involved  in  WrTo  accession,  most of  the  analysis  uses  a  standard
long-run  specification,  with capital  and  labor freely  mobile  between  industrial
sectors  and  within  agriculture,  although  there  are  barriers  to  labor  mobility
between rural  and urban  employment.
17.  The  fixed  employment  assumption  may  understate  the  costs  of accession  to some  degree.  Zhai
and Wang  (2002),  who  explore  the impact of W'TO  accession on  migration and unemployment,  conclude
that  structural unemployment  may  rise following China's WX'TO  accession as farmers move to urban  areas.
18.  The  assumption  of  fixed  trade  balance  as  a  share  of  GuM is  required  when  evaluating  welfare
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IV.  ASSESSMENT  OF  CHINA'S  ACCESSION
This section  assesses the impacts of China's  accession to the wTro  on China and
its trading partners.
Impacts on China
The  focus  here  is  on the  impacts  of the  trade  policy  changes  remaining  after
2001  (detailed results for the period before 2001 are presented in appendix table
A.5). A key feature of the period after 2001  concerns the effects  of removing the
quotas on apparel and textiles imposed on China and other developing economy
exporters by major industrial country importers.  These quotas are scheduled for
abolition  in  January  2005  for  all  WTro  members.  Abolition  gives  a  significant
boost  to the  textile  and  apparel  sectors  in  China,  which  had  been  one  of the
countries  most tightly  restricted  by  the  quotas.19 Output  in  these sectors  rises
16  percent  and  employment  57 percent  (table  5).  That  in  turn  stimulates  the
production of plant-based  fibers (mainly cotton), which increases  by 16 percent.
Output and employment in the other agricultural sectors, with the exception of
livestock  and meat, are expected to fall as unskilled agricultural  labor moves into
the  textile  and  apparel  sectors  and unskilled  nonfarm  real  wages  rise  (table  6).
Oilseeds  and sugar  contract  more  than  other  agricultural  sectors  as  a  result of
falling protection. Tariffs on oilseeds fall from 20 percent to 3 percent, and tariffs
on sugar fall from 40 percent to 20 percent. Protection in other agricultural sectors
is  assumed to remain almost unchanged.  The automobile  and electronics  sectors
also  expand  slightly,  creating  employment opportunities,  particularly for skilled
labor.20 Results suggest that approximately  6 million farm workers in China will
leave  their farm jobs as a result of wro  accession  reform after 2001  in pursuit  of
employment in the nonagricultural  sectors.21
For  most  merchandise  goods,  real  wholesale  prices  fall as  a result  of trade
liberalization  after  accession.  Retail  prices  reflect  a  uniform  consumption  tax
increase  of about 1.9 percent levied to compensate  for the loss of tariff revenue.
For some products,  such as beverages  and tobacco,  automobiles,  and sugar, the
fall in real  retail prices  reflects  a larger  than proportionate drop  in protection.
Increased  demand  for  nonagricultural  labor  means  higher  real  nonfarm
wages  and  higher  returns  to  nonagricultural  labor  relative  to  agricultural
19.  This  is  a  consensus  finding  supported  by  lanchovichina  and  Martin  (2001),  Deutsche  Bank
(2001), Wang (2002), and  lanchovichina  and  Walmsley (2003).
20.  The model  underestimates  the potential  expansion  and efficiency  increase  in the  service sectors.
With  its promise  to eliminate over  the next few years, most  restrictions on foreign  entry and ownership,
as  well  as most forms of discrimination against  foreign  firms (Mattoo  2004),  China has set the stage  for
increases  in foreign investment  and productivity  in these  sectors.  This  in turn could lead to much larger
income  gains from  wTo  accession  and larger  increases  in wages  of skilled  workers than shown here  (see
Walmsley  and others  forthcoming).
21.  This estimate  represents the number of "effective"  farm workers likely to migrate from rural to urban
areas  based on employment data for 2000 from Cbina Statistical Yearbook (NBs 2001,  pp.  111-12).lanchovichina and Martin  17
TABLE  5.  Changes  in  China's Key Economic Indicators  after  2001
as  a  Result of wro Accession  (%  unless  otherwise  indicated)
Trade balance  Wholesale  Consumer
Product  Output  Employment  Exports  Imports  (US$ million)  prices  prices
Agriculture
Rice  -2.1  -2.3  6.1  -7.1  64  -0.9  0.9
Wheat  -2.0  -2.3  18.9  -10.1  174  -1.7  0.4
Feedgrains  -2.3  -2.6  -77.8  -2.4  -596  -1.9  1.9
Vegetables  -3.4  -3.7  14.6  -6.3  214  -1.9  -0.1
and  fruits
Oilseeds  -7.9  -8.4  29.8  20.9  -789  -2.8  -4.7
Sugar  -6.5  -7.4  13.9  24.1  -73  -1.9  -3.1
Plant-based  fibers  15.8  16.4  -51.8  7.7  -189  0.1  3.1
Livestock  and  meat  1.3  1.1  15.5  -8.9  837  -1.6  0.2
Dairy  -2.0  -2.4  13.5  23.8  -143  -1.5  0.2
Manufacturing
Processed  food  -5.9  -6.4  11.4  62.6  -3,460  -1.7  -1.8
Beverages  and  -33.0  -33.1  9.7  112.4  -14,222  -1.8  -6.9
tobacco
Extractive  -1.0  -1.3  7.5  -4.4  2,088  -0.7  1.2
industries
Textiles  15.6  15.5  32.7  38.5  -10,366  -1.7  -3.2
Apparel  57.3  56.1  105.8  30.9  49,690  -0.5  -1.9
Light  3.7  3.7  5.9  6.8  1,786  -0.9  0.0
manufacturing
Petrochemicals  -2.3  -2.3  3.1  11.8  -8,810  -0.7  0.8
Metals  -2.1  -2.1  3.7  6.8  -1,893  -0.4  1.3
Automobiles  1.4  -2.2  27.7  24.0  516  -3.9  -4.2
Electronics  0.6  0.4  6.7  6.8  453  -1.3  -1.7
Other  -2.1  -2.2  4.1  18.9  -11,291  -0.5  0.8
manufactures
Services
Trade  and  0.0  0.0  0.8  -0.4  493  -0.2  1.6
transport
Construction  0.9  0.9  2.7  17.5  -436  -0.2  1.7
Communications  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5  10.9  -56  0.1  1.9
Commercial  -2.0  -2.0  -0.4  35.4  -1,749  0.2  1.9
services
Other  services  -1.7  -1.8  1.4  33.6  -1,525  -0.1  1.6
Total  1.0  0.Oa  16.8  17.3  717  -0.7  -0.2
'Reflects  the  fixed labor supply  assumption.
Source: Authors'  simulations with  modified  GTAP  model;  see  details in text.
labor. Removal of protection  on some agricultural sectors additionally  lowers the
attractiveness  of farming and implies  falling returns to farm labor and land.  Real
farm wages fall  0.7 percent, and the real rental price of land falls 5.5 percent. The
decline  in  farm  incomes  and  the  rise  in  the  real  retail  price  of many  nonfarm
products mean that some farmers  may be hurt by w-ro accession.  Nonfarm wages
rise  1.2 percent and skilled labor wages rise 0.8 percent, implying that workers in1  8  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  i  8,  NO.  I
TABLE  6.  Change in  Real Factor  Prices  in China as  a  Result of Accession,
2001-07  (%)
Accession  Accession  Accession  with
with labor  with increase  labor market
Accession  market  in  skill  reform  and increase
Item  alone  reform  only  level  only  in skill  level
Farm unskilled  wages  -0.7  16.8  1.6  19.4
Nonfarm unskilled  wages  1.2  -3.8  2.7  -2.5
Skilled labor  wages  0.8  -1.7  -6.3  -8.7
Rental  price of land  -5.5  -9.7  -6.4  -10.5
Rental  price of capital  1.3  -1.4  0.9  -1.8
Price  of capital goods  -0.9  -3.6  -1.1  -3.9
Migration  from rural  6  28  10  32
to urban jobs  (millions)
National  welfare  10.0  11.0  10.0  11.0
(1997  US$  billion)
Source: Authors'  simulations  with modified  GTAP  model;  see  details in text.
urban centers-and farmers who are able to engage in nonfarm employment-are
more likely to be  better off as a result of WTO  accession.22
Accession  will  make  China  a  much  bigger  player  in world  markets  through
three channels-the rapid growth and structural change of its economy, the liberal-
ization undertaken in preparation  for wro accession, and the liberalization under-
taken after accession in 2001. The liberalization undertaken after 2001 contributes
to an increase in China's share in world exports from 4.4 percent to 7.8 percent on
completion  of accession.  Similarly,  China's  share  in world import  markets  rises
from 5.8 percent in 2001  to 6.4 percent  in 2007. With the removal of textile  and
apparel quotas, apparel exports lead  export expansion  with an increase in export
volume of about  106 percent, followed  by textiles and automobiles.  The dramatic
fall in protection of beverages and tobacco results in imports more than doubling,
followed  by increases  in imports of food products, textiles, agricultural products,
automobile  parts, and commercial  services.
China's total  welfare gain from WTO  accession  is estimated at $40.6 billion per
year (in 1997 dollars), or 2.2 percent of per capita real income  (table 7).23 Most of
22.  High unemployment  due to the restructuring  of state-owned-enterprises,  privatization,  and fierce
competition in China  imply that W'ro  accession may dampen the effect on the wages of unskilled workers.
By assuming full employment,  the  model overestimates  the increase  in wages of workers in the nonfarm
sectors,  underestimates  the  fall  in the  wages  of  farm  workers,  and overestimates  the  increase  in total
welfare.
23.  These  estimates  are in  agreement  with  findings  in lanchovichina  and  Martin  (2001)  and Wang
(2002).  These  are  conservative  estimates  because  they  do  not  reflect  income  increases  resulting  from
trade-  and foreign  direct investment-induced  productivity  gains,  especially  gains associated  with liberal-
ization  of  China's  service  sectors  (Walmsley  and  others  forthcoming).  Transaction  cost  savings  from
developing institutions compatible with an open and modern market could be very large as well, but were
not factored  into the analysis.TABLE  7.  Welfare  Change  and  Sources  of Welfare  Change  as  a Result  of China's  WTO  Accession  (millions of  1997 US$)
Export subsidy  Liberalization  Auto sector
Country or  group  Total,  1995-2007  Tariff cuts  Quota  reductions  reductions  of services  restructuring  Impact  2001-07
North America  6,072  (0.0)  3,207  2,713  24  172  -44  5,259
Western Europe  18,189  (0.2)  9,724  8,285  -51  338  -107  14,200
Australia/New  Zealand  136  (0.0)  175  -47  2  18  -12  152
Japan  5,694  (0.1)  5,522  291  -22  5  -102  2,553
Chinaa  40,552  (2.2)  29,452  2,389  275  1,160  7,276  9,563
Taiwan,  China  2,985 (0.6)  2,300  338  -4  265  85  1,376
Other newly  industrialized  6,831  (0.7)  6,539  -82  -185  49  511  1,456
countries
Indonesia  -408  (-0.2)  -167  -216  -10  1  -16  -310
Vietnam  -453 (-1.4)  -63  -395  0  6  0  -405
Other Southeast  Asia  -585  (-0.1)  -109  -464  -46  16  18  -268
India  -3,357 (-0.4)  -1,087  -2,338  -5  -23  96  -2,999
Other  South Asia  -1,622 (-0.8)  -176  -1,427  -7  1  -12  -1,619
Brazil  -76 (-0.0)  -76  3  4  5  -12  359
Other  Latin America  -32  (-0.0)  59  -171  20  32  29  -36
Turkey  -338 (-0.1)  -50  -295  -2  7  2  -327
Other  Middle East and  368  (0.0)  675  -467  -13  57  116  -365
North Africa
Economies  in  transition  19  (0.0)  318  -321  4  15  3  -185
South African  Customs  Union  78  (0.0)  89  -18  0  5  2  13
Other  Sub-Saharan  Africa  -45 (-0.0)  71  -159  4  15  24  -78
Rest of world  155  (0.0)  330  -210  -15  27  23  -78
World  74,166  56,733  7,409  -27  2,171  7,880  28,261
Note:  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  percentage  changes  in per  capita  utility.  The  impact  for  1995-2001  is  the  difference  between  the  impact  for
1995-2007 and the impact  for 2001-07.
aImpacts  exclude  output tax  losses  because of a compensating  value  added tax  levied  uniformly on  both imported  and domestic  goods.
Souirce: Authors'  simulations with modified  GTAP  model;  see  details  in  text.20  I H}F W 0 RI  D  B ANK  FI ONONI(I(C  RE VIEYEW,  V ()1.  1 8,  N().  I
the  gain  ($31  billion)  was  realized  following  the massive  liberalization  between
1995  and  2001  and  the  ongoing  restructuring  of the  automobile  industry.  The
remaining reforms will lead to an additional  welfare gain of $9.6 billion per year.
The largest  part of this gain in welfare  will come from further merchandise  trade
liberalization  ($4.7 billion,  nearly  half the  $9.6  billion),  followed  by $2.4 billion
(25 percent)  from the removal  of quotas  on textiles  and apparel and $1.2 billion
(12 percent) from services liberalization.  Continuing  automobile sector restructur-
ing will generate  $1.1  billion  (11  percent),  and the removal of agricultural  export
subsidies  will provide  only $275 million  (3 percent)  in additional benefits.
Impacts on Chiina's Trading Partners
Among China's trading partners the largest absolute gains accrue to North Amer-
ica  and the Western Europe, with close  to half of the gains coming  from elimina-
tion  of the  quotas they  impose on China's exports of textiles and clothing-and
thus  elimination  of  the  efficiency  and rent  transfers  to  China.  North America,
Western  Europe,  and  Japan  also  gain  from  China's  cuts  in  protection,  which
increase China's efficiency  as an export supplier and its demand  for their exports.
Taiwan's  welfare  gain from its and China's accession to the WTO is estimated
at  $3.0  billion  per  year-the  second  largest  gain  relative  to  the  size  of the
economy  after  China's  (see  table  6).  About  half of the  gain  ($1.6  billion)  was
realized  as  a  result  of  the  liberalization  in  China  and  in  Taiwan  during
1997-2001.  Remaining  reforms  will  lead to  an estimated  real income  gain of
$1.4  billion a year after 2001.  Other newly industrialized economies  also benefit
from  China's accession.  Most of these  benefits  are associated  with trade liberal-
ization  and removal  of quotas on textile and apparel,  which translate  into gains
from terms  of trade  improvements  after 2001.
The world as a whole  and key  developing  economies  that trade directly  with
China  benefit  from  China's  accession,  but  developing  economies  in  Southeast
Asia,  South Asia,  and  Latin America  that compete with China in third markets
mav lose from the  removal of textile and  apparel quotas after 2001. The losses
will  be  largest for Vietnam-an  economy that is  following  in China's footsteps
and has a similar pattern of comparative advantage  in labor-intensive  products.
The  welfare  loss for Vietnam  is  estimated  as  a  1.4  percent  drop in per capita
income  (see table 7).  The loss to India is estimated  to be considerably  smaller as
a  share  of per capita  income,  at  0.4  percent,  whereas  the percentage  losses to
other countries  are very  small.
V.  COMPLEMENTARY  POLIC.Y  REFORMIS
Although  the overall  impacts of WTo  accession  on China's economy are generally
positive,  there are some  concerns that  declines in real  returns to farm labor may
exacerbate  poverty  in  rural  areas.  Approaches  that  deal  directly  with  these
problems  are  more  likely  to  succeed  than  approaches  that  attempt  to  water
down  China's  trade  policy  reforms.  Two  policy  tools  that  lend  themselveslanchovichina and Martin  21
to analysis within the model framework  used here are relaxation of the barriers to
labor  migration  from  rural  to  urban  areas  and  skills  upgrading  for workers  in
rural areas.
Impact of Reducing the Policy Barriers to Labor Mobility
Abolishing policy  barriers  to labor mobility from rural to urban areas-such  as
residence  permits,  differences  in social  insurance,  and the inability  to sell  agri-
cultural  land-in  conjunction  with  accession  leads  to  a  nearly  17  percent
increase  in real  returns  to rural workers  (see table  6).24  This contrasts  sharply
with the  0.7 percent  reduction  in  real  farm  wages  for  accession  without labor
market  reform.  Rents  to  farmland  would  decline,  with  higher  farm  wages
leaving  a  smaller  residual  return  to  farmland.  Real  urban  unskilled  wages
would  decline  by  an  estimated  3.8  percent.  Clearly,  there  would  be  scope  for
partial  reform  of these  arrangements  that could leave  both  farm  and nonfarm
unskilled workers  better off than  in the  absence  of labor market reform.
These  results  suggest that this  reform would have  significant  impacts on the
number of people  leaving their farm jobs for jobs in the nonfarm sectors  and on
the  industry  composition  of  China's  economy.  Some  28  million  people would
leave  their  farm  jobs  if the  government  removed  the  policy  barriers  to  labor
movement  from  rural  to urban  areas25_several  times  the estimated  6  million
people  who  would  move  as  a  result  of  WTO  accession  reforms  alone  between
2001  and  2007.  The  impact  on the  composition  of Chinese  industrial  output
would also be  substantial  (table  8).  This would allow not only apparel  produc-
tion to expand more but also metals,  automobiles,  electronics,  machinery,  other
manufactures,  and construction,  all  at the  expense  of reductions  in  some  agri-
cultural  sectors.
Impact of an Increase in Skill Level
A key problem facing most rural workers is their low levels  of education.  One way
to get  a sense of the likely impacts of improving  access to education  is to consider
the impact of resultant increases in the skill levels of rural workers on the perform-
ance  of  the  Chinese  economy.  This  experiment  looks  only  at  the  impact  of
improvements  in education  on the skills of rural  workers.  It ignores  any potential
benefits  to rural households  from improvements  in  access to education  for their
children-such as reductions  in school fees-and  any changes  in the government
budget associated  with increases  in government  spending on education. 26
24.  Zhai and Wang  (2002)  obtained similar results  for a combination of \W'TO  accession and full labor
market reform.
25.  Because the tax on nonfarm employment  of 34 percent  represents  a  bundle of policies that act as
a  barrier to rural to urban  migration,  this estimate is representative  of the  likely impact and could change
depending  on the  policy mix the government adopts.
26.  The  model  does  not  track  education  spending  as  a  component  of  the  government  budget
constraint.TABLE  8.  Change  in Output and Employment  in China  as a  Result of WTO  Accession  and Other  Reforms
(percent  change  over the period 2001-07)
Output  Employment
Without  With  With  With  labor  market  Without  With  With  With labor market
biikou  labor  market  increase in  reform  and increase  labor  labor  market  increase  in  reform  and increase
Product  removal  reform  skill  level  in skill  level  market reform  reforn  skill  level  in skill  level
Agriculture
Rice  -2.1  -4.3  -2.4  -4.6  -2.3  -7.4  -3.1  -8.2
Wheat  -2.0  -11.5  -3.3  -12.9  -2.3  -13.3  -3.9  -14.9
Feedgrains  -2.3  -7.8  -3.1  -8.6  -2.6  -9.7  -3.7  -10.6
Vegetables  and  fruits  -3.4  -7.1  -3.9  -7.7  -3.7  -8.9  -4.6  -9.7
Oilseeds  -7.9  -18.4  -9.4  -19.8  -8.4  -20.4  -10.2  -22.0
Sugar  -6.5  -17.1  -8.0  18.4  -7.4  -22.4  -9.6  -24.2
Plant-based  fibers  15.8  12.8  15.1  12.1  16.4  11.6  15.5  10.6
Livestock  and  meat  1.3  -3.3  0.6  -4.0  1.1  -7.0  -0.3  -8.2
Dairy  -2.0  -9.4  -3.1  -10.5  -2.4  -14.4  -4.3  -16.0
i'-)  Maufactturing
Processed  food  -5.9  -13.4  -7.0  -14.5  -6.4  -13.2  -8.9  -15.5
Beverages  and  tobacco  -33.0  -38.7  -33.7  -39.5  -33.1  -37.6  -35.0  -39.5
Extractive  industries  -1.0  0.1  -1.2  -0.1  -1.3  0.2  -1.7  -0.2
Textiles  15.6  14.7  15.3  14.3  15.5  16.8  12.7  14.0
Apparel  57.3  61.4  56.7  60.7  56.1  62.6  52.7  59.1
Light manufacturing  3.7  -6.8  2.1  -8.5  3.7  -5.4  0.1  -8.9
Petrochemicals  -2.3  -1.3  -2.3  -1.2  -2.3  0.7  -4.4  -1.4
Metals  -2.1  0.8  -1.8  1.2  -2.1  2.4  -3.9  0.7
Automobiles  1.4  4.1  1.8  4.4  -2.2  2.3  -4.0  0.5
Electronics  0.6  4.5  1.1  5.1  0.4  6.3  -1.3  4.6
Other manufactures  -2.1  0.3  -1.9  0.6  -2.2  2.2  -4.0  0.3
Services
Trade  and transport  0.0  0.8  0.1  1.0  0.0  3.4  -3.1  0.4
Construction  0.9  2.0  0.9  1.9  0.9  3.4  -1.4  1.0
Communications  -0.5  0.6  -0.3  0.9  -0.5  3.4  -3.0  0.8
Commercial  services  -2.0  -1.4  -1.8  -1.2  -2.0  1.0  -4.7  -1.8
Other services  -1.7  -0.5  -0.9  0.3  -1.8  1.5  -6.2  -2.9
Source: Authors'  simulations with  modified  GTAP  model.Ianchovichina anid Martin  23
An increase in the provision of education  that would  boost the annual growth
rate for skilled labor from 4. 15 percent to 5 percent and would lead to a decline in
the  annual  growth  rates  for  unskilled  labor  from  1.26  percent  to  1.1  percent
was  considered.  This  was  found  to  have  important  impacts  on  the  structure
of the Chinese economy. An increase  in skilled labor leads to a stronger expansion,
or  a  smaller  contraction,  in  the  manufacturing  sectors  that  are  skilled  labor-
intensive  than does accession with labor market reform but no change in education
spending  (table  8).  Metals,  automobiles,  electronics,  and  other  manufactures
all expand.
Although  output  in some  sectors  expands,  the real  wages  of skilled workers
fall  as the  supply  of skilled workers  increases  (see  table  6) and  world prices  of
the  outputs  they  produce  decline.  This  contrasts  with  the  case  of  accession
alone,  which results  in an increase  in the real  wages of skilled  workers.  How-
ever,  the  real  wages  of  generally  much  poorer  unskilled  workers  rise  with
increased  education,  with the wages of unskilled  nonfarm workers  rising  more
than those of unskilled farm workers  (see table 6).  Of course, those who are able
to  transfer  from  agricultural  to  nonagricultural  employment  as  a  result  of
increased  educational  opportunities  are likely  to be  substantially  better off.
Overall,  it  is  clear  that  increased  education  spending  will  generally  induce
propoor  growth  and  decrease  poverty.  It certainly has  the  opportunity  to  sub-
stantially  offset  the  adverse  impacts  on  rural  labor  of the  trade  reforms  asso-
ciated with accession.  Finally, increased  education boosts the need for migration
as  demand  for  unskilled  workers  increases  in  large  urban  areas.  An  estimated
10  million farm  workers  are expected to  exchange  farm jobs for nonfarm ones.
The impact  on consumer  prices  is small-with  falling prices  for  farm products
and rising prices  for manufactured  commodities  (see  table  8).
Impact of Labor Market Reform and an Increase in Skill Levels
The  combination  of removing  labor  market barriers  and  increasing  education
spending creates  the most favorable scenario for unskilled farm labor, leading  to
the largest increase in real  farm wages  (19.4  percent;  see table  6).  Farm output
contracts  more  than  in the case of labor  market  reform alone,  whereas  skilled
labor-intensive  industries such as  metals, automobiles,  electronics,  other manu-
factures,  and  services  expand  more  than  in  the  case  of  labor  market  reform
alone  or increased  education  spending alone  (see table  8).  Under this  scenario,
an  estimated  32  million  farm  workers  would  leave  their farm  jobs  for  jobs  in
urban areas  (see table  6).
These  results  suggest  that  to  generate  propoor  growth  over  the  next
decade,  the government  should  consider  both removing  policy  barriers  to labor
movement  and  changing  the  composition  of  spending  to  favor  education.
Not  only  would  these  policies  facilitate  the  transformation  of  China's  eco-
nomy  toward  services  and high-tech  manufacturing  sectors,  but they  also have
the  potential  to  more  than  offset  any negative  impacts  of accession  on  rural
wages and incomes.24  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  i  8,  NO.  I
VI.  CONCLUSION
The  analysis  suggests  that  the  reforming  economies  and  their  close  trading
partners  will  be  the  biggest  beneficiaries  of accession  to  the  WTO.  China  is
undertaking  the greatest  reform  and will  gain  the most. The  North American
and Western  European  economies  that abolish their  export  quotas  on textiles
and  clothing  and  increase  their  direct  trade  with  China  will  gain the  most  in
absolute terms.  Taiwan  will  benefit substantially,  both  as a consequence  of its
own liberalization  and through strengthened  trade links with China. Japan will
gain  substantially  because  of  increased  export  opportunities  in  China  and
China's increased  competitiveness  as a supplier.  Other industrializing and indus-
trialized  economies  that  are  China's  largest trading  partners  will  also be  sub-
stantial  gainers.
China's WTO  accession  will  have a noticeable  impact on the level and pattern
of  global  trade.  With accession,  China  is  becoming  a  much  bigger  player  in
world markets. Apparel exports will lead China's export expansion,  followed  by
textiles  and  automobiles.  In  addition  to being  an  important  source  of traded
goods,  China  will  become  an  important destination  for other  economies'  pro-
ducts.  Imports  of  beverages  and tobacco  will  more  than double,  followed  by
imports of food products, textiles,  agricultural  products, automobile parts, and
commercial  services.  The expansion of textiles,  light manufactures,  petrochem-
icals,  and  equipment  exports  from Taiwan  will  be  driven  almost  entirely  by
demand for these products in China.
Accession  will  have  important  distributional  consequences  for  China.  The
wages  of skilled  workers  and unskilled  nonfarm  workers  will rise  in  real  terms
and relative to the wages of farm workers. An estimated 6 million people will leave
their farm jobs in pursuit of employment in industry and services.  Real farm wages
and land rental rates will decline. The decline  in farm incomes and the rise in the
real retail prices of many nonfarm products suggest that some farmers may be hurt
by WTO accession  after 2001  (see Chen and Ravallion 2004).
To help offset these adverse impacts on farmers, the Chinese government  might
make  changes  in  its  labor  market  policies.  Abolition  of the  bukou system  and
reform  of the  labor  market  more  generally  would  raise  farm  wages  and allow
28 million people  to migrate to nonfarm jobs in search of a better  life.  It would
lead to an even bigger expansion of the labor-intensive  manufacturing  sector. An
increase  in  skill  levels  would  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  structure  of  the
Chinese economy.  As  the  supply of skilled  workers  increased,  the  real wages of
skilled workers would fall, while the real wages of unskilled workers would rise
with increased  education spending. Thus, on the income side, increased education
spending would induce  propoor growth and decrease  poverty and inequality.
A number  of  caveats  are  important.  The  gains  to  China and  Taiwan  are
probably understated  because tariff aggregation  in the  GTAP  model hides  much
of the  variation  in tariffs  and  the  welfare  gains  from reducing  this  variation
within  the  product  aggregates  used  in the  analyses  (Bach  and  Martin 2001;lanchovicbina and Alartin  2i
Martin and others  forthcoming).  When Bach and  others (1996) adjusted  for this
in  a  partial equilibrium  context,  gains  to China  almost  doubled.  The  analysis
here  assumes flexible wages and full employment.  However,  trade liberalization
and  foreign  competition  may  worsen  unemployment  and  put  downward  pres-
sure  on the wages of unskilled workers in the  short run.  Furthermore,  although
the  analysis  here  improves  on  lanchovichina  and  Martin  (2001),  with  better
treatment  of  the  extent  of  liberalization  in  agriculture  and  services  and  the
changes  in the  automobile  sector,  there  are  still  areas  that have  been  ignored.
One  is  nontariff barriers  in the manufacturing  sectors  other  than the  quotas on
apparel  and  textiles.  Another  is  the  impact  of  accession  on  foreign  direct
investment  and  the  hard-to-measure  efficiency  gains  in  services  that  are  asso-
ciated  with this increased  investment.
Foreign  direct  investment  has contributed  significantly  to China's  economic
growth  and  will  play  an  important  role  as  China  continues  to  reform  its
economy.  wTo  accession  is  likely  to  increase  foreign  direct  investment  in
China,  as  trade  liberalization  improves  returns  to  investment  and  the  liberal-
ization  of  rules  on  investment  eases  financial  flows  into  previously  restricted
sectors  such as  services  and automobile  production.  The substantial  productiv-
ity gaps  between  local  and  foreign  firms  imply  that new  foreign  direct  invest-
ment  will  raise  productivity.2 Walmsley  and  others  (forthcoming)  take  into
account both the impact of foreign  direct investment and increased  productivity
growth  in  services.  They find  that  the  impacts  of accession  are  far larger  than
those predicted  by earlier studies,  including this one, which ignore the  potential
productivity  gains  in  the services  sector and  abstracted  from capital  accumula-
tion  and foreign  investment.
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World Trade  Organization
Shaobua Chen and Martin Ravallion
;
Data from China's national rural  and urban household surveys are used to measure and
explain  the  welfare  impacts  of  changes  in  goods  and  factor  prices  attributable  to
accession to the World Trade Organization.  The price  changes are estimated separately
using  a general  equilibrium  model  to  capture  both direct  and indirect  effects  of the
initial tariff  changes.  The welfare  impacts  are  first-order  approximations  based  on  a
household model incorporating own-production  activities calibrated to household-level
data  and  imposing  minimum  aggregation.  The  results  show  negligible  impacts  on
inequality  and  poverty  in  the  aggregate.  However,  diverse  impacts  emerge  across
household  types  and  regions,  associated  with  heterogeneity  in  consumption  behavior
and income  sources, with  possible  implications  for compensatory  policy responses.
There has been much debate about the welfare impacts of greater trade openness.
Some  argue that external  trade  liberalization  is  beneficial  to the poor in  devel-
oping  economies,  whereas  others  argue  that the  benefits  will  be  captured  by
people who are not poor. Expected  impacts on relative wages (notably between
*  skilled and unskilled labor) and relative prices (such as between food staples and
luxury imports) have figured prominently in debates about the welfare  impacts.
What  does  the  evidence  suggest?  One  might  hope  to  provide  a  conclusive
answer  by  comparing  changes  over  time  in  measures  of inequality  or poverty
between  countries  that are  open to  external  trade  and  those  that  are  not.  A
number  of  attempts  to  throw empirical  light  on  the  welfare  effects  of  trade
liberalization  have  been  made  using  aggregate  cross-country  data  sets  that
combine  survey-based  measures  of  inequality  or  poverty  with  data  on  trade
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openness  and  other  control  variables  (see  Bourguignon  and  Morisson  1990;
Edwards  1997; Barro 2000; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Lundberg  and Squire 2003).
However,  there are reasons  to be cautious in drawing implications from such
cross-country  comparisons.  There  are  concerns  about  data  and  econometric
specifications.  Differences  in  survey  design  and  processing  between  countries
and  over  time  within  countries  can  add  considerable  noise  to  the  measured
levels  and  changes  in  poverty  and  inequality.  It  is  unclear  how  much  power
cross-country  data  sets  have  for  detecting  any  underlying  effects  of  greater
openness  or other  covariates.  There  is  also  the  issue  of whether  trade  volume
can  be treated as exogenous  in these cross-country  regressions;  it is clearly not  a
policy  variable and may  well be  highly correlated with other  (latent) attributes
of  country  performance  independently  of  trade  policy.  The  attribution  of
inequality  impacts  to trade  policy  reforms  themselves  is  clearly  problematic.
The  correlations  (or  their  absence)  found  in cross-country  studies  can also  be
deceptive  because  starting  conditions  can  vary  so  much  between  reforming
countries.  Averaging  across  this  diversity  in  initial conditions  can  readily  hide
systematic  effects  of relevance  to policy  (Ravallion  2001).
In  principle,  such problems  in  cross-country  comparative  work  can be  dealt
with  by better  data  and  methods.  However,  the  concerns go deeper.  Aggregate
inequality or poverty  may not change with trade  reform even  though there are
both  gainers  and  losers  at  all  levels  of living.  Survey  data  tracking  the  same
families  over time  commonly  show  considerable  churning  under  the  surface.1
The  data  show  that  many  people  have  escaped  poverty,  whereas  others  have
fallen  into poverty, even  though the  overall poverty  rate  is unchanged.
Numerous  sources  of such diverse  impacts  can  be found  in  developing  econ-
omy  settings.  For  example,  geographic  disparities  in  access  to  human  and
physical  infrastructure  affect  prospects  for  participating  in  economic  growth.2
For  China,  the  economic  geography  of  poverty  and  how  this  interacts  with
geographic  diversity in  the impacts of policy  reforms  are high on the  domestic
policy  agenda.  A  policy  analysis  that  simply  averaged  over  such  differences
would  miss  a  great deal  of what matters  to the debate  on policy.
This  article  follows  a  different  approach,  in  which  the  attribution  to  trade
policy  changes  is unambiguous  and the diversity  of welfare impacts  is not lost.
The article examines  the welfare  impacts at the household  level of the changes in
commodity and factor prices attributed to a specific trade policy reform, namely,
China's accession  in 2001  to  the World  Trade  Organization  (wro).  For  China,
this  meant  a  sharp  reduction  in  tariffs,  quantitative  restrictions,  and  export
subsidies,  with implications  for the  domestic structure  of prices  and wages  and
thus for household welfare.  Drawing on estimates  by lanchovichina  and Martin
1. Jalan  and  Ravallion  (1998)  report  evidence  of such  churning  using  panel  data  for  rural  China.
Baulch  and Hoddinott  (2000)  review evidence  for  a number of countries.
2. For  China's lagging  poor areas  see jalan and  Ravallion  (2002).Cbest and Ral'allion  3 1
(2002)  of the  impacts  of reform  on prices  (for  both commodities  and  factors
of  production),  the  following  analysis  applies  standard  methods  of  first-order
welfare analysis to measure the gains and losses at the household level using large
sample  surveys collected by  China's National  Bureau of Statistics  (NBS).
I.  MEASURING  THE  WELFARE  IMPACTS  OF  TRADE  REFORM
Previous  approaches  to  studying  the  welfare  impacts  of specific  trade  reforms
have tended to be either partial equilibrium analyses,  which measure household-
level welfare impacts of the direct price changes due to tariff changes using survey
data  (typically)  covering  many  thousands  of  randomly  chosen  households,  or
general  equilibrium  analyses,  which use  a computable general equilibrium  (CGE)
model to capture second-round  responses.- 3 Although partial equilibrium analysis
requires  little or no aggregation  of the primary household  data, it misses poten-
tially important indirect effects on prices and wages. General equilibrium  analy-
sis has the power to capture  these effects by simulating economywide  impacts on
markets.  However,  standard  CGE  models  entail considerable  aggregation  across
household types, with rarely more than six or so representative  households.  Such
models  are crude tools for welfare-distributional  analysis.
The  challenge  for  applied  work  is  to  find  an  approach  that  respects  the
richness  of  detail  available  from  modern  integrated  household  surveys  while
ensuring  that the  price  changes  attributed  to  reform  are  internally  consistent
with economywide  equilibrium conditions.  In principle, the  CGE model could be
built onto the household survey, so that the number of households  in the model
is  the number  sampled in the  survey.4 For this study, that degree of integration
would  require  an  extraordinarily  high  dimensional  CGE  model,  with  85,000
households.  This is  currently  not a  feasible route.
The intermediate  approach  used  here carries the  reform-induced commodity
and factor price changes simulated  from a general equilibrium model to the level
of all the sampled households  in the survey.5 The welfare impacts are measured
using standard  tools of analysis familiar  from prior work  on the welfare  effects
of price  changes  associated  with  tax  and  trade  policy  reform.  This approach
imposes minimal  aggregation  conditions on the survey  data within unavoidable
3.  Examples  of  partial  equilibrium  analysis  of  the  welfare  distributional  effects  of  price  changes
include King (1983),  Deaton  (I1989),  Ravallion  (I 990),  Ravallion and van de Walle  (1991),  and Friedman
and Levinsohn  (2002).  OnI  applications  to tax policy  reform, also see  Newbery and Stern  (1987).  On  CCCE
models see Decaluwve  and MTartens  (  1988)  and Hertel  (  1997).
4.  The  only  known  example  of this full  integration  is  Cockburn  (2002),  who  built a  classic  trade-
focused  CCo model  onto the Nepal  Living Standards  Survey covering  about  3,000 households.
5.  In an antecedent  to the approach  take here, Bourguignon  and others (2003) also take price changes
generated  by  a  (,F  model  to survev  data  (for  Indonesia).  Methodologically,  the main  difference  is that
they generate income impacts at the household  level from  a microeconometric  model of income determi-
nation,  whereas  this study  derives first-order  welfare  impacts  analytically  from  a  standard  competitive
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data limitations. In addition  to calculating  the trade reform's  overall  effects  on
poverty and inequality,  this approach provides  a detailed socioeconomic  map of
impact,  showing  how  it  varies  with  other  nonincome  characteristics,  such  as
location.  This generates  better insights to  the questions policymakers  ask about
who gains  and who loses  from reform.
The  general  equilibrium  analysis  generates  a  set  of price  and  wage  changes.
These  embody both the direct price effects  of the trade policy change and second-
round, indirect  effects  on the  prices of nontraded  goods  and on  factor  returns,
including effects operating through the government's  budget constraint.  lanchovi-
china and Martin (2002) use a competitive  market-clearing model from the Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP).6 The revenue implications of the trade policy change
are reflected in changes  in indirect tax rates.7 Because  the price changes  are based
on an explicit model, their attribution to the trade policy reform  is unambiguous,
thus  avoiding the  identification  problems common  to previous  attempts  to esti-
mate distributional effects of trade policy reform using cross-country comparisons.
The  approach  can  be  outlined  as  follows.  Each  household  has preferences
over consumption  and work effort  (under the  standard assumption  that goods
have  positive  marginal  utilities,  whereas  labor  supply  has  negative  marginal
utility) represented  by the utility function ui(qd, Li), where  qid is an m-dimension
vector  of the  quantities  of commodities  consumed  by household  i and  L,  is  a
vector  of  labor  supplies  by  activity,  including  supply  to  the  household's  own
production  activities.  The  household is  assumed to be free  to choose  qi  and Li
subject to its budget constraint.  Consistently  with the general equilibrium  model
that generated  the  price  and wage  changes,  there  is no rationing  at the  house-
hold level;  for example,  involuntary  unemployment  is ruled  out.
The indirect utility function of household  i is given  by
(1)  ''i[pj,  wi, 7ri]  =  max [u,(q1 L,)  Pq=  wiL, + 7i]
(q,L,)
where p4 1 is the price vector (of dimension m) for consumption,  wv,  is the vector of
wage rates, and it,  is the profit obtained from all household  enterprises as given by
(2)  iri(p,, pd,  'V  ) = max[psq  - p  zi-  wiL7  qs, < f,,(zij,  LL),
j=l  ..,m; Zzij < z,,Eli  < LO]
I  i
where  ps  is  the  m-vector  of  supply  prices,  q'  is  the  corresponding  vector  of
quantities  supplied,  Lo  is the labor input to own-production  activities, of which
II~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Lj°j is used  in producing good j, fj, is the household-specific  production function
6.  Hertel  (1997)  contains descriptions  of the standard  GTAP  model with applications.
7.  A  full  discussion  of  the  assumptions  of  the  general  equilibrium  model  and  the  results  of  its
application to  China's accession  to the  WTro  can  be found  in lanchovichina  and Martin  (2002).Cben and );.'  .ll.  33
for good j (embodying fixed factors), and the zi terms are the commodities  used
as production  inputs, of which  zii  is used in producing good  j.
Measurement  of the welfare  impacts  is  of course  constrained  by the  data,
which do not include  initial  price and wage  levels.8 However,  this data limita-
tion does  not  matter  in  calculating  a  first-order  approximation  to  the welfare
impact in a neighborhood  of the household's optimum. Taking the differentials
of equations  1 and  2  and  using  the  envelope  property  (whereby  the  welfare
impacts  in  a  neighborhood  of an  optimum can  be  evaluated  by  treating  the
quantity  choices  as  given),  the  monetary  value  of  the  change  in  utility  for
household i is given by
(3)  g,-  d  p  Pd,  ps  - P(qi-t+zii)  p  di  E  WkL  W
where  v,j is  the marginal utility  of income for household  i (the multiplier  on the
budget constraint  in equation  (1)  and L'  = L,k  - L'  is the household's  "external"
labor supply to activity k.  (Notice that gains in earnings from labor used in own-
production are exactly matched by the higher cost of this input to own-production.)
Equation  3  is the key formula  used in calculating  the household-level  welfare
impacts  of the price changes  implied  by the  general  equilibrium  analysis  of the
trade  policy  reform.  The  proportionate  changes  in  all  prices  and  wages  are
weighted  by  their corresponding  expenditure  and  income  shares.  The  weight
for the  proportionate change  in the jth selling price  is p',q~,  the revenue  (selling
value) from household  production activities  in sector j. Similarly, - pd(qd  z)
is the  (negative)  weight  for demand  price changes,  and  wkL,k  is the weight  for
changes  in the wage rate for activity k.  The term ps qs - p  ±d(qd  + z,j)  is referred
to  as  net  revenue,  which  (to  a  first-order  approximation)  gives  the  welfare
impact  of an  equiproportionate  increase  in the price  of commodity j.
With the gain (or loss) to each household calculated  based on equation  3, the
covariates  of those gains can now be examined. One covariate of obvious interest
is income,  needed to assess impacts on aggregate poverty and inequality. Ideally,
one  would  use  a  money  metric  of utility  based  on equation  1. However,  that
would require  an explicit model  of the demand and supply system  (that can  be
integrated back to obtain the indirect utility function).  Again, feasibility becomes
an issue  because of the absence  of complete data  on price and  wage levels. Thus
there  is  little  choice but to use income  as the money metric  of utility, in  effect
ignoring  all geographic  differences  in the prices faced  or in the extent to which
border  price  changes  are  passed  on  locally.  However,  we  make  a  seemingly
plausible allowance  for urban-rural  cost of living differences  in this setting.
8. For  food items,  unit values  can  be calculated  (expenditure  divided  by quantitv)  from the  survey
data,  but there is no such option  for food inputs  to production,  nonfood commodities consumed  or used
in production, or wages (the survey data do not include labor supplies  or quantities consumed of nonfood
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Two further limitations of this approach  should be noted.  First, applying the
calculus  in  deriving  equation  3  implicitly  assumes  small  changes  in  prices.
Relaxing  this  requires  more  information  on price  levels  and  the structure  of
the demand  and supply  system.9 This would entail considerable  further  effort,
and  the  reliability  of  the  results  will  be  questionable  given  the  problem  of
incomplete  price  and wage data.
Second,  as already noted and consistent with the general  equilibrium analysis,
this  approach  also  rules  out  rationing  in  commodity  or  factor  markets  or
nonconvexities  in  consumption  or  production.  In  principle,  these  problems
can  also  be  handled through a  completely specified  demand model  (which  can
be  used  to estimate  the  virtual  prices  at which  the  rationed  demand  or  supply
would  be chosen).  This is  not feasible  without data on price  and wage  level.
II.  SETTING  AND  DATA
Although  the  official  date of China's  WTO  accession  is  2001,  it is clear  that the
Chinese  economy  had  already  started  to  adapt  to  this  expected  change  well
before  that  time.  The  trade  reform  can  thus  be  thought  of  as  having  two
stages-a  lead-up  period  in  which  tariffs  started  to  fall  in  anticipation  of
wro  accession  and  the  period  from  2001  onward.  lanchovichina  and  Martin
(2002)  argue  for  1995  as  a plausible  beginning  of  the  lead-up  period.  Their
estimates  of  the  price  changes  induced  by  WTO  accession  for  the  periods
1995-2001  and  2001-07  are  used  in  this  analysis.  Although  the  primary
focus  is  on  the  second  period,  welfare  impacts  are  also  estimated  for  the
lead-up  period.
The measure  of welfare  impacts given  by equation  3  is  calibrated  to survey
data  for  1999, two  years before  official  wro accession  and  a few  years after the
likely beginning of the lead-up  period. The choice of 1999 was partly made  for
data reasons,  because it was the most recent year for which the micro-data were
available.  Choosing  a year  near the middle of the  lead-up period  (rather than a
survey  at  the  beginning  or  end)  should  also  diminish  biases  due  to  any non-
linearity  in the welfare  impacts  of price  and  wage changes.
Survey Data
The survey data used in this study are from the  1999 Urban  Household Survey
and the  1999 Rural Household  Survey by China's NBS.  The  sample size  is 67,900
households  for the rural survey and  16,900 households  (out of the survey total
of 40,000 households) for the urban survey.' 0 Over the past 15 years, the NBS has
worked  to improve  both  surveys,  focusing  on  sample  coverage,  questionnaire
9.  Examples  of this approach can  be found  in King (1983)  and  Ravallion and van de Walle  (1991).
10.  The  full sample of the urban  survey was about 40,000  households,  but until 2002  the central  NBS
office kept  individual  record data  for  only  16,900  households.Cben and Ravallionz  35
design,  methodology,  and  data  processing." 1 The  number  of variables  in  the
surveys has  increased dramatically, with additional details  on income,  expendi-
ture, savings,  housing,  and productivity,  among  others. The  NBS  also  provided
micro-data  for three  provinces  (Liaoning,  Guangdong,  and Sichuan-the  test
provinces).  A  computer  program  to  implement  the  estimation  method  was
written  for  these  data,  after  which  the  program  was  run  by  NBS  staff on  the
entire national  data set.
A number  of problems remain in the  1999  surveys. For a sample  frame,  the
rural survey relies on its sampled counties  from 1985, which may no longer be
representative.  The  urban  survey excludes  rural  migrants, because  the base  of
the sample frame is the  legal registration  system (hukou). As  in other countries,
the  rural survey  gives  data  on the  remittances  of migrant workers,  but it does
not provide  information about the migrant workers themselves,  who (unlike  in
other  countries)  are  not  sampled  in  the  urban  survey  either.  This  makes  it
difficult to measure  impacts through labor mobility and rural-urban  transfers.
Comparisons  between the rural and urban surveys also present problems.  For
example, income  in the rural survey includes  in-kind income (such as from own-
farm  production  and  other  household  enterprises),  but  income  in  the  urban
survey  ignores  some  in-kind  components,  notably  subsidies  from  the  govern-
ment.
Sampling Weights
The  population  census  puts  the  1999  urban  population  share  at  34  percent,
whereas  the sample-based  urban  population  share is 20 percent. To  correct the
rural  and urban  sampling weights,  the  urban population  share  from  the  China
Statistical Yearbook  (NBs  2000)  was  used  to  replace  the survey sample  weights
to form the  national figures.
Matching the Global Trade Analysis Project Model and the Surveys
There  are 57 sectors  in the GTAP model.  The China GTAP  model used in this study
regroups these 57 sectors  into 25: rice, wheat,  feed grains, vegetables  and fruits,
oilseeds,  sugar,  plant-based  fibers,  livestock  and  meat,  dairy,  processed  food,
beverages  and  tobacco,  extractive  industries,  textiles,  apparel,  light manufac-
tures,  petrochemicals,  metals,  automobiles,  electronics,  other  manufactures,
trade  and  transport,  construction,  communications,  commercial  services,  and
other  services.  To  these  are  added  land,  capital,  and  three  types  of  labor  (see
later discussion).
China's rural  and  urban  surveys  have  about 2,000 categories  for consump-
tion and production.  The variables  from the household surveys are matched to
the closest category  in  the GTAP  model.  For example,  corn, millet, and potatoes
11.  For further  discussion  in the context  of the  Rural  Household  Survey,  see  Chen  and  Ravallion
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are  placed  in the  category  feed grains  and cotton  and  fiber  crops  are  placed  in
the category plant-based  fibers.  (The working paper version of this article, Chen
and  Ravallion  2003,  gives  details  on  how  the  variables  from  the  surveys  are
matched  to the GTAP  model  sectors.)
Definitions of Labor and Labor Earnings
The  China  GTAP  model  defines  three  types  of  labor:  unskilled  farm  labor,
unskilled  nonfarm  labor,  and  skilled  nonfarm  labor.'2 Because  the  rural  and
urban  surveys  have  different  questionnaires,  rural and urban labor earnings  are
treated differently.  In the urban survey  three variables-sector,  occupation,  and
education-are  used  to  determine  labor  types.  But  sector or occupation  alone
cannot  indicate  whether  a  person  should  be  classified  as  skilled  labor.  For
example,  the  financial  sector  may hire  some  unskilled  labor  and  the  services
sector  may  hire  some  skilled  labor.  Similarly,  a  train  driver in  the  occupation
category  "workers and staff-members  in production and transportation"  counts
as skilled labor.  Therefore,  education is  also taken  into account. Workers  who
have received  education  at the senior high  school  level  or higher are considered
skilled labor.  Others  are  classified  as  unskilled  labor.
It  is  more  difficult  to determine  the  type  of  labor  income  for  rural  areas.
There  is no information  on how much  each  person  earns  and from what work.
Consequently,  labor earnings  can  be  classified  only roughly  by  income  source.
For instance,  all labor remuneration  from agriculture  is considered  income from
unskilled  farm labor;  earnings from industry  or construction,  grain processing,
and the like are considered  income from unskilled nonfarm  labor; earnings from
the  services sector, transportation  and trade, and the like are  considered  income
from  skilled nonfarm  labor.
Land
Under China's  economic reforms,  which  began  in  1978,  all farmers  have land-
use  rights  but not the right to  sell,  although  they can subcontract  the  allocated
land to other farmers.  Therefore,  the change  in land prices from  the GTAP model
affects  only the value of land rentals paid and  received.
Household Income
For  assessing  the  overall  impacts  on  poverty  and  inequality,  rural  and  urban
households  are combined.  There  is  no cost  of living index  between  urban  and
rural  areas of China. (Urban and rural consumer price indexes are both indexed
to  100  at  the  base  date.)  The  urban  price  level  is assumed  to  be  15  percent
higher  than  the  rural  price  level.  This  differential  is  less  than  that  for  other
12.  By  the International  Labour  Organization's  definitions,  skilled labor consists  of managers  and
administrators,  professionals, and para-professionals,  and uinskilled labor consists of tradespeople, clerks,
salespeople  and personal  service workers, plant and machine operators  and drivers,  laborers,  and related
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developing  economies  because  subsidies  to urban  households  in  China  help
compensate  for  higher housing  and food costs  than in rural  areas.
Income per person is used as the welfare  indicator  (so that all households are
ranked  by  per  capita  income,  from  the  poorest to  the  richest).  This  is  termed
"net income"  in the rural  survey and "disposable  income"  in the urban survey.
Postreform income is then income plus the estimated gain defined by equation 3.
III.  MEASURED  WELFARE  IMPACTS  OF  WTO  ACCESSION
Based on the predicted  relative price and wage changes  from the GTAP model for
1995-2000  (table  1) and  2001-07  (table  2)  and production  and  consumption
shares from the  1999 rural and urban household survey data,  equation 3  can be
used to compute the net gain for each household.  The first panel in table 3  gives
the mean gains for 1995-2001  and 2001-07, split by urban and rural areas. The
second panel gives the Gini indices, both actual (for the baseline year,  1999) and
simulated. The two simulated income distributions are obtained by subtracting
the estimated  gains over  1995-2001  from  the  1999  incomes  at the household
level  and  by  adding  the  household-specific  gains  from 2001-07  to  the  1999
incomes. Thus the first simulation shows the distributional  impact of the price
changes  during the first stage of the trade reform (what the baseline distribution
would have looked like without the reforms) and the second shows the impact of
the post-2001  price changes (how the changes  are expected to affect the baseline
distribution,  looking  forward).  The third  panel  gives  the headcount  index  of
poverty for the  official  poverty  line  based on the poverty lines used by China's
NBS and for the $1/day and $2/day poverty lines from Chen and Ravallion (2001).
There is an overall gain of about  1.5 percent of mean income. All of this gain
is  in  the  period  leading  up  to  wTo  accession.  There  is  almost  no  impact  on
inequality,  either  in  the  period  leading  up  to  WTO  accession  or  predicting
forward. The aggregate  Gini index increased  slightly, from 39.3 percent without
wro  accession to 39.5  percent after accession.
The incidence  of poverty would have been  slightly higher  in 1999 if not for the
trade policy changes  in the lead-up  to wro  accession,  whereas  poverty is predicted
to increase  slightly  during 2001-07 due to the expected  price changes  induced by
the  remaining tariff changes  during that period.  The impacts on rural and urban
poverty  for a  wide range  of poverty  lines can be  seen  in figure  1, which gives  the
cumulative  distributions  of income  for  both  the  baseline  and  the two  simulated
distributions for the poorest 60 percent in rural areas and 40 percent in urban areas.
Although  there  is  virtually  zero  aggregate  impact  when  predicting  forward
from  wro  accession,  the  disaggregated  results  show  a more  nuanced  picture.
The  analysis  focuses  on  three  measures  of impact  at  the  household  level:  the
absolute gain  or loss, gj; the proportionate  gain or loss, g,/yi;  and whether  there
is a gain or not, I(g,), where I is the indicator function. This third measure helps
determine where  there might be high concentrations  of losers in specific areas or
socioeconomic groups.TABLE  1.  Predicted  Price  Changes from  GTAP  Model and per Capita  Net Gain or Loss  for Rural and Urban Households,  1995-2001
Rural  Urban
Expenditures  and  Wholesale  Consumer  Net  revenue  Mean  welfare  Net  revenue  Mean  welfare income sources  prices (%)  prices  (%)  (yuan)  change  (yuan)  (yuan)  change  (yuan)
Expenditures
Rice  0.5  1.5  73.66  0.15  -109.33  -1.64 Wheat  -1.7  -1.5  40.86  -0.74  0.00  0.00 Feedgrains  2.6  10.7  117.04  2.15  0.00  0.00 Vegetables  and  fruits  0.5  1.5  123.41  0.13  -378.69  -5.68 Oilseeds  -0.6  -0.8  37.05  -0.24  -1.04  0.01 Sugar  0.7  1.4  13.74  0.05  -174.06  -2.44 Plant-based  fibers  -3.6  -1.9  36.84  -1.34  (.00  0.00 Livestock  and  meat  2.0  3.1  194.62  2.59  -500.65  -15.52 Dairy  1.5  2.5  2.50  0.02  0.00  0.00 Other  food  1.2  3.1  -81.60  3.39  -343.13  -10.64 Beverages  and  tobacco  -4.6  -7.2  -72.98  5.25  -197.20  14.20 Extractive  industries  -0.2  0.8  17.99  0.44  -173.03  -1.38 Textiles  -5.0  -8.9  -11.08  0.99  -53.50  4.76 Apparel  -2.7  -7.4  -64.13  4.75  -394.30  29.18Light manufacturing  -0.3  -2.5  -16.15  0.40  -82.96  2.07
Petrochemical  industry  -0.7  -0.1  -325.39  0.33  -398.23  0.40
Metals  -0.7  -- 0.1  - 15.30  0.02  -24.02  0.02
Autos  -17.7  -20.4  -52.27  10.66  -37.76  7.70
Electronics  -1.5  -4.0  -24.27  0.97  -162.69  6.51
Other manufactures  -0.6  -0.3  -264.61  0.79  -431.16  1.29
Trade  and transport  0.2  1.3  -18.70  -0.24  -110.53  -1.44
Construction  0.1  1.1  0.00  0.00  -31.11  -0.34
Communication  0.9  1.9  -16.72  -0.32  -152.04  -2.89
Commercial  services  0.8  1.8  -61.37  -1.10  -533.33  -9.60
Other services  0.1  1.1  -414.45  -4.56  -680.99  -7.49
Income souirces
Farm unskilled  labor  1.7  1.7  313.58  5.22  0.00
Nonfarm  unskilled  1.7  1.7  287.19  4.78  1,227.51  20.44
Skilled labor  2.0  2.0  360.87  7.09  3,391.11  66.64
Land  1.3  1.3  17.08  0.22  0.00
Capital  1.3  1.3  21.14  0.27  126.01  0.77
Source:  lanchovichina  and  Martin (2002)  and author's computations  based on  China NBS  1999  Rural Household  Survey  and  1999 Urban Household
Survey.TABLE  2.  Predicted  Price  Changes  from  GTAP  Model  and  per  Capita  Net Gain  or Loss for Rural  and  Urban Households,  2001-07
Rural  Urban
Expenditures  and  Wholesale  Consumer  Net revenue  Mean  welfare  Net  revenue  Mean welfare income  sources  prices  (%)  prices  (%)  (yuan)  change  (yuan)  (yuan)  change  (yuan)
Expenditures
Rice  -1.4  0.7  73.66  -1.39  -109.33  -0.75 Wheat  -1.5  0.7  40.86  -0.92  0.00  0.00 Feedgrains  -3.7  2.1  117.04  -4.90  0.00  0.00 Vegetables  and  fruits  -2.6  -0.6  123.41  -4.02  -378.69  2.24 Oilseeds  -5.7  -5.9  37.05  -2.10  -1.04  0.06 Sugar  -2.8  -3.5  13.74  -0.34  -174.06  6.01 Plant-based  fibers  1.6  4.1  36.84  0.56  0.00  0.00 Livestock  and meat  -1.5  0.7  194.62  -5.21  -500.65  -3.40 Dairy  -2.4  -0.5  2.50  -0.09  0.00  0.00 Other food  -3.1  -2.7  -81.60  2.04  -343.13  9.32 Beverages  and  tobacco  -5.6  -7.7  -72.98  5.62  -197.20  15.09 Extractive  industries  -0.4  1.7  17.99  -0.86  -173.03  -2.92 Textiles  -0.2  -1.5  -11.08  0.17  -53.50  0.82 Apparel  2.6  0.8  -64.13  -0.51  -394.30  -2.98Light manufacturing  -0.6  0.5  -16.15  -0.08  -82.96  -0.43
Petrochemical  industry  -1.1  0.8  -325.39  -2.60  -398.23  -3.19
Metals  --0.6  1.3  -15.30  0.20  -24.02  -0.31
Autos  -3.8  -4.0  -52.27  2.09  -37.76  1.52
Electronics  -1.2  -1.4  -24.27  0.34  -162.69  2.20
Other manufactures  -0.8  0.8  -264.61  -2.12  -431.16  -3.46
Trade  and transport  -0.4  1.7  -18.70  -0.32  -110.53  -1.85
Construction  -0.4  1.7  0.00  0.00  -31.11  -0.52
Communication  -0.4  1.7  -16.72  -0.28  -152.04  -2.54
Commercial  services  -1.1  0.9  -61.37  -0.55  -533.33  -4.72
Other  services  -0.7  1.3  -414.45  -5.39  -680.99  -8.76
Income sources
Farm  unskilled  labor  -0.3  -0.3  .313.58  0.85
Nonfarm  unskilled  1.0  1.0  287.19  2.96  1,227.51  12.64
Skilled labor  0.4  0.4  360.87  1.55  3,391.11  14.58
Land  -4.7  -4.7  17.08  -0.8(
Capital  0.6  0.6  21.14  0.13  126.01  (.80
Souirce: lanchovichina  and Martin  (2002) and  authors'  computations  based  on China  NBS  1999  Rural Household  Survey and 1999 Urban  Household
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TABLE  3.  Summary Statistics  on Aggregate  Welfare  Impacts,  1995-2001
and 2001-07
Item  Rural  Urban  National
Mean gains (yuan per capita)
1995-2001  34.47  94.94  55.49 (1.54%)a
2001-07  -18.07  29.45  -1.54  (  -0.04%)a
Inequality impacts (Gini index as percentage)
Baseline,  1999  33.95  29.72  39.31
Simulated:  Less gains  1995-2001  33.90  29.68  39.27
Simulated:  Plus  gains 2001-07  34.06  29.65  39.53
Poverty impacts (headcount index,  I.  . L  .;. 
Official poverty line
Baseline,  1999  4.38  0.08  2.92
Simulated:  Less  gains  1995-2001  4.56  0.08  3.04
Simulated:  Plus  gains  2001-07  4.57  0.07  3.04
$1/day (1993 purchasing power parity)
Baseline,  1999  10.51  0.29  7.04
Simulated:  Less  gains  1995-2001  10.88  0.28  7.28
Simulated:  Plus gains  2001-07  10.81  0.28  7.23
$2/day (1993 purchasing  power parity)
Baseline,  1999  45.18  4.07  31.20
Simulated:  Less  gains  1995-2001  46.10  4.27  31.88
Simulated:  Plus gains 2001-07  45.83  3.97  31.60
'Percentage  of mean  income.
bOfficial  poverty  line  is  from China  NBS;  $1/day and  $2/day  poverty  lines are from  Chen  and Ravallion  (2001).
Source: Authors'  computations  based  on  China  National  Bureau  of  Statistics  1999  Rural Household  Survey  and  1999  Urban  Household  Survey.
The  results  by  provinces  ranked  by  mean  income  per person  are  plotted  in
figure  2a  for  mean  absolute  gains  (gi  in  yuan  per  capita),  in  figure  2b  for
proportionate  gains  (g,Iyi,  as  a percentage),  and in  figure 2c for the proportion
of  households  that  registered  positive  gains.  (The  average  gain  or  loss  by
province  for urban  and rural  areas and the number of gainers  in each  case are
shown  in  appendix  tables  A.1  and  A.2;  Chen  and  Ravallion  2003  gives  the
province rankings.)
The same results are also plotted in figure  3 against percentiles  of the income
distribution.  So, for example,  to see  the mean  impact in yuan per capita  at the
median income, one looks at the 50th percentile of figure 3a. (Notice that figure 3a
gives the horizontal differences  in figures  I a and l b plotted against the point on the
vertical  axis.)
In  the  aggregate,  about three-quarters  of rural  households  and one-tenth  of
urban  households  will  experience  a  real  income loss.  Farm income  is predicted
to  drop  by  18  yuan  per person,  whereas  urban  income  rises  by  29  yuan  per
person.  The  breakdown  by  sectors  in  table  2  shows  that  the  decline  in  ruralChen and Ravallion  43
FIGURE  1.  (a)  Rural and  (b) Urban Poverty Incidence  Curves
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Soturce: China National  Bureau of  Statistics  and Chen  and Ravallion  2001.
income  is  due  to the  drop  in  wholesale  prices  for  most  farm  products,  plus
higher prices  for education  and health care.  Farmers  will also benefit from the
drop in some consumer  prices and from the increase in nonfarm labor wages. In
urban areas residents  will enjoy lower  prices for most  farm products and higher
wages,  but they  will  also  be  hit by  increases  in  service  fees  for  education  and
health care.
Impacts differ considerably  across  regions  (see figure  2 and appendix tables
A.1  and  A.2).  The  mean  absolute  gains  tend  to  be  highest  in  the  richest
provinces  in both urban and rural  areas  (figure 2a),  though there is  no correla-
tion between the proportionate  gains and mean income of provinces  (figure 2b).
One  spatially  contiguous  region-the  northeast  provinces  of Inner  Mongolia,
Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang-stands out as having the largest  loss from the
reform.  Both  absolute  and  proportionate  impacts  are  highest  in this region-
more  than  90  percent  of farmers  in  Heilongjiang  and  Jilin  are  predicted  to
experience  a net  loss.44  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMI'C  REVIEW,  VOL.  i  8,  NO.  I
FIGURE  2.  (a) Mean Absolute  Gain or Loss  by Province Ranked  by per Capita
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Rural  Household  Survey  and  1999  Urban  Household  Survey.Chen and Ravallion  45
FIGURE  3.  (a) Mean Gain or Loss  by Population Ranked by per Capita Income
Percentile  (Yuan).  (b)  Mean  Percentage  Gain  or  Loss  Ranked  by per  Capita
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Notice  that  these  geographic  differences  in  welfare  impacts  arise  entirely
from differences  in consumption  and  production  behavior.  In  reality,  there  are
also  likely  to  be  differential  impacts  on  local  prices  due  to  transport  or other
impediments  to  internal  trade.  The  analysis  here  does  not  incorporate  such
differences,  and doing  so would  pose a  number  of data  and analytic  problems.
This might, however,  be a fruitful  direction  for future work where the necessary
data on prices  and  wage  levels are  available  by geographic  area.
When  households  are ranked  by initial  income,  there is a notable  difference
between  urban  and rural  households,  with absolute gains  tending  to be  higher
for  higher-income  households  in  urban  areas  but  lower  for  higher-income
households  in  rural  areas  (see  figure  3a).  Nationally  (combining  urban  and
rural  areas with the corrected  weights),  there is the hint of a U-shaped relation-
ship,  but still  with the highest absolute  gains for the rich.
This picture  is reversed  for proportionate  gains, which tend to fall as income
rises  in  urban  areas,  but to  rise  with  income  in rural  areas  and nationally  (see
figure  3b).  In the aggregate the proportion of gainers  rises with income,  a result
that is  driven  by the rise in  the number of gainers  as income  increases  in rural
areas  (see  figure 3c).
IV.  EXPLAINING  THE  INCIDENCE  OF  GAINS  AND  LossEs
The way  the problem  of measuring welfare  impacts was formulated  in section II
allows  utility  and profit  functions  to  vary  between  households  at given  prices.
To  explain  the  heterogeneity  in measured  welfare  impacts,  these  functions  can
instead be supposed  to vary  with observed  household  characteristics.  The indirect
utility function  becomes
(1')~  ~  ~~V  Pi(p  ,IV,,7ri  Vpi  ,wi,7[ij,xIi
where
(2')  7ri = 7 (pi, p,ti,  l  2ix)i
for  vectors  of  characteristics  x1i  and  x2i  that  shift  the  utility  functions  in
equation  1 and the profit functions  in equation 2.  Note that the characteristics
that influence  preferences  over  consumption  (xl,)  are  allowed  to  differ  from
those  that influence  the outputs from  own-production  activities  (x2,).
The  gain  from  the  price  changes  induced  by  trade  reform,  as  given  by
equation  3,  depends  on  the  household's  consumption,  labor  supply,  and pro-
duction choices,  which  in turn  depend on prices and characteristics,  xti and x2 i.
For  example,  households  with  a  higher  proportion  of  children  will  naturally
spend more  on food,  so if the relative  price of food changes,  the welfare  impacts
will  be  correlated  with this  aspect  of household demographics.  Similarly,  thereChen and  Ravallion  47
may be differences  in tastes associated  with stage of the life cycle and education.
There  are also likely to be  systematic  covariates of the composition  of income.
Generically,  the gain can  be written  as
(4)  g, =  g (Pi ,p11,s'xliiX21)
= E  [ppqS ( pd l psitvix2i)  s  - pd [qP (Pi Wt'7rixii) +Z11  (P  P.P,  xv>  P
+Zvk  LLk (piw 117rixii) -L,  (pc,',ps,wjx 2,,)] dk)
Notice that the gain from reform is inherently nonseparable,  in that it cannot be
written  as a function solely  of p,  xi,,  and 7ri because  the gain also  depends on
production  choices.
However,  as noted in section  II, household-specific  wages  and prices  are not
observed,  so  further  assumptions  are  required.  In  explaining  variations  across
households  in the predicted  gains from trade  reform, wage rates are assumed to
be  a  function of prices and characteristics  as lvi = tv(pM,pfx 1,  1 X2i), and differ-
ences in prices  faced are assumed to be adequately captured by a complete  set of
county-level  dummy variables.
Under these assumptions, and the linearization  of equation 4 with an additive
innovation error term, the following regression  model applies  for the gains:
(5)  gl  =  Oixii +  32x2i +  ^ ikDki  + E,
k
where  Dki= 1 if household  i lives in county k and 0 otherwise  and i, is the error
term.
The  characteristics  considered  include  age  and  age  squared  of the  household
head, education and demographic  characteristics,  and land (interpreted as a fixed
factor of production because it is allocated largely by administrative means in rural
China).  Also  included  are  dummy variables  describing  some  key  aspects  of the
occupation and principle sector of employment,  such as whether the household is
a registered  agricultural  household, whether  there is wage employment,  whether
there is state-sector  employment,  and whether there  is participation  in a township
and village  enterprise.  There are endogeneity concerns about these variables,  but
they  appear  to  be  minor  in  this  context,  especially  when  weighed  against  the
concerns  about omitted  variable bias  in estimates  that exclude  these  characteris-
tics. Under the usual assumption that the error term is orthogonal  to these regres-
sors, equation  5  is  estimated  by ordinary  least  squares.  The model  is  estimated
separately  for urban  and rural areas in each of the three test provinces (Liaoning,
Guangdong,  and Sichuan) for which complete micro-data are available.
There  are some differences  in the explanatory variables between  urban (tables
4 and 5) and rural areas (tables 6  and 7).  Results are presented for both absolute4 8  THE  WORLD  BANK  FCONON1IC  RBVILW,  Vol  . I 8,  NO.  I
TABLE  4.  Regression  Results  for  Level  of Gain  (Yuan)  in Rural  Areas
of Three  Provinces,  2001-07
Variable  Liaoning  Guangdong  Sichuan
Log  of household  size  37.642  (6.42)  28.822  (2.64)  4.958  (2.16) Age  of household  head  -2.425  (-3.11)  -1.783  (-2.60)  -0.548  (-1.51) Age of household  head  squared  0.026  (3.36)  0.017  (2.66)  0.005  (1.30) Agriculture  household  -10.942  (-3.31)  -42.850  (-6.45)  -37.723  (-6.54) Number  employees/household  size  12.665  (4.10)  -6.932  (-0.29)  12.652  (3.02) Number  township  and  village  enterprise  10.768  (3.13)  29.466  (3.06)  15.327  (4.26) workers/household  size
Number  of migrant  workers/household  5.399 (1.73)  7.798  (2.35)  7.067  (3.79) size
Area  of cultivated  land  -0.027  (-5.73)  -0.002  (-1.00)  -0.001  (-0.28) Area  of hilly  land  0.000  (-0.05)  -0.001  (-0.87)  0.002  (1.94) Area  of fishpond  land  -0.001  (-0.94)  -0.070  (-2.85)  0.000  (0.04)
Highest education level
Illiterate  or  semi-illiterate  7.926  (1.04)  19.016  (1.25)  8.387  (0.92) Primary  school  0.071  (0,01)  -2.148  (-0.13)  9.694  (1.06) 1M1iddle  school  -0.755  (-0.11)  -4.261  (-0.26)  7.669  (0.84) High  school  2.125  (0.31)  2.806  (0.18)  9.675  (1.03) Technical  school  -3.096  (-0.44)  -36.482  (-1.09)  4.270  (0.38) College  (default)
Labor  force/household  size  0.576  (0.08)  2.877 (0.15)  -4.995 (- 1.16) Children  under  6//household  size  46.999  (2.71)  8.109  (0.35)  -2.291  (-0.45) Children  6-11/household  size  1.414  (0.11)  2.247  (0.10)  -9.011  (-1.50) Children  12-14/household  size  -0.155  (-0.01)  -24.489  (-1.20)  -9.606  (-1.51) Children  15-17/household  size  -2.592  (-0.22)  -23.390  (-1.02)  -5.485  (-0.73) Constant  -17.851  (-0.82)  -17.742  (-0.65)  -17.220  (- 1.43) R
2
0.278  0.116  0.116
Note: Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.
Souirce: Authors'  computations  based  on  China  NBS  1999  Rural  Household  Survey  and  1999 Urban  Household  Survey.
gains  (gi)  and  proportionate  gains  (glIyi).  Recall  that  these  are  averages  across
the impacts  of these characteristics  on  the consumption and production  choices
that determine  the welfare  impact of given  price  and wage  changes.  This  makes
interpretation  difficult.  These  regressions  are  mainly  of descriptive  interest  to
help  isolate  covariates  of potential  relevance  in  thinking  about  compensatory
policy  responses.
For rural  areas,  the results  show  that  the  predicted  gain  from  trade  reform
tends  to  be  larger  for  larger  households  in  all  three  provinces.  There  is  also  a
U-shaped  relationship  with  age  of  the  household  head:  The  gains  reach  a
minimum  around  50  years  of  age  (47  in  Liaoning,  52  in  Guangdong,  55  in
Sichuan).  The gains are  lower  for agricultural  households  and higher for house-
holds with  more  employees and  more township  and village  enterprise  workers,
with  more  migrant  workers,  and  with less  cultivated  land  (though  significant
only in Liaoning).  The only strong demographic  effect  is that younger householdsChen and Ravallion  49
TABLE  5.  Regression  Results  for Percentage  Gains  in Rural Areas
of Three Provinces,  2001-07
Variable  Liaoning  Guangdong  Sichuan
Log of household  size  0.768  (2.46)  0.022 (0.20)  0.030  (0.40)
Age  of household  head  -0.108 (-2.17)  -0.007 (-0.34)  -0.004  (-0.31)
Age of household  head squared  0.001  (2.19)  0.000  (0.40)  0.000  (-0.02)
Agriculture  household  -0.896  (-2.98)  -1.365 (-14.85)  -1.420  (-7.58)
No.  employees/household  size  0.630  (2.76)  0.271  (2.57)  0.444 (3.61)
No.  township  and village  enterprise  0.669  (4.27)  0.585  (4.47)  0.548  (6.11)
workers/household  size
No. migrant workers/household  size  0.655 (3.59)  0.187  (3.59)  0.346  (7.08)
Area  of cultivated  land  0.000 (-1.77)  0.000 (-0.73)  0.000  (-1.61)
Area  of hilly land  0.000  (-0.48)  0.000 (-0.35)  0.000 (2,20)
Area of fishpond land  0.000  (-0.17)  -0.001  (-2.23)  0.000 (0.55)
Highest education level
Illiterate  or semi-illiterate  1.393  (2.18)  0.507  (1.26)  -0.013  (-0.05)
Primary school  -0.634 (-2.01)  -0.154 (-0.90)  0.069 (0.30)
Middle  school  -0.891  (-3.08)  -0.023  (-0.14)  -0.011  (-0.05)
High  school  -0.660  (-2.42)  0.010  (0.06)  0.006  (0.02)
Technical  school  -0.573  (--1.87)  -0.229 (-1.18)  0.038  (0.14)
College  (default)
Labor  force/household  size  0.456  (0.85)  0.323  (1.81)  -0.099 (-0.71)
Children  under  6/household  size  3.730 (3.61)  0.461  (1.49)  -0.169 (-0.78)
Children  6-11/household  size  1.557 (1.41)  0.173  (0.72)  -0.275  (-1.48)
Children  12-14/household  size  1.625  (1.54)  -0.477 (-1.60)  -0.343  (-1.85)
Children  15-17/household  size  1.325 (1.80)  -0.289 (-0.91)  -0.192 (-0.88)
Constant  0.788  (0.69)  -0.709 (-1.39)  -0.584 (-1.68)
R
2 0.108  0.217  0.171
Note: Numbers  in parentheses  are  t-statistics.
Source: Authors'  computations  based  on China  nbs  1999  Rural  Household  Survey and  1999
Urban Household  Survey.
(with  a  higher  proportion  of children  under  age  six)  tend  to  be  gainers  in
Liaoning.  Although  the  results  for the county  dummy  variables are  not shown
(to  save  space),  losses  were  significantly  higher  than  average  in  six counties  in
Liaoning,  seven in Guangdong,  and six in Sichuan. table  8 gives  the mean  losses
in these counties  for agricultural  households.
In urban  areas the gains tend to be higher for smaller households  (except in
Guangdong).  As in rural areas there is a U-shaped pattern (except for Liaoning),
with lowest gains at 66 years  of age in Guangdong  and 51  in Sichuan. Although
there  is  no pattern  in the  relationship  between  education  and  welfare  gains  in
rural  areas,  the  gains  in  urban  areas  tend  to  be  larger  for  less well-educated
households. However, this may be biased by the fact that education was used in
identifying  skilled  labor  (noting that unskilled nonfarm wages are  predicted to
increase  relative  to skilled  labor; see  table  2).  There  are some  signs  of sectoral
effects, though only significantly so in Liaoning, with higher gains for those with
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TABLE  6.  Regression  Results  for  Level  of Gain  (Yuan)  in Urban  Areas of Three Provinces,  2001-07
Variable  Liaoning  Guangdong  Sichuan
Log  of household  size  -5.627 (-1.81)  5.289  (0.27)  -19.441  (-4.09)
Single  household  head  -1.366 (-0.4)  -37.216  (-2.06)  -17.369  (-3.61)
Age  of household head  0.531  (0.92)  5.266  (2.43)  1.542  (2.34)
Age  of household head  squared  -0.001  (-0.24)  -0.040 (-1.8)  -0.015  (-2.22)
Highest education level
(default  is  college)
Primary  school  or lower  13.240  (2.95)  50.434  (2.4)  23.079  (3.11)
Middle  school  19.104  (5.99)  56.659 (3.58)  26.096  (4.34)
High school  5.123  (1.62)  12.053  (0.95)  12.717  (2.39)
Technical  school  11.086  (3.23)  11.075  (0.88)  9.552 (1.62)
College  3.974  (1.26)  3.447 (0.3)  11.013  (2.12)
Sector (default  is government)
Agriculture  -16.310  (-1.22)  -25.590  (-2.23)  17.293  (1.76)
Mining  -14.586 (-3.24)  19.351  (1.13)  -3.851  (-0.53)
Manufacturing  -9.231  (-2.59)  17.773  (1.28)  -4.634 (-1.2)
Utility  9.387  (-1.63)  -10.816  (-0.42)  1.516 (0.13)
Construction  -6.394  (-1.18)  8.622  (0.63)  -4.409  (-0.92)
Geological  prospecting  and  water  -27.422  (-2.62)  20.089  (0.92)  -16.585 (-0.83)
conservancy
Transportation and  6.368 (1.52)  16.525  (1.24)  1.644  (0.25)
telecommunications
Wholesale  and retail  -3.184 (-0.61)  5.664  (0.45)  -1.983  (-0.4)
Banking  and  finance  -5.278  (-0.55)  3.888  (0.3)  9.491  (0.85)
Real  estate  -11.708  (-1.71)  46.192  (1.35)  7.670  (0.37)
Social  services  -5.542  (-1.02)  -4.186  (-0.33)  0.504  (0.1)
Health care  -9.260 (-1.93)  0.683  (0.04)  -1.049 (-0.17)
Education  -7.279 (-1.64)  7.649  (0.46)  -5.219 (-0.87)
Scientific  research  -20.982  (-4.06)  17.882  (1.14)  -7.929 (-0.59)
Other  -7.784  (-1.42)  -24.851  (-0.75)  -7.012  (-0.73)
Type of employer (default  is state-owned)
Collective  owned  -1.927  (-0.76)  11.882  (0.54)  -5.946  (-2.09)
Foreign  company  -3.138  (-0.72)  -10.988  (-1.22)  2.038  (0.31)
Self-employed  4.278  (0.6)  9.448  (0.64)  10.582  (2.08)
Privately  owned  business  -9.587  (-1.41)  -14.823  (-0.99)  -4.601  (-0.57)
Retirees  reemployed  -13.333  (-2.45)  -35.591 (-1.82)  -6.752 (-0.99)
Retirees  -15.569 (-3.66)  -49.442  (-1.91)  -12.218  (-1.95)
Other  -10.350 (-1.36)  -6.568 (-0.34)  -16.796  (-2.06)
Occupation (default  is  retiree)
Engineer  and  technician  10.244  (1.66)  3.479  (0.12)  10.179  (1.49)
Officers  12.747  (2.07)  17.701  (0.64)  10.564  (1.53)
Staff  in commerce  11.742  (2.08)  18.553  (0.65)  12.734  (1.92)
Staff in  services  19.940  (2.54)  3.380  (0.11)  4.057 (0.5)
Worker in manufacturing  17.484  (2.02)  13.151  (0.47)  13.810  (1.86)
Worker  in  transportation  and  21.469  (3.59)  9.637  (0.34)  16.117  (2.35)
telecommunication
Other  15.318  (2.05)  9.810 (0.27)  -6.141  (-0.77)
Constant  -10.744 (-0.77)  -164.442 (-2.43)  -17.611  (-1.1)
R2  0.265  0.131  0.181
Note: Numbers  in  parentheses  are t-statistics.
Source: Authors'  computations  based  on  China  nbs  1999 Rural  Household  Survey and  1999 Urban  Household  Survey.Chen and Ravallion  51
TABLE  7.  Regression  Results  for Percentage  Gains  in Urban Areas  of Three
Provinces,  2110-07
Variable  Liaoning  Guangdong  Sichuan
Log of household  size  0.175  (3.54)  -0.038  (-0.4)  0.036  (0.46)
Single  household head  -0.022  (-0.36)  -0.221  (-2.21)  -0.259  (-3.07)
Age of household head  0.000 (-0.01)  0.033  (2.55)  0.017  (1.53)
Age  of household head  squared  0.000  (0.1)  0.000 (-2.12)  0.000 (-1.46)
Highest education level  (default is  college)
Primary  school or lower  0.524  (6.43)  0.389  (3.7)  0.509  (5.15)
Middle school  0.539  (10.41)  0.583  (7.25)  0.591  (8.27)
High school  0.180  (3.56)  0.095  (1.46)  0.262  (3.83)
Technical  school  0.214  (4.04)  0.076  (1.22)  0.120  (1.79)
College  0.054  (1.04)  0.015  (0.25)  0.125  (2.24)
Sector (default  is government)
Agriculture  -0.079  (-0.32)  0.166  (2.2)  0.338  (2.64)
Mining  0.183  (1.11)  0.346  (3.38)  -0.129  (-1.01)
Manufacturing  -0.015  (-0.27)  0.114  (1.41)  -0.021  (-0.34)
Utility  -0.040 (-0.36)  -0.144 (-1.18)  -0.134  (-0.84)
Construction  0.095  (0.91)  0.109  (1.19)  0.036  (0.51)
Geological  prospecting and water  -0.407 (-3.06)  0.178  (1.03)  -0.228  (-0.53)
conservancy
Transport and  telecommunications  0.206  (2.93)  0.060  (0.79)  -0.036  (-0.4)
Wholesale  and retail  0.060  (0.78)  0.081  (0.99)  -0.015  (-0.18)
Banking and  finance  -0.088 (-0.47)  0.049 (0.53)  0.013  (0.12)
Real estate  -0.108  (-0.91)  0.222  (1.16)  0.106  (0.29)
Social  services  -0.090  (-1.09)  0.065  (0.69)  0.148  (1.37)
Health  care  -0.088  (-1.1)  0.007  (0.06)  -0.124  (-1.49)
Education  -0.057  (-0.75)  0.044  (0.44)  -0.031  (-0.39)
Scientific  research  -0.454  (-4.09)  0.126  (1.11)  -0.082  (-0.73)
Other  0.012  (0.14)  0.034  (0.25)  -0.121  (-0.55)
Type of employer (default  is  state-owned)
Collective  owned  0.053  (1.16)  0.008  (0.08)  0.137  (1.73)
Foreign  company  -0.046  (-0.54)  -0.122 (-2.3)  -0.193  (-2.08)
Self-employed  -0.069  (-0.59)  -0.051  (-0.39)  0.317  (2.46)
Privately  owned business  -0.182  (-1.65)  -0.231  (-1.96)  -0.037  (-0.22)
Retirees  reemployed  -0.302 (-3.39)  -0.242  (-1.41)  -0.177 (-1.32)
Retirees  -0.341  (-4.2)  -0.452 (-2.37)  -0.359  (-3.42)
Other  -0.124 (-1.13)  -0.187 (-1.24)  -0.338 (-1.2)
Occupation (default  is retiree)
Engineer  and technician  -0.015  (-0.14)  -0.141  (-0.69)  -0.036  (-0.29)
Officers  -0.044  (-0.43)  -0.063  (-0.31)  -0.045  (-0.36)
Staff in commerce  0.012  (0.12)  -0.036  (-0.17)  0.029  (0.24)
Staff in services  0.437  (3.08)  0.019  (0.09)  -0.011  (-0.08)
Worker in manufacturing  0.118  (0.82)  0.025  (0.12)  0.091  (0.56)
Worker in transport and telecommunications  0.209  (2.02)  -0.018 (-0.09)  0.130  (1.03)
Other  0.171  (1.33)  -0.069  (-0.27)  -0.636 (-4.2)
Constant  0.172  (0.7)  -0.623  (-1.68)  -0.197  (-0.71)
R2  0.401  0.290  0.359
Note: Numbers  in the parentheses  are t-statistics.
Source: Authors'  computations  based  on  China  nbs  1999  Rural  Household  Survey  and  1999
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TABLE  8.  Average  Impacts  for Agriculture  Households  in  Selected  Counties,
200 1-07
Gain  Provincial  mean
Province  County  identifier  Yuan  %  Yuan  %
Liaoning  -32.34  -1.29
210181  -73.72  -3.07
210212  -145.40  -2.99
210381  -[72.01  -5.57
210921  -57.70  -5.21
211321  -45.58  -3.78
211322  -53.60  -3.23
Guangdong  -29.34  -0.81
440111  -107.31  -2.74
440126  -183.63  -2.64
440223  -102.33  -3.53
440523  -148.90  -2.55
440620  -227.23  -3.11
440621  -109.59  -2.64
441425  -316.49  -5.34
Sichuan  -12.31  -0.67
510121  -130.46  -2.86
510125  -63.19  -3.81
512425  -138.34  -5.71
512610  -52.23  -3.11
512825  -40.44  -2.80
513021  -93.02  -4.07
Note: A  negative sign means a net loss. Agriculture household  means that more than 75 percent of income  is  from  agriculture.
Source: Authors'  computations  hased  on  China  nbs  1999  Rural Household  Survey and  1999 Urban  Hotusehold  Survey.
V.  CONCIUSIONS
In  the  aggregate,  the  analysis finds that China's  trade  reforms have  had  only a
small  impact  on  mean  household  income,  inequality,  and  poverty  incidence.
There is,  however,  a  sizable  (and  at least partly explicable)  variance  in impacts
across  household  characteristics.  Rural  families  tend to lose;  urban households
tend to gain. There are larger impacts  in some provinces than in others,  with the
highest  impacts  in  the northeast  region  of Inner  Mongolia,  Liaoning, Jilin,  and
Heilongjiang,  where  rural  households  are  more  dependent  on  feed  grain  pro-
duction  (for which  falling  prices  are  expected  from  WTO  accession)  than  else-
where  in  China.
Within  rural  or urban  areas  of  a given  province,  the gains from trade reform
vary with  observable household  characteristics.  The most vulnerable households
tend to  be in rural areas,  dependent on agriculture,  with relatively fewer workersChen and Rat'allion  53
and with weak economic links to the outside economy  through migration.  There
are also some strong geographic concentrations  of adverse impacts. For example,
agricultural  households  in  some counties  incur  welfare  losses  of  3-5  percent of
their incomes.
Naturally, the approach  taken here has limitations.  For example, there  may
well be dynamic gains from  greater trade  openness that are not captured  by the
model used to generate the relative price  impacts.  Trade may facilitate  learning
about new technologies  and innovation,  bringing longer-term  gains in produc-
tivity. Trade reform may also come with (and possibly help induce) other policy
reforms,  such as  in factor markets. The approach here has attempted  to capture
only the static welfare  effects  of wro  accession.
A  further  limitation  was  the  need  to  make  linear  approximations  in  the
neighborhood  of an initial  optimum for each  household.  In other applications
this could be deceptive if price or wage changes  are large or if the household was
initially  out of equilibrium,  due  to rationing  (including  involuntary  unemploy-
ment),  for example.  In principle, there  are ways of dealing with these problems
by  estimating  complete  demand  and  supply  systems  that  allow  for  rationing.
This may prove  a fruitful  avenue for future research, though it should be noted
that these  methods  generate  their  own  problems,  such  as  those  arising  from
incomplete  data on price  and wage  levels at household  level.
Despite  these  limitations,  the  type  of approach  followed  here  can  usefully
illuminate  the  range  of  welfare  impacts  to  be  expected  from  economywide
reforms.  By  avoiding  unnecessary  aggregation  of the  primary  household-level
data, these  relatively simple  tools can also offer insights into the sorts of policy
responses  that might  be called  for to compensate  losers from reform.APPENDIX
TABLE  A-1.  Rural Gains and Losses  by Province,  2001-07
Number  Original  Post-wTo
sampled  Number  income  income  Gain or loss  Change  Share  of losers Province  households  gainers  (yuan)  (yuan)  (yuan)  (%)  (%)
Beijing  750  381  4,221.05  4,210.08  --10.96  -0.26  49.20 Tianjin  595  219  3,401.71  3,380.48  -21.22  0.62  63.19 Hebei  4,200  1,310  2,441.50  2,426.82  -14.68  -0.60  68.81 Shanxi  2,100  926  1,772.62  1,765.13  -7.49  0.42  55.90 Inner Mongolia  2,198  206  2,055.49  2,011.26  -44.22  -2.15  90.63 Liaoning  1,886  353  2,501.98  2,469.64  -32.34  1.29  81.28 Jilin  1,598  132  2,260.12  2,210.46  -49.66  -2.20  91.74 Heilongjiang  1,997  115  2,166.59  2,114.18  -52.41  2.42  94.24 Shanghai  600  416  5,409.11  5,428.79  19.68  0.36  30.67 Jiangsu  3,400  1,209  3,495.20  3,486.78  -8.42  0.24  64.44 Zhejiang  2,693  1,148  3,946.44  3,934.92  -11.52  -0.29  57.37 Anhui  3,095  676  1,900.76  1,885.79  -14.97  -0.79  78.16 Fujian  1,750  469  3,091.39  3,071.40  -19.99  -0.65  73.20 Jiangxi  2,450  553  2,129.45  2,117.26  -12.19  -0.57  77.43 Shandong  4,200  822  2,520.76  2,494.89  -25.87  -1.03  80.43 Henan  4,200  828  1,948.36  1,931.70  -16.66  -0.86  80.29Hubei  3,188  755  2,212.71  2,200.04  - 12.68  -0.57  76.32
Hunan  3,700  1,181  2,102.98  2,095.39  -7.60  -0.36  68.08
Guangdong  2,560  514  3,628.95  3,599.61  -29.34  -0.81  79.92
Guangxi  2,310  309  2,048.33  2,025.75  -22.58  -1.10  86.62
Hainan  718  28  2,086.40  2,057.85  -28.55  -1.37  96.10
Chongqing  1,500  404  1,736.63  1,730.20  -6.43  -0.37  73.07
Sichuan  3,998  879  1,843.23  1,830.92  -12.31  -0.67  78.01
Guizhou  2,240  417  1,363.07  1,354.03  -9.04  -0.66  81.38
Yunnan  2,397  399  1,438.34  1,421.34  -17.00  -1.18  83.35
Tibet  480  143  1,309.46  1,307.41  -2.05  -0.16  70.21
Shaanxi  2,217  446  1,456.48  1,442.09  -14.39  -0.99  79.88
Gansu  1,800  479  1,357.28  1,350.34  -6.95  -0.51  73.39
Qinghai  600  135  1,466.67  1,452.61  -14.06  -0.96  77.50
Ningxia  600  108  1,754.15  1,729.05  -25.11  -1.43  82.00
Xinjiang  1,495  312  1,471.11  1,447.57  -23.55  -1.60  79.13
Rural total  67,515  16,272  2,257.15  2,239.08  -18.07  -0.80  75.90
Note: The  ordering  of provinces  is the  traditional  administrative  ordering  as  used  (for example)  in  Chiina Statistical Yearbook  (NBs 2000).
Source: Authors'  computations  based  on  lanchovichina  and  Martini  (2002)  and China  NBS  1999 Rural  Household  Survey  and  1999  Urban Household
Survey.TABLE  A-2.  Urban  Gains  and Losses  by  Province,  2001-07
Number  Original  Post-wro
sampled  Number  income  income  Gain  or loss  Change  Share of losers Province  households  gainers  (yuan)  (yuan)  (yuan)  (%)  (%)
Beijing  500  430  9,388.88  9,431.72  42.84  0.46  14.00 Tianjin  500  451  7,323.57  7,358.47  34.91  0.48  9.80 Hebei  650  591  5,673.46  5,702.35  28.89  0.51  9.08 Shanxi  650  598  4,519.20  4,549.94  30.74  0.68  8.00 Inner  Mongolia  550  495  4,491.87  4,516.19  24.32  0.54  10.00 Liaoning  1000  916  5,257.42  5,285.65  28.23  0.54  8.40 Jilin  700  610  4,630.13  4,650.46  20.33  0.44  12.86 Heilongjiang  1000  887  4,798.92  4,820.50  21.58  0.45  11.30 Shanghai  500  458  10,927.18  10,984.16  56.98  0.52  8.40 Jiangsu  800  723  6,933.07  6,968.78  35.71  0.51  9.63 Zhejiang  550  498  9,044.40  9,098.28  53.87  0.60  9.45 Anhui  500  458  5,159.46  5,190.37  30.91  0.60  8.40 Fujian  550  516  7,521.52  7,569.70  48.18  0.64  6.18 Jiangxi  550  498  4,762.78  4,783.38  20.60  0.43  9.45 Shandong  650  602  5,689.90  5,720.69  30.78  0.54  7.38 Henan  600  565  4,689.43  4,717.89  28.46  0.61  5.83 Hubei  750  619  5,743.18  5,765.29  22.11  0.38  17.47 Hunan  700  612  5,727.42  5,750.43  23.00  0.40  12.57 Guangdong  600  490  10,871.06  10,903.85  32.79  0.30  18.33 Guangxi  600  496  6,011.10  6,033.40  22.30  0.37  17.33 Hainan  200  172  5,766.33  5,787.64  21.31  0.37  14.00 Chongqing  300  239  5,910.18  5,931.90  21.72  0.37  20.33 Sichuan  800  691  5,610.29  5,634.60  24.30  0.43  13.63 Guizhou  450  383  5,324.43  5,347.71  23.27  0.44  14.89 Yunnan  650  566  5,939.69  5,973.23  33.54  0.56  12.92 Tibet  n.a.
Shaanxi  500  427  4,768.99  4,788.25  19.26  0.40  14.60 Gansu  400  372  4,610.86  4,641.27  30.41  0.66  7.00 Qinghai  250  240  3,759.53  3,788.65  29.12  0.77  4.00 Ningxia  200  177  4,472.43  4,493.27  20.84  0.47  11.50 Xinjiang  250  214  5,277.25  5,295.94  18.69  0.35  14.40 Urban total  16,900  14,994  6,046.13  6,075.60  29.45  0.49  11.28
Note: The  ordering  of provinces  is the  traditional  administrative ordering  as used  (for example)  in  China Statistical Yearbook  (NBS  2000).
Source: Authors'  computations  based  on lanchovichina  and  Martin  (2002)  and  China  NBS  1999 Rural  Household  Survey  and  1999 Urban  Household Survey.Cbeo  aind Ravallion  .57
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China and  Its Accession to the
World Trade  Organization
Jikun Huang, Scott Rozelle, and Min Chang
This  article  examines  the impacts  of China's  accession to the  World Trade  Organiza-
tion  (WTO)  on  prices  in  its  agricultural  sector.  The  analysis  uses  a new methodology  to
estimate  nominal  protection  rates in  China's agricultural  sector  before  its accession  to
the  wro.  These  new  measures  account  for  differences  in  commodity  quality  within
China and between China  and world markets. The analysis shows that some  of China's
agricultural  commodities  are  well  above  world  market  prices  and  others  are  well
below.  The  article  also  assesses  market  integration  and  efficiency  in China.  It  finds
high  degrees  of integration  between  coastal  and  inland  markets  and between  regional
and village  markets.  The remarkable  improvements  in market  performance  in recent
years  mean  that if increased  imports  or exports  affect  China's  domestic  price  near the
border,  producers  throughout  most  of China  will feel  the price shifts.
Trade liberalization  affects rural populations in a number of offsetting ways  (OECD
2001).  On  one  hand,  increases  in  the  demand  for  a  nation's  industrial  goods
through  higher  exports  can  increase  the  employment  and  wages  of workers  in
rural areas.  Farmers benefit  from new opportunities  to export  agricultural  goods
and  from  better  access  to more  affordable  inputs.  Rural  consumers  gain  from
access  to  cheaper food.  On  the  other  hand, rising  imports of lower-priced  com-
modities reduce  farm profits, and improved access to export markets raises prices
to domestic consumers  and to producers  that use agricultural goods  as inputs.
Although  all  the  effects  are  important,  trade  officials  concerned  about  the
profitability  of  domestic  producers  are  frequently  interested  in  the  impact  of
trade  liberalization  on  agricultural  prices  (Martin  2001).  Knowing  what  to
expect  is  particularly  important  for  countries  with  many  small  farmers  that
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produce  not  only  for  their  household  but  also  for  commercial  markets.'
Government  officials  know  that  agricultural  price  shifts  can  have  important
effects  on domestic  food production,  farm household  incomes, national poverty
rates,  and overall rural stability.  Thus, in determining positions for trade negotia-
tions, officials  must  solve a  complicated  political  economy equation.
But there  is often confusion about how trade liberalization  will affect  produ-
cer prices.  First, there may be confusion about the level of protection  (or implicit
taxation)  for  individual  commodities.  Studies  sometimes  reach  contradictory
conclusions, with some claiming that a commodity  is being protected and others
that the commodity  is  receiving  negative  protection.2 One  reason  for the  dis-
crepancies  is  shortcomings  in  traditional  methods  of  measuring  distortions.
Studies often  assume  that price  differences  between  domestic  and foreign  pro-
ducts  equal the  tariff rate or calculate  differences  between  an average  domestic
price,  taken  from  surveys,  and  an  average  border  price,  taken  from  trade
statistics.  Such  methods  may  not  capture  the  real  protection  rate  because  of
aggregation  issues and because  (if some prices are from interior areas) transport
costs  are  confounded  with  protection.  Also,  most  analyses  assume  that  trade
liberalization  affects  all prices  in the  same way,  but some internal  markets may
not function well.  In short, the confusion  in the literature  about the real level  of
trade protection  may lie  in the way  researchers  have measured  it.
Second,  the  source  of protection  is  sometimes  unclear  (Garcia  2003).  Trade
negotiations  have  tarrified  most  traditional  quotas  and  reduced  average  tariff
rates.  In  this environment  the main  barriers  to  the flow  of many  agricultural
commodities  are  nontraditional  ones,  such  as  domestic  tax  policies,  export
subsidies,  and tariff rate quotas  (instead of traditional  tariffs  and quotas).
Finally,  studies  on  the  effects  of  trade  liberalization  can  arrive  at  different
answers  if assumptions  about  domestic  market  integration  are  not  considered.
There  is often disagreement  about the effect  of trade liberalization  on subsets of
producers that produce  different commodities, belong to different income groups,
or live  in certain geographical  regions.  For example,  before  the North American
Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA)  there was a concern that reducing Mexico's tariff on
1.  There is also demand for information  about the effect of liberalization  on prices in more developed
economies,  where  producers  exercise  considerable  political  influence.  Although  the  discussion  in  the
article  is cast  in terms of producer  prices,  similar arguments  can  be made  for a  nation with many  poor,
landless rural residents. In that case,  however, officials  are also interested  in the effect of liberalization  on
agricultural  prices, but their concerns would  focus on how such effects would alter the cost of the average
household's consumption  bundle. In countries with large populations of smallholders  (such as China), the
concern  of officials with agricultural prices  is on maintaining producer prices to  keep the income of poor
farmers  from falling.
2.  In China, for example,  some researchers argue that the agricultural impact  of China's World Trade
Organization  accession  will  be  substantial,  with  sharply  lower  prices  adversely  affecting  hundreds  of
millions of farmers (Carter and Estrin 2001; Li and others  1999). Others believe  that the overall  effect on
agricultural  prices  will  be  modest although  there  will  be substantial  impact  on  prices  in  some  specific
areas and for some  specific commodities  (Anderson and Peng  1998; Anderson  and others forthcoming).Huianzg,  f.  I..  and Cha72g  61
maize imports  would  hurt maize  producers,  especially  those  who lived  in poor,
remote  regions  (see  Taylor  1998  for  details  of  the  debate).  Some  researchers
claimed that by lowering maize prices, liberalization would bankrupt these farmers
and force them into the migrant labor force, with many of them eventually entering
the United States  illegally. Others  believed that fragmented markets isolated poor,
small  farmers  in many regions of the nation  from the direct effects  of the  NAFTA-
induced  downward  pressure  on  prices.  Today,  more  than  a  decade  after  NAFTA,
research shows  the importance  of market characteristics  in determining  the effect
of trade liberalization on farm producer  prices.  When commodity markets do not
operate  well  and  there  is poor  integration,  the  effects  of trade  liberalization  on
producer prices  in isolated areas  are greatly  attenuated (Taylor  1998).3
To improve understanding  of how trade liberalizarion  will affect  agricultural
prices  and how price  changes  will  be experienced  in different  parts of country,
this  article  describes  ways to  create  more  accurate,  disaggregated  measures  of
protection  (nominal protection  rates)  that can be used in  two ways. They can  be
used  to  analyze  the  expected  effects  of liberalization  and  identify  remaining
trade  barriers  by matching up different sources  of protection  to  observed  levels
of protection. After liberalization,  they  can be  used to assess the effectiveness  of
policy implementation.  Price determination and market integration analyses are
then  used  to  study  domestic  markets  to  assess  how  price  shifts  at  the  border
arising  from  trade  liberalization  affect  different  producers  in different  parts of
the country.  The  main  contribution of this  study is the way  it combines  a  series
of analytical exercises  to improve understanding  of how trade liberalization  will
affect the  level  of agricultural  prices and  the distribution  of their effects.
The  impact  on  agricultural  prices  of  China's  accession  to  the  World  Trade
Organization  (\'TO) was chosen for study because of the intense interest by officials
and  academics  in  how China's  WTO  agreements  on agriculture  would  affect  the
prices received  by farmers  (RCRE  2000; Huang  and Chen  1999).  China  was  also
selected  because  of the lack of agreement in other studies about how liberalization
will affect farmers. Finally, because  many of China's poor rural  households live  in
remote regions far from the coast and rely more than other groups on income from
cropping,  if China's  markets  were integrated,  poor households  are the most likely
to be affected by liberalizing  measures  (Chen and Ravallion  forthcoming).
This  case  study focuses  only  on the  effects  of WTO  accession  on  agricultural
prices even though other effects  of accession on the rural population  will likely
3.  In  his  case  study,  Taylor  (  1998)  finds  that  the  impacts  of  NAFTA  on  Mexican  farmers  in  border
regions  and those  in more  remote  regions,  who  face  higher tranisaction  costs  for marketing  their output
and  buying inputs,  differ  dramatically.  He  finids  that NAFI.\  has little  impact on those  in  the  poorest  areas
mainly because  they  are  insulated  hy  high transaction  costs.  Because economic activities  in remote areas
are mostly  within  the  household,  village, or township,  the prices  of goods are  determined  locallv and  not
affected  hy what happens far away in the nation's border areas. That  is  not to say that trade liberalization
policies do not affect welfare in  these areas.  But the complicated wa's farmers in these economies  respond
to changes  in prices and marketing  opportunities usually meani  that the effects  are much smaller than they
would  be on  households that  live and  work  in completely  commercialized  economies.62  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  TS,  NO.  I
be at least as important (Zhao and Sicular 2002). The analysis does not quantify
the total welfare  effect,  but rather  considers  the  qualitative  effects  on  China's
farmers  to  illustrate  one  way  of  conceptualizing  the  effects  of  trade  liberal-
ization on agricultural  prices.
The  article  reviews  China's trade  policy  liberalization  before  and  after  WTO
accession, looking at traditional reforms, such as tariffication  and tariff reduction,
and nontraditional  reforms,  such  as taxation  policy, export  subsidies,  and tariff
rate quotas.  It then  describes how the new measures of nominal protection  rates
were  created and examines how these  distortions might change  with WTO  acces-
sion. Finally, it analyzes  the nature of China's agricultural  markets to see how  the
price effects of trade liberalization might affect different types of farm households.
I.  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  AND  REMAINING  DISTORTIONS
IN  AGRICULTURE
Partly  because  of the  vulnerability  of  parts  of  the  rural  economy  and  partly
because  of the prominence  in China's political economy, agriculture  has been at
the  center  of discussions  of China's  entry  into the  WTO.  Yet  the  likely  shifts  in
China's trade policy  and their impacts  on agricultural  prices  are not well under-
stood.  Debates  on  the  future  of China's  agriculture  and  the  price  level  in  the
sector  remain  unresolved.  Some  argue  that  the  agricultural  impact  of  WTO
accession  will  be  substantial  (Carter  and  Estrin  2001;  Li  and  others  1999);
others  disagree  (Anderson  and Peng  1998;  Huang and Anderson  2003).
Traditional  Souirces of Protection
Some  of this  divergence  can  be  traced  to  a  lack  of understanding  of the  policy
changes  that may be induced by China's WTO  accession  (Martin 2001). Tradition-
ally, analysts have focused on the measures most frequently used by other countries
to protect their agricultural sectors. Most previous work (for example,  CARD 2001;
Tuan  and Cheng 1999; and  OECD  2001)  focuses  on tariffs, quotas and licensing,
state  trading,  and traditional  nontariff  barriers.  Some  of these  studies implicitly
assume that WTO  agreements  are concerned  solely  with  these policies,  that these
policies provided most of the protection China  enjoyed before accession,  and that
accession  represents China's initial  assault on protection at the border.
In  fact,  after  nearly  two  decades  of  reform,  some  of the  worst  distortions
caused  by traditional  policies  have  already  disappeared.  In the  late  1970s and
early  1980s,  the  domestic  wholesale  price  of China's  four  major commodities
(rice,  wheat,  maize,  and soybeans),  converted  at  the official exchange  rate,  far
exceeded  the  world price,  measured  at China's  border.  China's main food  and
feed  grain  and  soybean  prices,  for  example,  were  10-92  percent  above  world
market  prices  (table  1).  Over  the  next  15  years  the  nominal  protection  rate
became negative for rice  and fell to around  15-30  percent for wheat and maize.
Intervention  by state traders and the use of nontariff barriers  also gradually  fell
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TABLE  1.  Changes in Nominal  Rates  of Protection  for China's
Major Agricultural  Commodities,  1978-2000  (%)
Period  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Soybeans
1978-79  10  89  92  40
1980-84  9  58  46  44
1985-89  -4  52  37  39
1990-94  -7  30  12  26
1995-97  -1  19  20  24
1998-00  -6  26  32  28
1998  -6  22  40  34
1999  -9  30  33  27
2000  -5  15  33  20
Note: Nominal rates of protection  are measured as the difference  (in percentage  terms) between average  border  prices  and  average  domestic  wholesale  (market)  prices.
Source: Huang  (2001).
Falling protection and  changes in international trade and  domestic marketing
policies  have  resulted  in dramatically  shifting  price  trends  and  trade  patterns.
Depreciation  of  China's  currency  explains  a  big  part  of  China's  changing
protection  during  the  1980s  and  1990s  (Huang  and  Chen  1999).  Huang  and
others (2002)  also trace the changes  in prices following implementation  of trade
liberalization  policies.  Between  1985  and  2000  the  real  price  of  agricultural
commodities  (measured  by  the  agricultural  price  index  divided  by  the  rural
consumer  price  index)  fell  27 percent  (State Price  Bureau various years).
These  policy reforms  led to a large  decline  in price distortions  over the past 20
years.  Current policy reforms  accompanying  China's accession  to the WTO  should
be considered an extension of these past efforts. Much of the falling protection has
come from relaxing licensing procedures,  reducing the scope of nontariff barriers,
reducing tariffs, and tariffying quotas (Huang and Chen 1999). This likely explains
why  so much research  on China's entry into the w«o focuses on these  traditional
policies.  And, as  is argued here,  while nontraditional  policies  may be  even more
important  in  assessing  the  effect  of  trade  liberalization  on  agricultural  prices,
changes  in  China's  tariff  regimes,  state  trading  system,  and  nontariff  barriers
undoubtedly  will  remain  at  least  somewhat  of an  influence  on price  distortions
in China's agriculture.
Nontraditional  Sources of Protection
With many of the gains from  traditional  trade reforms already  achieved,  China
may need other, less discussed policies to push forward  additional trade  liberal-
ization. For example,  China has used tax policy to protect agriculture, especially
for commodities  such as soybeans and barley that have been  most liberalized  in
terms  of traditional  forms  of protection.  In  the  early  1990s,  leaders  radically
revised China's fiscal system, making revenue generation  more reliant on  a value
added tax (Nyberg and Rozelle  1999). A  13-17 percent tax is assessed  on value
added  for  all goods through  all  stages  of their  manufacture  and  sale.64  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONONMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  I  8,  NO.  I
Because  many other countries  do not have  a value-added  tax, national regula-
tions state  (and the wro  allows) that the tax should also apply to imported goods
that are not for immediate  reexport. For a variety of political  and tax collection
reasons, however, farmers were initially exempt from the tax when they sold their
products to traders from their farms or in local markets. When the good is resold in
a downstream wholesale market, the trader owes the tax only on the amount of the
marketing margin, or the difference between the procurement price and sales price.
With marketing margins in China's competitive grain markets at about 5 percent
(ranging between  1 and 10 percent,  according to Xie  2002), the real  value-added
tax rate on domestic agricultural goods is only 5 percent of that of the tax rate on
imported goods (or about 1 percent of the value of the domestic good, compared
with 13 percent  of the value of the imported good).
When  assessed  at the  border  but not at the farm  gate,  the value-added  tax
provides  producers  with rates of protection greater  than the official  tariff rate.
For example, the published  tariff rate on soybeans  is 3  percent.  Theoretically,
then,  soybean  imports  when  they  arrive  at  China's  borders  should  cost  only
3 percent more than China's domestic soybeans.  However,  when soybeans cross
the border,  importers  must  also  pay  a  13  percent  value-added  tax.  Domestic
soybeans,  in contrast,  are  taxed  at  less  than  1 percent  on average.  As  a con-
sequence,  the  use  of  a value-added  tax  at  the  border  gives  China's  soybean
producers  more  than 10  percent of additional  price protection.4
China  also  aggressively  used export  subsidies  in  the years leading  up to  its
accession  to  the  wTo  to  increase  exports  of some  commodities,  thereby  in-
creasing  protection  by  raising  the  price  of  certain  domestic  commodities
(table  2;  Rozelle  2003).  Maize  and  cotton  have  received  the  largest  export
subsidies.  Interviews  in  the  field  during  2001  revealed  that maize  exporters,
especially  in  northeast  China,  received  subsidies  averaging  34 percent  of  the
export price and cotton exporters received  subsidies  averaging  10 percent  of the
export  price.
Although  there  are  no  subsidies  for  meat  exports  (that  is  a  more  difficult
transaction  because there are many meat exporters and most of them are private
or commercialized  public  firms,  unlike maize  and cotton traders that are mostly
associated with formal, public state trading firms), tax policies also favor exporters
of many livestock products.  For example,  when meat producers execute an export
contract, the company can receive a tax rebate.  In 2001  pork and beef exporters
received  a rebate equal to 5.2 percent of the value of their transaction  and poultry
exporters  received  a  13  percent  rebate.  Because  domestic  wholesalers  are  not
eligible for the rebates, such policies encourage traders to export.
4.  Some  scholars  in  China  have  also  pointed  out  that because  part  of  the  value  of  agricultural
commodity  production  derives  from  inputs on which  the value-added  tax  has  been  assessed,  the  real
tax rate on agricultural  commodities is actually higher.  Although this is so, the most that could be added
would  be 2-4 percentage  points  (15  percent times the  share of the inputs that were taxed-about  10-30
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TABLE  2.  Subsidies  and Tax Rebates  for Exports  of
Selected Agricultural Commodities in China, 2001 (%)
Rebate of value-added
Commodity  Export subsidy  tax for exports
Rice  <1  0
Cotton  10  0
Maize  34  0
Pork  0  5.2
Beef  0  5.2
Chicken  0  13.0
Source: Authors'  survey.
In  summary,  then,  as  China  enters  the  wro  there  are  still  a  number  of
challenges  in  liberalizing  its  trade.  In  addition  to  using  traditional  trade  poli-
cies-tariffs,  quotas,  state  trading,  and nontariff  barriers-to  manage  agricul-
tural  prices  in  the  domestic  economy,  China  has  protected  or  may  decide  to
protect  agriculture  with  a  number  of  other policy  measures,  such  as taxation
policy,  export  subsidies,  and  rebates.  China  may  try  to  use  such  policies  to
protect or further  open its agricultural  sector.
II.  NEW  ESTIMATES  OF  CHINA'S  NOMINAL  PROTECTION
RATES  IN  AGRICULTURE
This  section  illustrates  how  to  estimate  nominal  protection  rates  that  avoid
some of the common problems of past estimates and that permit more  accurate
assessment of the impact of China's implementation  of its WTO obligations.  They
show,  in  a  more  disaggregated  way,  the  level  at  which  China  is  protecting
agricultural  commodities  or  parts  of  certain  markets.  Then,  by  aggregating
these  nominal  protection  rates  into  single  crop-specific  rates,  these  estimates
allow  assessment  of  how  these  methods  can  be  compared  with  traditional
methods  of  estimating  nominal  protection  rates.  (The  appendix  summarizes
some of the difficulties  of trying to estimate nominal protection rates for China's
agriculture  using traditional  methods.)
The  new nominal  protection  rates depend  on the collection  of a new type of
data.  Interviews  and  surveys  were  used  to  gather  information  on  prices  of
agricultural  commodities  to identify price  gaps  between  an  imported  good  on
one  side  of the  border  (outside  China)  and  a domestic  good  on the  other  side
(inside  China)  and  between  exportable  domestic  goods  as  they  leave  the
country  and  the  same  goods  from  other  countries  that  are  being  traded  in
international  markets.  Between  August  and  November  2001,  the  survey  team
visited  seven  coastal  cities  (Dalian,  Guangzhou,  Lianyungang,  Ningbo,
Qinghuangdao,  Shanghai,  and  Shenzhen)  and  two  inland  cities  (Beijing  and66  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  I8,  NO.  I
Changchun).5 Information  was  collected  from  samples  of  domestic  traders,
importers and  exporters, wholesalers,  grain and  oilseed  users, trade regulators,
agents,  and  other  grain  and fiber  officials.  More  than  100  people  were  inter-
viewed.6 Less than  10 percent of those contacted  refused to be  interviewed.
The  survey  was  particularly  concerned  with  understanding  price  gaps
between  the  international  and  domestic  markets  of  commodities  in  which
interviewees  were trading or otherwise participating.  The survey recorded char-
acteristics  (qualities,  grades,  varieties)  of  commodities  being  traded  in  the
immediate marketing  area. For imported commodities  interviewees  were asked
about  the  current  international  cost,  insurance,  and  freight  (cif)  price  of  the
good  (for  a  ship  docked  in their  home  port)  and  then  about  what  the  good
would sell for in a competitive  auction. This yielded  a  series of price gaps for a
carefully defined  set of goods.  Because  each interviewee  had  information  on a
number  of commodities,  this process  yielded  several  thousand  observations.  A
similar set of questions was asked  about exportable  goods,  including  rice, fruits
and  vegetables,  and  meat  products.  For  exported  goods  that were  being  sub-
sidized,  interviewees  were  asked  how  much  they  would  lose  if  they  sold  a
shipment  onto  the international  market  without  any  financial assistance  from
the  government.
Disaggregated  Nominal Protection Rates for Selected
Agricultural Commodities
The  analysis  here  illuminates the  problems with traditional nominal  protection
rate  estimates  of a  single  rate of protection  for a commodity  using the typical
types  of secondary  data that are  available  for most  countries.  For example,  it
would  be  difficult  to  provide  just  one  nominal  protection  rate  for wheat  in
China,  one  of  the  world's  largest wheat  importers  over  the  past two  decades
(table 3).  Traders reported that the price of very high-quality wheat from North
America  was  20-50  percent  higher  in  the  domestic  markets  of China's  major
ports than when  it was sitting on a ship in China's port ready to be brought into
5.  Although  Beijing  and  Changchun  are  inland  cities,  firms  from  the  two  areas  are  still  actively
engaged  in international  and domestic  trade.  The  prices  that they  quote used  the  same basis  as those
quoted by  firms  from the coast.
6.  Because  of the absence  of  a single  central  authority  that manages  grain  flows,  the  enumeration
team chose  their  sample  by  first visiting  the local  grain  bureau in each area to obtain  a list of the firms
that  they  were  running  on  a  commercial  basis  and  their  subsidiaries.  Officials  in the  grain  marketing
division and transportation  division were  interviewed.  Three firms owned by the grain bureau and three
affiliated  with the grain bureau  were  selected.  In several cities, the grain bureau had  a list of large  grain-
trading  and grain-using firms  (such as mills and feed  lots). In others,  lists were obtained from the market
administration bureau. Five  firms were  chosen on the basis that they were private and had yearly sales of
more  than  1  million  yuan.  Representatives  of  at  least  two  flour  or  rice  mills  and  feed  mills  in  each
location  were  interviewed.  Five  stalls  at  the  wholesale  market  were  randomly  chosen  for  interviews.
Questions  about the  grain trade  were  asked  at a number  of other entities, such  as  the grain reserve,  the
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TABLE  3.  Disaggregated  Nominal  Protection  Rates for Selected  Agricultural
Commodities  in  China,  October 2001
Comparable  Border price
domestic  price  per ton
per ton  (US$)
Commodity  and  Nominal  protection
variety  Yuan  US$  cif  fob  rate  (D)
Rice
Weighted  average  - - - -
Thai  jasmine  rice  3,690  446  380  - 17
High-quality  japonica  2,930  354  - 398  -11
Medium-quality  indica  1,519  184  - 185  -0.5
Wheat
Weighted  average  - - - - 12
U.S.  DNS  2,350  284  190  - 49
Canadian  number  3  1,800  218  181  - 20
Australian soft  1,625  196  175  - 12
U.S.  hard red  1,550  187  169  - 11
U.K.  1,350  163  145  - 12
China  high  quality  1,350  163  145  - 12
China  medium quality  1,250  151  140  - 8
China  low quality  1,100  133  133  - -0.1
Sovbeans
Common  varietv  1,950  236  205  - 15
Maize
Common  variety  1,150  139  - 105  32
Note: Estimated  at the official exchange  rate  of 8.28 yuan  to the U.S. dollar.-,  not available.
Soutrce: Authors'  survey.
the country. More precisely,  if a ton of imported Canadian number 3  hard white
wheat were  costlessly  brought  across  the border  and  auctioned  off in  China's
domestic  market  in  October  2001,  the  competitive  bid  price  would  have  been
20.5 percent  higher on  average than  the international  price  on a  cif basis.  This
price  gap  would  imply  that  China's  protection  rate  is  high,  and  that if  China
were  to open  its  markets completely  domestic  wheat prices  would fall and  the
import volume would  rise.
Interviewees  were  quick  to  point  out, however,  that they did not think  that
even  with  open  markets  China's  overall  wheat price  would  fall  anywhere  near
50 percent  (even if there  were  no effect  on the world price-they  were  not con-
sidering the impact of China's imports  on the world  price).  They noted  that the
market for  baking-quality  wheat,  the main use  for hard  white wheat from North
America,  is  small  in China,  at most only several million  metric  tons.  Few wheat
users in China outside those who demanded  flour for making cakes,  pastries, and
high-quality  breads  would  use  this  type  of wheat  even  if were  available  at  a
cheaper  price.  On  the supply  side  only a  small  group  of farmers  and processors
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If these supply and demand dynamics are  accurate,  this would mean that even
in a  world  free  of trade  restrictions,  imports  of hard  white  wheat would con-
tinue only until demand  for that variety was met and the domestic price  fell to
international  levels. Most of the production  of that variety  of wheat would shift
outside of China,  but because  of the limited  demand for  such wheat varieties,
only  the  small  number  of  domestic  farmers  who  had  been  producing  these
varieties  at  the  trade  barrier-protected  price  would  have  to  abandon  their
production  following  liberalization.  Moreover,  in this  specific  case-one  with
few domestic suppliers  and little  or no substitution of baking-quality  wheat for
other  domestic  uses-there  should  be  only  a  small  price  impact  on  other
domestic  wheat  producers.  In short,  growers  of the high-quality  wheat would
lose;  they  would  either  have  to  keep  growing  at  a  lower  price  or  switch  to
another  wheat variety  or some  other crop.  The  overall  price  impact  would  be
minimal,  however,  because  such  specialized  wheat  varieties  fill such  a special
niche and the quantities  involved  are small.
Although  not  as  extreme  as  the  case  for  North  American  baking-quality
wheat,  traders  reported  arbitrage  possibilities  in  other  wheat  markets  (see
table  3).  With  a  remarkable  degree  of  consistency,  the  cif  price  of medium-
quality  wheat  imports  from  Australia,  the United  Kingdom,  and  the  United
States  (hard  red)  was  reported  to  be  10  percent  lower  than  the  price  that
interviewees  believed  the  same  wheat  would  command  in  China's  domestic
market.  Used  for  more  common  breads,  cheaper  pastries,  and  high-quality
noodles,  this  wheat  accounted  for  an  estimated  10-15  percent  of  China's
wheat  demand,  according  to  interviewees.  However,  unlike  the  case  for  the
highest-quality  baking  wheat,  there  was  more  production  in  China.  During
2001  domestic  producers  supplied  most  of this  quality  of  wheat  to  China's
wheat  market,  enjoying  protection  provided  by  state  trading  or  the  value-
added  tax  policy  (a  13  percent  tax  is  enough  to  keep  these  varieties  from
being competitive  inside  China's domestic market).7
Finally,  China's  medium-quality  wheat,  by  far  the  biggest  part  of  China's
production  (estimated to be  more than 60 percent)  appears at most to be only
marginally  protected  (see  table  3).  Interviewees  believed  if  China's  medium-
quality wheat were  sold on the international market in late 2001,  it would sell at
a discount of about 8 percent.  In other words, if international traders could ship
this  quality  of wheat  to  China,  which  they  have  not done  to  date, it would
command  a  premium  of  8 percent.  Because  this wheat  constitutes  the  largest
7.  In  China's domestic  market, medium-quality wheat from  international  markets  was considered  to
be equal  to high-quality  wheat  from  China's  domestic  suppliers.  Interestingly,  evidence  that medium-
quality wheat on international  markets  is  the same  as high-quality  wheat supplied  by China's  farmers is
found in the answer  to the question asked of interviewees:  "If China's  higher-quality wheat were sold on
international  markets,  how  much loss  would a  trader incur?"  This rate,  10 percent,  was almost exactly
the  same  as  the  premium  importers  would  make  from  bringing  in  medium-quality  grain  from  the
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part  of China's  wheat  crop,  a  price  gap  of this  size  would  likely  mean  that
China's accession to the WTO would  lead to imports of this type of wheat  (in the
absence of a value-added  tax or  other nontariff barrier).
China's  lowest-quality  wheat  (about  10-15  percent  of its  harvest)  is at  the
world's  feed wheat price.  China did export some  feed  wheat into international
markets in 2001  (mostly  to Asia,  according  to an interview).  Similar  differences
in the  size  of the  price  gap among  varieties  of a  single  type  of commodity  are
found  for rice,  though not for soybeans  and maize,  which  are more homogen-
eous products  (see table  3).
New Nominal Protection  Rates and Sources of Protection for
Agricultural Commodities
Although there are differences  among  major types  of any  individual agricultural
commodity, more traditional  aggregate  nominal  protection rates can be created
by weighting  the  rates  by sown  area  for crops or production  shares for meats
(table 4).  When the individual  nominal  protection rates in table  3  are weighted
by their  area  shares,  wheat,  for example,  has an aggregate  nominal  protection
rate of 12 percent.  Rice,  on the other hand,  is implicitly taxed at 3 percent.  The
aggregate  figures,  though  helpful  (especially  for  analysis  that is  disaggregated
only to the crop level),  provide much less insight about which groups of farmers
in which  areas producing  which  varieties  will  be  hurt or helped  if trade liberal-
ization were to reduce trade-related  distortions.
TABLE  4.  Average Nominal  Protection  Rates for Major Imports  and
Exports  in China,  October 2001
Domestic  price  Nominal protection
Commodity  (yuan  per ton)  rate  (o/o)
Imports'
Wheatb  1,250  12
Soybeans  1,950  15
Cotton  9,500  17
Sugar  2,612  40
Exportsa
Riceb  1,954  -3
Maizeb  1,150  32
Porkh  11,442  -30
Beefh  13,743  -10
Poultryb  9,904  -17
Fresh  fruit  5,472  -4
almports  commodities  are  compared  with  international  prices  cif  China,  and  exports  are
compared with  international  prices  fob,  China.
bAverage  nominal  protection  rates  are  created  by  summing  the  nominal  protection  rates  of
individual  varieties  weighting  by  share  of area  sown  (production).
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For  commodities  with  fewer  quality  differences  (such  as  maize,  soybeans,
sugar, and cotton to a lesser extent), the aggregate  measures have more inherent
interest.  Maize  and  soybeans  are  rarely  consumed  directly  (unlike  rice  and
wheat,  which  are  staple  food  grains  that  are  sensitive  to  human  tastes  and
preferences)  and  are  used  mostly  as  a  feed  or are  otherwise  processed.  Thus,
in the next part of the analysis, in which the observed protection rate is matched
with  the  source  of protection,  only the  aggregate  nominal protection  rates  for
maize,  soybeans,  sugar, and cotton  are examined.8
The findings  show not only that significantly  positive rates of protection exist
for  a  number  of  China's  major  field  crops  but  also  that  they vary  across  the
country  and  according  to  China's  position  as  a  net  importer  or  net  exporter.
Maize  prices,  according  to  exporters,  averaged  more  than  30  percent  above
world prices, meaning that traders would have lost more than 30 percent  of the
value  of their  exports without  government  subsidies.  Protection  rates  differed
across regions, however.  For example, interviewees  in the northeast  said that if
they  were  not  exporting  and  foreign  maize  were  to  come  into  China,  the
importer  could  make  21  percent  on  average.  In  south  China,  however,  the
price gap  between imported maize (cif China) and maize traded in the domestic
market in and around Guangzhou was more than 35 percent. Aggregated across
areas  and weighted  by  maize  consumption  shares,  the  nominal protection  rate
on maize was 32 percent in 2001  (see table 4). The level of protection  for maize
corresponds almost exactly to the subsidies  being paid to maize exporters during
fall  2001.
Interviewees  also  reported  that  despite  the  large  increase  in  the  volume  of
soybean  imports  in recent  years,  there  is still an average  15 percent  difference
between  the  cif price  and  the  domestic  price  in  the  port  (see  table  4).  That  a
price gap remains  seems remarkable  considering that China imported almost  15
million tons  of soybeans  in 2001,  the  official  tariff  is  only 3  percent,  and  the
commodity can  be traded  by any foreign  trade company.  The  remaining  price
gap  shows  that  there  may  be other  reasons  for distortions  beyond  tariffs  and
state  trading.  In  fact,  the  gap  between  the  domestic  and international  price  is
almost  certainly  a result  of  China's  policy  of  assessing  a  value-added  tax  on
imported  soybeans  at the  border.  As  already  shown,  the  difference  in the tax
rate between imported and domestic soybeans  is about  12 percent. Because this
is  the  difference  between  the  price  of  imported  soybeans  after  paying  the  3
percent tariff, this suggests that the main distortion in China's soybean price  in
fall 2001  was the value-added tax.
8.  The survey was conducted  the same  way.  In  most cases,  interviewees  reported  that there was not
much  difference  in quality  among maize  varieties and  that there  was only a  slight  (around 2-3 percent)
price  difference  between  imported  and  domestic  soybeans.  Hence,  questions  were  asked  both  ways.
"What was  the  price  difference  if  imported  soybeans  (cif  China)  were  auctioned  off  in  the  domestic
market with no taxes  or tariffs  added?  What  was the price  difference  if domestic  soybeans  (fob  China)
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Cotton  and sugar  were fairly highly protected  in October 2001  (see  table 4).
Traders in south China and Shanghai reported that they could have sold a ton of
imported  sugar  (cif  China)  for  almost  40  percent  more  on  China's  domestic
market  if they  did  not have  to pay any  fees.  In fall  2001  the  official  tariff  for
sugar was 40 percent  (MOFTEC  2002). Thus for sugar the main distortion was the
official tariff rate,  with the value-added  tax having  almost no role.
Cotton  demonstrates one of the shortcomings  of this new approach  (and other
approaches)  to calculating  nominal protection  rates.  In fall 2001  the average  gap
between  the  international  and the domestic  price  of cotton was  17 percent.  Inter-
viewees told us that if they could costlessly bring imported cotton across the border
in  late  September  and  early  October  2003,  they  could  earn  17  percent  if they
auctioned their shipment immediately.  When the survey team did follow up work
at the end  of November,  however,  the  domestic price  of cotton  had fallen  from
9,500 yuan per ton to less  than 8,000 yuan per ton, bringing the nominal protec-
tion  rate to around zero.  Then  by the end of the  year (late December 2001),  the
international price of cotton also fell. Although the December follow-up surveys by
phone  covered  only  a  few  cotton  traders  and  users,  the  information  from  that
abbreviated  survey  indicated that the nominal  protection rate was positive again.
The  domestic  and international  prices of other crops varied less than those  of
cotton in 200 1, but cotton provides a cautionary lesson of how nominal protection
rates can change rapidly, even over a short period. Thus, if a statistical bureau were
to adopt this method  as a  way to track nominal protection  rates for  a variety of
commodities, the surveys  would have  to be repeated at periodic intervals.
Assessing the New Methodology
Because  one  objective  was  to  use  the new  data  and  methods  for  aggregating
variety-specific  nominal protection  rates to generate crop-specific  nominal pro-
tection  rates, this  section compares the nominal protection  rates created  by this
time-  and  data-intensive  approach  with  those  using traditional  methods,  data
sources,  and  assumptions.9 Although  the  two approaches  yield similar  results
for  some  commodities,  such  as soybeans  and  maize, the  results  vary consider-
ably for other commodities.  For example,  the average price of wheat imports  in
2001,  calculated  by  dividing  total  import value  by total  import  quantity, was
1,393  yuan  per ton,  whereas  the national  average  price  for domestic  wheat  as
9.  These  are  computed  by comparing  the  domestic  wholesale price  with  the  average  implicit  inter-
national  price.  For  tradables  it  is  total  value  of the  import  or  export divided  by  the  total volume.  For
some commodities,  comparisons  using these traditional  methods  and data may not be comparable to the
estimates  here  because  the  traditional  measures  are  calculated  on  an  annual  basis  and  those  for  the
estimates  here are  for a  single  quarter  (fall  2001).  In  this particular  case,  because  the  international  and
domestic  prices  of rice,  wheat,  and maize  were fairly constant across  the year, there is little  bias. But  the
proper  method  would  be  to  compare  the  fall  in  nominal  protection  rates  from  both  methods  or  for
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reported  in the Ministry of Agriculture's  reporting system  was  1,113  yuan per
ton,  or about 21  percent  below the cif price  of imports.
Thus,  the standard  methodology  would  imply that wheat,  rather than being
protected  (by  12  percent-see  table  3),  was  actually  being  taxed  by  trading
policies.  Yet  as  the  previous  analysis  shows,  the  main  reason  for the  negative
rate  of protection  is that China  imports almost exclusively  high-grade,  baking-
quality wheat,  whereas  its  domestic  consumers  use  mostly  medium  and  lower
qualities  of  wheat.  Hence,  the wrong  conclusion  is  reached  when  using  the
specialty  prices  for  imports  as  an  international  reference  price  for  types  of
wheat  that  are  of much  lower  quality  and  price.  The  same  problem  is  found
for rice.10
This  shows  the  importance  of  estimating  nominal  protection  rates  more
carefully,  at least  for  certain  commodities.  The  traditional  approaches  work
reasonably  well  for commodities  that  are  fairly  homogeneous  in quality,  such
as  maize  and  soybeans.  But  for wheat  and rice  in  China  in  2001,  comparing
average  prices  inside and  outside the country can yield  misleading results.
III.  AWAY  FRONM  THE  BORDER  EFFECTS
The entire  effect of trade liberalization  on agricultural  prices (and the distribu-
tion of the effect)  depends not only on the size of the distortion but also on how
the effects  are distributed,  which  is  largely  a  function  of the nature  of China's
markets. At least three factors play a role: policy safeguards that prevent market
forces  from  fully  equilibrating  domestic  and  international  prices;  household
responses,  which  include  shifting away  from commodities  whose  price  falls to
production  of  higher  profitability  commodities;  and  high  transaction  costs,
which can buffer the effects  of liberalization  policies  in rural areas. This section
focuses  on the nature of markets.  Policy safeguards  are discussed  in the  conclu-
sion.  Household  responses  are  discussed  in  Taylor  (1998),  OECD  (2001),  and
Huang  and others (2002).
If  large  areas  of the  country  are  isolated  from the  coastal  markets  where
imports  enter  the  country,  WTO  accession  would  not  be  expected  to  have
highly  adverse  impacts  on  the  poor,  most  of whom  live  in  inland  areas  far
from major  coastal cities.  While  being  isolated  from negative  external  shocks
is  a  benefit,  there  are  also  costs.  Those  living  in  poor,  isolated  areas  would
not benefit  from price  rises  when there are  enhanced  opportunities to export.
Living in isolated  markets  also makes households  more vulnerable  to regional
10.  Because  China imports only high-quality  jasmine rice from Thailand, the international  price of rice,
3,908  yuan per ton (calculated by total import value divided  by total import quiantity),  appears to be more
than 150 percent  higher than the average  domestic price,  1,464 yuan per ton. In  fact, China's  average  price
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price  shocks  (which  may  be  caused  by  regional  production  or consumption
shifts).  In  contrast,  with  well-functioning  markets,  increased  import  or
export  flows  concentrated  in  coastal  cities  will  affect  the  prices  that  small,
poor  households  face  even  when  they  live  thousands  of  kilometers  away.
Moreover,  if markets  link inland  and coastal  areas,  local  shocks  to supply or
demand  in  inland regions  are  less likely  to have any large effect  on the  prices
local  producers  receive  (which  in most cases  means that  price variability  will
be  less).
To  the  extent  that  there  are  high  transaction  costs  inside  China  and  some
domestic markets are isolated from others, the impacts of WTO  accession  policies
may not  be  evenly  distributed.  Previous  work on  China's  agricultural  markets
(for  example,  Park  and  others  2002)  found  that  markets  had  become  fairly
integrated  by  the  mid-1990s.  However,  certain  qualifications  apply.  First,
although markets  improved greatly  during the  early  1990s  (compared with the
1980s),  the  analysis  found  that  in  some  years  large  regions  of  the  country,
especially  poorer  areas,  were  not completely  integrated  into national  markets.
Moreover, the study ends with 1995.  It is  unclear from the literature  (although
there  is no rigorous  national study of market integration  in the late  1990s)  and
government  market policies  during  the late  1990s  whether  markets  were  likely
to  have  become  more  or  less  integrated  since  the  mid-1990s  (Nyberg  and
Rozelle  1999).
Assessing Interregional Market Integration
To assess market integration in rural  China in the late  1990s and  in 2000, data
from  China's  State  Market  Administration  Bureau  were  used to see  how well
prices  in different markets moved together  and how well integrated prices  were
between  market towns  and China's  villages.
DATA.  The  data  come  from  a  unique  set  of price  data  collected  by  the  State
Market  Administration  Bureau.  Nearly  50  sample  sites  from  15  provinces
report  the  prices  of  agricultural  commodities  every  10  days.  The  prices  are
averages  of transactions  that day  in  the  local rural  periodic  market.  The Min-
istry  of  Agriculture  (2001)  assembles  the  data  in  Beijing  and  makes  them
available  to researchers  and policymakers.
Price data were  examined for  rice, maize,  and soybeans  for 1996-2000  (price
data for maize were available  only through 1998).  The three crops  are produced
and consumed  in nearly every province in China. Because  of quality differences
among rice  varieties  in different  regions  of China,  price  integration was exam-
ined among markets  within  four regions,  South China,  the Yangtze  Valley, the
North China  Plain and Northwest  China,  and Northeast  China. Prices  for rice
are  available  for  more  than  90 percent  of  the  time  periods  for  the provinces
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of  soybeans  for  20  markets."  Product  homogeneity  for  maize  and  soybeans
makes it possible to examine  price integration  among markets  across a broader
geographic  range.  The results for 1996-2000  are compared  with the results for
1988-1995  in Park and others  (2002).2
INTEGRATION  TESTS.  This  section  uses  more  formal  tests  of market  integration.
Cointegration  means that  although  many  developments  can  cause  permanent
changes  in the  individual  elements of a tested  series  (grain  price  here),  there  is
some  long-run  equilibrium  relation tying  the  individual components  together,
represented  by the linear combination,  as in equation  1.  Here, the Engle-Gran-
ger cointegration  approach  is  applied  to test  China's market  integration.  The
basic intuition  behind  the approach  is that if one  can write  two price series  in
the following way:
(1)  U, = P't-  W,
and  if  each  price  series  is  stationary  of order  zero,  I(O),  then  this  condition
implies the existence  of a long-run equilibrium.  In other words, in the long run
the two  series  will  eventually  return  to  a  constant  mean.  Moreover,  a  linear
combination of the two prices  shows that it is efficient  to predict one  market's
price  based on the information  from another  market's price. Equivalently,  these
two  price  series  are  cointegrated  and the two  markets  are  integrated.' 3 If the
price  series  are  not stationary of order zero,  then  a unit  root test is  applied to
determine  whether  each  element  of the  price  series  is  stationary  of order one,
I(1).  The  analysis  shows  that  all  price  series  for  the commodities  in  China's
grain markets in the late  1990s are stationary of order one.
Using the stationary price  series,  one price series is then regressed on another
using ordinary  least squares:
(2)  P' = o + At +  4P{  + et
11.  Because time-series  data are  used, prices  must be  converted to a real basis. Nominal  prices  from
the  data  set  are  deflated  using  monthly  consumer  price  indices  calculated  and  reported  by  the  China
National  Statistical  Bureau.  Deflation  facilitates  transaction  cost comparisons  across  time  and  allows
transaction  cost increases  within periods  associated  with inflation to be  disregarded.
12.  To produce the results, cointegration  tests are run on each pair of markets using the data for each
year. In other words, 36 observations are used (because  the price  data are available every  10 days) and the
number  of pairs of markets that are cointegrated  in a statistically  significant way are counted  (see  note  13
and  text  for  explanation  of testing).  For  example,  for  the  case  of soybeans  for  the late  I 990s  (1996-
2000),  this  means that  being  examined  is  the  extent  of integration  between  190  (20  * 19/2)  pairs  of
markets  in each of five  years, which equals 950  pairs of markets.  So because  prices in  646 markets  were
found  to  be  integrated  (according  to  the  testing  procedure),  68  percent  of  markets  are  reported  as
integrated  in  the late  1990s.  Because  only  36 observations  are  used  per test, and because  cointegration
tests typically  perform better with longer time series,  by splitting data into annual increments,  the results
are  biased  against  integration.  This  makes  the  analysis  comparable  to  Park  and  others  (2002),  which
follows  a  similar procedure.
13.  Note  that  the b coefficient  need  not be  unity to conclude  cointegration  and integrated  markets
(only needed  for  applying the  much more  restrictive  criteria of the  Law of One  Price).Huang, Rozelle,  and Chang  75
where t is the common  trend of the two price series and et is the error term. The
residual,  et,  is then  used  in the augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test:
N
(3)  Aet  =  6et-  I + E  -yAet-i +  t  .
i-2
If the test statistic  on the  (  coefficient  is less  (more  negative)  than the  relevant
critical value from the Dickey-Fuller table, the null hypothesis is rejected  and the
two series  are  said to  be cointegrated  of order  (1,1).  According  to Engles  and
Granger,  this implies  that the two markets  are integrated.  The  analysis assumes
that markets  are integrated  when the absolute value of the test statistic is greater
than  3  (implying significance  at the  10 percent  level).
RESULTS.  The cointegration  analysis  shows that China's markets have continued
to develop  in the  late  1990s,  especially when the results  are compared  with the
market integration  research  of the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s  (table  5).  In the
middle part of the reform era  (1988-95), a  time when markets  were  starting to
emerge,  some 20-25 percent of markets showed  signs of prices moving together
(Park and others  2002).
Using the results from the early 1990s as a baseline, the current analysis  shows
that during the late  1990s China's markets continued  along their path of matura-
tion.  The  comovement  of  prices  among  pairs  of markets  in  the  sample  shows
significant increase in the share of market pairings that are  integrated.  In the case
of maize, for example, prices in paired markets moved together in 89 percent of the
cases, up from 28 percent  in the early  1990s  (table  5). The share  of market pairs
showing  price  integration  also increased  for  soybeans,  japonica  rice,  and indica
rice. The integration  is especially notable because in many cases the paired markets
are  more than a 1,000 km apart.  For example,  in many years  soybean  and  maize
prices  were  found to  be  integrated  between  markets  in Shaanxi  and Guangdong
Provinces and between  Sichuan  Province  and southern Jiangsu.
Despite  significant  progress  in  integration,  the  results  also  show  pairs
of markets  that are  not  integrated.  For example,  in  a  third  of  cases  japonica
rice  prices  moved  in  one  market  but  not  in  another.  One  explanation  is  an
TABLE  5.  Percentage  of Market Pairs  in Rural  China that Test Positive  for
Integration  Based on  Dickey-Fuller Test,  1988-2000
Commodity  1989-95  1996-2000
Mlaize  28  89
Soybeans  28  68
Japonica  rice  (Yellow  River Valley)  25  60
Indica  rice  (Yangtze  Valley  and South  China)  25  47
Note: Results  are  for two periods from  same  data set. For results for 1989-1995  for maize  and
rice,  see  Park  and  others  (2002).  Rice results  are  for the whole  country  in  1989-95.  Results  for
soybeans  for  1989-95  and  all  results  for  1996-2000  are  from  the authors.76  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  r  8,  NO.  I
institutional  breakdown  or infrastructure  barrier  (a  policy  measure  or  a weak
link in the transportation  or communication  infrastructure)  that is  fragmenting
China's markets  for certain  commodities,  as  shown in Park and others  (2002).
But  because  every province in China produces  and consumes  rice, it is  also the
case that if supply in one region during one period is just equal to demand and if
regional  price differentials  stay within the band between regional  "export"  and
"import"  prices,  then  moderate  price  movements  in  another  area  might  not
induce  a  flow into  or out of the  region  that is  in equilibrium.  For that reason,
despite the nontrivial number of cases in the  late  1990s in which market prices
in pairs of markets do not move together,  it must be concluded  that the impacts
of wro accession  on China's  agriculture will  increasingly be  experienced  across
wide regions  of the  nation from coastal  to inland areas.
Assessing Village Integration  into Regional Markets
The interregional  integration  of markets  is only half of the story,  however.  The
remarkable  degree of integration  between coastal and inland markets  is still not
sufficient  to  state  confidently  that  village  households  are  integrated  into  the
nation's  marketing  network.  That  requires  analysis  of  the  extent  to  which
villages  are integrated  into regional  markets.
This integration test looks at whether farmers  are  price takers or whether they
reside  in isolated villages  in which local prices  are determined  by local supply and
demand.  The equation to test for village-regional  market integration  is:
(4)  P, = aO+al*Ai  + b1*Ti +dl-ID +e,.
In brief,  if variables  that  affect  local  grain  availability,  Ai,  in  village  i  signifi-
cantly  affect  the  village's  price,  Pi, villages  are  assumed  to  be  isolated  from
markets.  If the variables  that  affect  local  availability  do  not affect  the price,
villagers  are  assumed  to  be  price  takers  and  markets  can  be  thought  to  be
integrated.  Availability  in  each  village  during  the  survey  year  is  measured  as
the sum of production,  PS,, and storage, Si. If markets are isolated, a rise or fall
in availability  would be expected  to  negatively  or positively affect  the village's
price.  In contrast,  if markets  are integrated,  changes  in local availability would
be expected to have no affect on the village's price. Because it is total availability
(production  plus  storage  at  the  beginning  of  the  period)  that  matters
(Ai = PS, +  Si),  total  availability  should  enter  equation  4.  Equation  4  is  solved
separately  for rice,  wheat,  maize, and soybeans.
In  examining  the  impact  of local  grain  availability  on the  household's  grain
price  in  equation  4,  other  factors,  Di, need  to  be  controlled  for  in  the  cross-
sectional analysis.  In equation 4, D, is assumed to include two components,  one
spatial  (the  distance  of the  village  from  the  county  seat,  the  typical  site  of  the
regional market)  and one temporal (the timing of the grain sale). The further the
village  is  from the county  seat and the closer the grain sales are to  the harvest
(within  the first three  months), the lower the price  is likely to be.  Because  villageHuang, Rozelle,  and Chang  77,
price  levels  in  different  provinces  are  expected  to  vary  according  to  each  pro-
vince's  location  (with  respect  to  the  port)  and infrastructure  (the  quality  of its
road  and  rail  network),  a  provincial  dummy  variable  is  also  included.  For  rice,
because  quality  varies  so  much  from  region  to  region,  dummy  variables  for
regional  quality  are  included  (for  South  China,  the  Yangtze  River  Valley,  and
North/Northeast  China).
The data were  collected  in a  randomly selected,  nearly nationally  representa-
tive  sample  of  60 villages  in  six provinces  of rural  China  (the China  National
Rural  Survey).  To  accurately  reflect  varying  income  distributions  within  each
province,  one  county was randomly  selected  from each  income  quintile  for the
province,  as measured  by the gross value of industrial output. Two villages were
randomly  selected within each county.  The survey teams used village rosters  and
their  own counts to randomly choose 20 households,  both those with residency
permits  (bukoii) in the  village  and  those without.  A total  of 1,199  households
were  surveyed. 14
A number of variables  were constructed  that might affect the price that farmers
received  in the  village.  The  survey  team  gathered  detailed  information  on  both
production  and marketing  behavior  of all  farmers  in  the  sample  and the  char-
acteristics  of  each  village  and  its  relationship  to  the  nearest  regional  market.
Individual  respondents  provided  information  on  the  price  and  timing  of  sales
for  each  commodity.  The  prices  for  all  household  sales  in  the  village  were
averaged,  with  each  sale  weighted  by  its  volume  in  kg.  From  the  information
on  timing  a  set of  variables  was  constructed  that  measures  the  proportion  of
village  sales occurring  within  each of the  first three  months after  the harvest.  A
community questionnaire  provided  information on how far the village's  center is
from the nearest  paved  road and the  distance to the county  market.  Finally,  for
each  crop  there  was  information  on  any  shocks,  both  their  incidence  and  the
percentage  by which the yield fell.  These  were  aggregated  to the village  level.
There  are  no variables  that control  for the  presence  of a community  buffer
stock  system,  primarily  because  such  institutions  are  rare  in  modern  China.
However, farmers,  at least in the past, have been known  to hold large stores of
grain.  It  is  possible  that in  an  isolated  village  hit  by  a  production  shock  that
caused  local  prices  to rise,  farmers  could  draw on  their own  stocks  so that  the
local price would  exhibit no net change, thus making the village look as though
14.  The China  National  Rural  Survey  project  team  gathered  detailed  information  on the  production
and marketing  behavior of all of the farmers in the sample, the characteristics of each village, and its relation-
ship to the nearest regional  market.  Each  individual respondent  in the survey in each village gives the price
and  timing  of  the  sale  for  each  commodity.  From  these  data,  an  average  village  price  for  each  month
are  constructed  in yuan  per kilogram.  In a community  questionnaire,  how  far  the  village's center is from
the nearest  paved  road and the distance to  the county  market is  determined  in kilometers.  Finally, for  any
shocks  to the  farmer's crop, the  incidence and the percentage  by which the  yield fell  are known for each crop
that the farmer  cultivated.  No variable that controls for the  presence of a community  buffer stock system  is
included,  primarily because such an institution is almost  never observed in modern  China. In addition, sales
among farmers  wNithin  a village  are rare (according  to data, less than 5 percent  of sales).78  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  1 8,  NO.  I
it were  integrated  into  the  regional  market,  when  it  was  not.  Beginning  year
stocks,  aggregated  to the  village  level,  are  used to  measure  the  potential  that
households stocks might  have for increasing  availability.
To test the  hypothesis, grain price,  Pi,  is a  function of total grain  availability,
Ai,  for each  of the  main  staple crops  i (where i = 1),  holding the  other variables,
T,  and D,  constant.  Total  grain  availability  is  measured  in  three  ways:  as  the
production shock,  PS,, alone;  as the  production shock,  Pi, and grain storage,  Si;
and  as  the  interaction  between  the  grain  storage  variable  and  the  production
shock  variable  (or a  direct proxy of Ai =  PSi + Si).  Because  the interaction  effect is
the  most intuitive  (it captures  total  grain  availability  of  the village  in one  vari-
able),  the regressions that use this version of the variable  are reported in table 6.
(Results  of regressions  using  the  alternative  variables  are  reported  in  appendix
tables A.1  and A.2.)  If villages are isolated from regional  markets,  the coefficient
on the interaction  term should  be negative  and significant  when there  is positive
production shock  and high  levels  of grain storage-that  is, when  the interaction
term  is large.  If markets  are integrated  into  China's  larger  marketing  networks,
the coefficient  should  be insignificant.
The  analysis  clearly  shows that markets  in China are  integrated  down to  the
village  level  (see table  6). The signs on the coefficients  (and levels  of significance
in  some  cases)  on  the  variable  measuring  the  distance  of  a  village  from  the
regional marketing center demonstrate that the further  a village  is from a market,
the  lower the  price the  farmer  receives.  More  important here,  the  t-ratios  of the
coefficients  of the village  supply shock  variables  are  all small,  signifying that  the
output of the local village's  crops does not affect the local price.  The implication
is  that  factors  outside  the  village  are  the  primary  influence  on  the  prices  that
farmers receive, making them price takers. Moreover,  when the main variables of
interest are interacted with a dummy variable  for village  income  level (equaling  1
when  a  village  is  in  the  bottom  two  income  deciles),  the  coefficient  is  still
insignificant.  In  other words,  even  farmers  in  China's poor, remote  villages  are
linked to China's  regional  markets.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS
This article  looked  exclusively  at the  effect  of China's accession  to the  wTo  on
agricultural  prices  (although  other  effects  may  be  equally  large  or  larger).  The
analysis found that there will be an impact on most farmers in the economy-both
those in coastal  areas and small, poor farmers in inland areas.  The findings,  based
on new methods to collect data and create more accurate nominal protection rates,
show that for some crops, WTO accession will likely lead to a fall in prices and a rise
in  imports.  Maize  and cotton  prices  may  be  most  affected.  Soybean  and sugar
prices could  also  fall.  However,  not all effects  are  negative. There  are also com-
modities in which China has considerable comparative advantage (rice, meats, and
horticulture products) and for which wTo accession could provide benefits to those
engaged  in these  activities  to the extent that markets  in  other countries  becomeTABLE  6.  Ordinary Least  Squares  Regression  Explaining  Effect of Local Grain Availability  on the Price of
Major  Crops  in China's Villages  in 2000
Variable  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Soybean
Explanatory variable
Local grain  availability
Village-level  climate shocks
(production  shock)a
Village-level  grain storage at the
beginning  of year (grain  storage)a
Interaction:  production  shock  -3.15e-06  (1.31)  7.50e-07  (0.37)  -3.91e-07  (0.33)  0.000045  (0.15)
and grain storage'
Control variables
Distance to  the nearest  county  (km)  -0.00074  (0.74)  -0.0079  (2.1)  -0.0005  (0.55)  -0.032 (2.76)'
Variables  representing  proportion  of  Included  Included  Included
grain  marketed  during  each  of the
first three months  after harvest
Quality  dummy variables  Included
Provincial  dummy  variables  Included  Included  Included  Included
Adjusted  R 2 0.16  0.38  0.50  0.15
Number  of observations  31  30  28  17
Note: Village-level  price is the dependent  variable.  t-ratios  in parentheses.
*Significant  at the 5 percent level.
aIndependent  measures  of production  shocks  and  grain  storage  are  not included  in  this version.  See  appendix  tables A.1  and  A.2 for  versions  that
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more  open to China's exports.  The prospect  of increased  imports of feed  grains
(maize and soybeans) at lower prices means that livestock producers could become
even more competitive.
How much prices fall  because  of rising imports or increase  because of rising
exports  in part  depends  on how  China executes  its WTO  obligations,  especially
the  agreements  affecting  some  of  the  more  nontraditional  barriers  that  were
shown to be protecting  China's farmers  before  accession  to the wTo.  Although
there may  be room for  delay,  which could  slow the  negative effects  (for exam-
ple, China was subsidizing  maize exports in 2003 to keep domestic  maize prices
from  falling  and  hurting  maize  producers;  Rozelle  2003),  the  agreement  also
contains several  provisions to limit downside  effects. For example,  although the
tariff rate quotas  section  of the  accesses  agreement  lowers  tariffs  and provides
access  for nonstate  traders  to  import commodities  such  as  cotton,  sugar,  and
edible  oil,  it also  caps the  quantity that can be  imported at the low tariff rates.
Likewise,  the  size  of benefits to China's producers  will  depend on how well its
trading partners  honor their commitments  to provide  China  with better access
to global markets  for products  in which  China has a  comparative  advantage.
Unlike  the case  of Mexico  after  NAFTA  it appears  as  though most of China's
villages,  even  those  in remote,  inland regions,  may  be well  integrated  into  the
economy.  This is good news  and bad news for poor farmers.  The good news is
that they can benefit  from falling  input  prices  and rising export  opportunities.
The bad news is that if the results here are correct and maize  and cotton prices
fall  for  large  parts  of  China,  poor  farmers  will  be  affected.  The  problem,
although  a short-run  one, may affect the poorest households most-households
most dependent  on agriculture  and least  able to adjust their cropping structure.
Thus, the findings should signal to government leaders the  need to consider the
welfare  effects  on these  susceptible groups.
APPENDIX:  CHALLENGES  AND  ISSUES  IN  MEASURING  NOMINAL
PROTECTION  RATES
The  wide  range  of nominal  protection  rate estimates  for  China  demonstrates
that measuring  differences  between an economy's  domestic  price and the inter-
national  price  is  not straightforward.  Several  issues  complicate  such  measure-
ment.  First,  confusion  may  stem  from  the  way  analysts  have  asked  their
question  about  nominal  protection  rates.  Policymakers  and  researchers  have
sought  to  summarize  the  impact  of  various  commodities  in  a  single  number.
Trade  modelers  need  a  single  number  to  make  their  analytical  frameworks
tractable.  People  want  to know the price  of wheat in China  and  to be  able to
compare that to the world  price  of wheat.  With this information,  the nominal
protection  rate  of  a  commodity  is  simply  the  difference  between  these  two
numbers.
However, more careful  observation  shows that the search for a single number
may be one of the main reasons why analysts reach so many different conclusions.TABLE  A-1.  Ordinary Least  Squares  Regression  Explaining  Effect  of Local  Grain Availability  on the Price
of Major  Crops in China's  Villages in 2000
Variable  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Soybean
Explanatory variable
Local grain  availability
Village-level climate  shocks  -0.108  (1.05)  0.06 (0.61)  0.109  (1.23)  -0.11  (0.49)
(production  shock)
Village-level  grain  storage  at  the  beginning
of year  (grain  storage)'
Interaction:  production  shock and
grain  storage'
Control variables
Distance  to the  nearest county  (km)  -0.00069  (0.69)  -0.0081  (2.15);  -0.0007 (0.79)  -0.031  (2.75)*
Variables  representing  proportion  of  Included  Included  Included
grain marketed  during  each  of the
first three  months  after  harvest
Quality  dummy  variables  Included
Provincial  dummy  variables  Included  Included  Included  Included
Adjusted R 2 0.14  0.38  0.53  0.16
Number  of observations  31  31  28  17
Note: Village-level  price  is the dependent  variable.  t-ratios  in parentheses.
"Significant  at  the 5 percent  level.
'The  grain  storage  variable and interaction  variable are  not included  in this table.  See appendix table  A.2 for version  that adds grain  storage variable.
See  table 6 for a version  that includes  that interaction  term.TABLE  A-2.  Ordinary  Least Squares  Regression  Explaining  Effect of Local Grain Availability  on the Price
of Major Crops  in China's Villages in 2000
Variable  Rice  Wheat  Maize  Soybean
Explanatory variable
Local  grain  availability
Village-level  climate shocks  -0.108  (1.02)  0.06  (0.6)  0.132  (1.3)  -0.206  (0.96)
(production  shock)
Village-level  grain storage  at the  -8.21e-08  (0.18)  1.12e-07  (0.14)  -4.04e-07  (0.5)  0.00018  (1.66)
beginning  of year  (grain  storage)
Interaction:  production  shock
and  grain  storage'
Control variable
Distance  to the  nearest county  (km)  -0.00069  (0.66)  -0.0082 (2.11):-  -0.0005  (0.51)  0.034  (3.19)^
Variables  representing  proportion  of  Included  Included  Included
grain marketed  during  each of first
three  months after  harvest
Quality dummy  variables  Included
Provincial dummy  variables  Included  Included  Included  Included
Adjusted R
2 0.10  0.36  0.51  0.29
Number of observations  31  30  28  17
Note: Village-level  price  is the dependent  variable.  t-ratios in  parentheses.
Significant  at  the  5 percent level.
'The  interaction  variable  is not included  in  this table.  See table  6 for  a version  that includes  interaction  term.Huiaing,  Rozelle,  and Chang  83
There  are  many prices  for wheat  in China.  Prices vary within a  year.  They vary
across  regions.  What price  should  be used  in calculating  the nominal protection
rate?  Should  it  be the price  of corn  in a  Guangzhou  feedlot or the  price of corn
sitting in storage  in a farmer's homemade silo in Northeast  China? Moreover,  not
all rice is the same.  There are many different  varieties and types, all commanding
different prices at different places and times during the year. The same sets of issues
faces analysts when they attempt to choose a price series (or more difficult yet, the
single price)  to represent the international  price.  Should it be fob or cif?  Should  it
be the average annual price or a price during a particular period?  If there are many
different types of imported varieties, which type should be chosen?
In  part  because  previous  studies  have  not  dealt  with  these  issues  (at  least
explicitly),  it  is  unsurprising that  different  research  efforts  have  generated  dif-
ferent  estimates  of  nominal  protection  rates.  For  example,  Tuan  and  Cheng
(1999)  estimated high and variable  nominal  rates of protection  for agricultural
commodities:  62  percent for wheat,  15 percent  for maize,  and  140  percent  for
soybeans  in  1997. Carter and Estrin (2001)  find generally negative  price  distor-
tions. Huang (200  1) provides  estimates that show that some products  are highly
protected  and others  have negative  rates of protection.
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Accession,  and the Motor Vehicle  Sector in China
Josepb F. Francois and Dean Spinanger
This article  is  concerned  with  the interaction  of regulated efficiency  and World  Trade
Organization  (wTo)  accession  and  its  impact  on  China's  motor  vehicle  sector.  The
analysis  is  conducted  using  a  23  sector-25  region  computable  general  equilibrium
model.  Regulatory  reform and  internal restructuring  are  found  to be  critical.  Restruc-
turing is represented  by a cost reduction  following  from consolidation  and rationaliza-
tion  that  moves  costs  toward  global  norms.  Without  restructuring,  WTO  accession
means  a  surge of final  imports,  though  imports  of parts could  well fall  as production
moves  offshore.  However, with  restructuring,  the final assembly industry  can be made
competitive  by world standards, with  a strengthened  position  for the  industry.
Producing  automobiles  has  often  been  a  symbol  of  economic  prestige  in  the
developing  world.  Brazil,  China,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and  others  have  all
promoted  and  sometimes  even  showcased  the  development  of  a  domestic
motor vehicle  industry.  In  China,  with its huge  population  and  a  surface  area
roughly  as  large  as  the United  States  and almost  15  percent  larger  than  Brazil
(table  1),  almost every  province  has  its own motor vehicle  factory  and satellite
factories.  But  despite  all  the factories,  China  has the  largest  number of people
per  vehicle  among  major  economies  in  the  world.  Even  Indonesia,  with  a  30
percent lower per capita  income,  has only half as many people per automobile.
China's  status  as  a  country  with  one  of the  highest  number  of people  per
vehicle  is the outcome  of a series  of policy measures,  dating  as  far back  as  the
inception of the People's Republic  of China, that have distorted the structure  of
the  automobile  industry  (table  2).  Internal  measures  limited  and  even  pro-
hibited trade  through  local  protectionism  (analogous  to former  interprovincial
trade  restrictions  in  Canada).  The  government  has  also  set  prices  and  limited
competition  through  a  barrage  of  import  restrictions,  which  have  included
Joseph  F. Francois  is professor  of  economics  and  research  fellow  at  the  Tinbergen  Institute  and
research  fellow at the  Centre  for Economic  Policy  Research;  his  e-mail  address is francois@few.eur.nl.
Dean  Spinanger  is senior  research economist  at  the  Institute  for  World  Economies  in Kiel;  his  e-mail
address is dspinanger@ifw.uni-kiel.de.  The authors thank Zhang Wenkui for help with data,  Will Martin
and Alan Winters  for detailed comments  on an earlier  draft, and three  anonymous  referees  who  offered
valuable  suggestions.  They also thank participants  in a World  Bank-sponsored conference  in Beijing for
helpful  discussion.
THE WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW, VOL.  18,  NO.  I,
©  The International  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development /  THE WORLD  BANK 2004;  all  rights reserved.
DOI:  10.1093/wber/lhhO34  18:85-104
8586  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  i8,  NO.  I
TABLE  1.  GNP,  Population,  and  Stocks of Automobiles  in China
and Selected  Countries,  2000
GNP per  Vehicle  stock,
capita  Population,  2001  (millions)
(2002  2001  People  per  Surface area
Economy  ppp  $)a  (millions)  Automobiles  Trucks  automobile  (1,000  sq. km)
Low and middle  4,682  3,274.4  140.6  54.9  23.3  49,263
income
India  2,570  1,032.4  6.3  5.9  163.2  3,287
Indonesia  2,990  209.0  3.0  2.4  68.8  1,905
China  4,390  1,271.8  8.5  15.4  149.0  9,598
Colombia  5,870  43.0  1.8  0.8  23.4  1,139
Turkey  6,120  66.2  4.5  1.6  14.6  775
Thailand  6,680  61.2  2.9  4.1  21.4  513
Brazil  7,250  172.4  15.8  4.0  10.9  8,547
Russia  7,820  144.8  21.2  5.1  6.8  17,075
Malaysia  8,280  23.8  4.2  1.0  5.6  330
Mexico  8,540  99.4  12.2  5.6  8.2  1,958
South Africa  9,870  43.2  41.0  2.5  1.1  1,221
Argentina  9,930  37.5  5.4  1.6  7.0  2,780
High income  29,248  742.7  351.6  129.4  2.1  21,937
Korea,  Rep.  of  16,480  47.3  8.9  4.0  5.3  99
Taiwan,  China  17,730  22.4  4.8  0.9  4.6  36
Spain  20,460  41.1  18.2  4.2  2.3  506
Italy  25,320  57.9  33.2  3.8  1.7  301
United  Kingdom  25,870  58.8  27.8  3.4  2.1  243
Japan  26,070  127.0  53.5  19.9  2.4  378
France  26,180  59.2  28.7  5.9  2.1  552
Germany  26,220  82.3  44.4  3.6  1.9  357
Canada  28,070  31.1  17.1  0.7  1.8  9,971
United  States  35,060  285.3  128.7  88.0  2.2  9,629
appP  is purchasing  power  parity.
Source:  World  Bank,  various  years,  World  Development  Indicators; Verband  der
Automobilindustrie,  various  issues.
quotas, high tariffs,  and differential  taxes  favoring local suppliers.  The restric-
tions on trade  have encouraged  inefficient  production  and allowed  for market
segmentation.
China's integration  into the World Trade  Organization  (wro),  and thus into
most  favored  nation  principles,  has  important  implications  for  its  economy,
especially  the  motor  vehicle  sector.  Accession  agreements  define  major
changes  in tariffs,  quotas  and local content requirements,  and  rules on foreign
investment.  There  has  already  been a  change  in market  perceptions  by outside
investors,  as  the  application  of  wro  rules  on  treatment  of  foreign  firms  has
reduced  uncertainty  about  the  general  economic  climate,  inducing  notable
increases  in  investment  and  prompting  new  decisions  about  entering  the
market.Francois and Spinanger  87
TABLE  2.  Summary  of Developments  in the  Chinese  Automotive  Sector
Period  Characteristics
1953-65:  Self-reliance  policy  Roughly  60,000  vehicles produced  per  year.
Relied  on Soviet technologies.
No other international  contacts.
Provincial  governments  set up production  units.
By  1960,  16  auto producers and  28 assembly
companies.
1966-80:  Security  oriented  Government  invested  heavily in western  regions
(Sichuan,  Shanxi,  and Hubei).
Remote locations  caused  severe problems  and
overcapacity.
Focus on heavy  military vehicles.
Car demand  increased  rapidly and capacities
expanded to 160,000  units a year.
By  1980, 58 carmakers,  192 assembly companies,
and 2,000 spare  parts  producers.
1981-98:  Initial  fruits  of open-door  policy  Open-door  policy  in  1978 kick-started  industry.
VW already  started  in  1978.
Number  of companies  almost doubled during
83-85,  from  65 to  114 units.
By  1998, roughly 2,500 production  units.
Provincial  governments  further  regionalized
production.
Major international  firms begin to invest and then
stop  rapidly.
Joint  ventures accounted  for  about  60  percent  of
production.
1999-present:  opening  up and  beyond  Major investments  by foreign  companies.
All major Japanese  and  German  companies
in China.
French,  Italian,  and U.S.  producers  nominally
present.
Rapid  expansion;  capacity  now  near  2.5 million
units.
Growing  capacity  in costal  areas.
Source: Summary produced  by authors from  various  sources.
This  article  is  concerned  with  the  impact  of  these  broad  changes  on  the
Chinese motor vehicle sector.  It emphasizes  the role  of administratively  imposed
inefficiencies  ("regulated  efficiency")  within  the  sector  and  the  role  of  such
regulated  efficiency  in  structural  adjustment.  The  industry  itself  anticipates
significant  change.  In  recent  years  the sector  has  grown  rapidly,  with  output
expanding  at an annualized  rate of 13 percent in the four years ending in  1999,
at a rate of 26 percent  in the three  years to 2002, and at more than  double that
in  2003.  With  modern  plants  having  come  on  line  in  2001  and  2002,  and8  8  THE  WORID  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  1 8,  NO.  I
additional  facilities  expected  to  increase  capacity  by  more  than  150  percent
from 2002  to 2005,  a large,  discrete change  in production  levels  is expected.
At the  same time,  WTO  membership  implies  lower prices  and  steeper  foreign
competition  in  the  sector.  Response  to this  shift  in  the  competitive  landscape
will  be  shaped  by continuing  problems with local  government  protection,  lack
of  automobile  infrastructure  (roads,  parking,  service  facilities),  and  related
factors  that act  as  constraints  on growth  of  the  sector.  Even  so,  the  industry
itself expects continued  strong growth.'
Notwithstanding  industry  expectations,  what  can  realistically  be  expected
once  the  competitive  landscape  has  changed  in  critical ways?  This question  is
explored  here using a  computable  general equilibrium  (cGE)model.
I.  THE  AUTOMOBILE  INDUSTRY  IN  CHINA
National  and  regional  policies  in  China  have  resulted  in  a  highly  fragmented
and inefficient motor vehicle industry by global standards.  This was not only the
result  of  the  introduction  of  Soviet-style  industrialization  beginning  in  the
1950s,  with  firms  viewed  merely  as  production  units  producing  according  to
plan,  making  questions  about  efficiency  irrelevant.2 It  was  also  the  result  of
import  substitution  policies  and  cooperation  agreements  with  foreign  com-
panies beginning in the  1980s that were  meant to fill the increasing  gap between
supply  and  rapidly  expanding  demand  for  automobiles.  The  major  thrust  of
policies was to build trucks, not passenger cars  (figure  1).
Motor vehicle companies are thus operating with cost structures  that are well
within  the  global  frontier,  with plants  that are  producing  considerably  below
global  standards  for  efficient  scale  (table  3).  For  plants  producing  a  single
model,  minimum  efficient  scale  for  final  assembly  of cars  has  been  estimated
1.  See,  for  example,  China  Online  (2000).  As  Wro  membership  approached,  the  opinions  of  the
industry and related  ministries,  as reflected  in the Chinese  press, hinged critically  on whether restructur-
ing of the domestic industry would be allowed to proceed. Thus a report in Touzi Yu Hezuo (summarized
in China Online 2000)  stressed expected injury to the industry, whereas the industry  itself was expressing
optimism that it could realize  significant  cost reductions  and remain  competitive  with imports (Feenstra
and others 2001).  In the meantime,  price cuts by foreign producers in China are becoming common,  some
of them  induced  by  increased  import  competition  and  others  by  more  intense  domestic  competition.
Buick,  for  instance,  reduced prices  on its  domestically produced models  by  12 percent,  and Volkswagen
lowered  Passat prices by  6.5 percent  (indiacar.net,  May 3, 2002).  Even more important,  nearly  all major
foreign  producers  have  announced  plans  to establish  or sizably  increase  production capacities.  A  recent
major manufacturer  to do so was DaimlerChyrsler  in September 2003, finally ratifying  plans to establish
facilities  to produce  C and E  models in  China (International  Herald Tribune, September  9,  2003).
2.  As  noted  by Zhang  and Taylor  (2001, pp.  261ff.),  First Automobile  Works  (FAW)  provides  ample
evidence of the impact of various policies over the past 50 years. Between  1959 and  1981  FAW produced  a
mere  1,542  units,  an average  67  units annually.  In  1970  the production cost  of a particular  model  (the
CA72) was 220,000 yuan, but "the  sales price was only 40,000 yuan....  In the absence  of competition,
all  production  units  ran  at  low  levels  of  productivity  and  efficiency.  ...  By  1980  the  number  of
automotive  enterprises  had  risen  to  2,379,  consisting  of  56  vehicle  manufacturers  ...  [producing]
5,418 cars."Francois and Spinantger  89
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at more  than 200,000  units  per plant per year  (Huang  2002,  p.  543).  China's
entire sedan production  in 1998  was 507,000  vehicles produced in  13 factories.
Of these,  only one factory produced  more  than 200,000  sedans.
Several  plants  had  production  runs  of fewer  than  20,000  sedans. 3 In  1998
China  had  122  motor  vehicle  manufacturing  plants,  520  automobile  refitting
factories,  130  motorcycle  factories,  62  car  engine  factories,  and  1,589  auto-
mobile  and  motorcycle  spare  parts  factories.  Annual  production capacity  now
exceeds  2.3  million  motor vehicles  and  10 million motorcycles.  Since  1995 the
general pattern has  been to shut down smaller plants (generally relegated to the
"other"  category  in  table  3),  and expand  production  runs in  the larger  plants.
With foreign investment and rapid growth  in the industry, the number of plants
producing  at least 25,000 vehicles  rose from 3 in  1995  to 11  in 2002.
Import  and domestic shipment data in value terms for 1997, the preaccession
reference  point,  are summarized  in table 4.  Reflecting  relative  tariff differences,
imports  are  concentrated  in  parts  rather than  in  vehicles.  China's  preaccession
average tariff on automobile products (vehicles and parts) was 35 percent (table 5).
The rate for vehicles averaged  70 percent, with sedans  subject to tariffs  of 80-100
percent. Parts  were subject to an average tariff of 23 percent. Import  shares were
3.  There  are  strong  parallels  to  the  situation  in  Mexico  before  the  North  American  Free  Trade
Agreement  (Lopez de Silanes  and others  1994), where protected, inefficient factories operated well within
the global  technology  frontier.TABLE  3.  Number  of Passenger  Cars Produced  by Plants  in China,  1995-2002
Rank 2002/1995  Plant  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002a
1/1  Shanghai-Volkswagen  160,070  200,222  230,443  235,000  230,946  221,524  230,378  248,000
2/4  FAW-Volkswagen  24,553  44,825  46,405  66,000  81,464  94,147  101,622  131,000
3/NA  Shanghai-General  Motors  - - - - - 30,024  58,548  106,000
4/2  Tianjin  Xiali  (Daihatsu)  65,258  88,232  95,155  100,021  101,828  81,951  41,703  93,000
5/5  FAW-Audi-Hongqi  19,350  15,000  15,731  31,225  52,667  78,000
6/9  Shenlong  (Citroen)  3,797  9,228  30,035  36,240  40,200  53,900  52,850  68,000
7/6  Changan  (Suzuki)  17,770  16,420  35,160  36,239  44,583  48,235  50,573  64,000
8/NA  Guangzhou-Honda  - - - 2,246  10,008  32,228  51,153  60,000
9/NA  Shanghai-Qirui  - - - - - 2,767  30,085  47,000
10/NA  Geely  Group  - - - - - 14,594  21,702  38,000
11/NA  Dongfeng  Fengshen  - - - - - 3,159  8,000  32,000
12/NA  Haima  (Nainan-Mazda)  - - - - - 3,059  7,800  20,000
13/NA  Yuedo-Kia  - - - - - 2,423  6,210  16,000
14/NA  Qinchuan  - - - - - 5,380  5,686  16,000
15/NA  Nanya  - - - - - 1,000  8,000  13,500
16/3  Beijing  (Jeep)  25,127  26,051  19,377  8,344  9,294  4,867  4,663  4,400
17/7  Guizhou  Yunque  (Subaru)  7,105  798  1,000  - - 859  1,253  2,100
18/NA  Tianjin-Toyota  - - - - - - - 2,000
NA/8  Guangzhou-Peugeot  6,698  2,416  1,557  - - - - -
Other  22,570  - 22,479  8,013  31,312  17,930  1,900
Total  352,298  388,192  481,611  507,103  565,366  649,272  732,883  1,040,900
Number  of plants  3  4  5  5  5  8  9  11
producing  > 25,000 cars
Number of plants  2  2  2  3  3  4  7  8
producing  > 50,000  cars
Number of plants  I  1  1  2  2  1  2  3
producing  >  100,000 cars
NA, not  applicable.
-,  Not  available or  plant did not exist.
aValues  are based  on company  projections.
Souirce: Bessum 2002; Chinese  Motor Vehicle  Documentation  Center  2002.Francois and Spinaniger  91
TABLE  4.  China's Motor Vehicle Industry before World
Trade  Organization  Accession,  1997  (millions US$)
Sector  Amount
Imported  motor vehicles  and  parts,  world prices  3,607.7
Imported  motor vehicles  and  parts, internal  prices  4,849.3
Imported  parts  3,239.5
Imported  motor vehicles  1,609.9
Domestic  motor vehicles,  intermediates,  and parts  32,812.5
Intermediates  and parts  10,896.2
Industry consumption  of motor vehicles  21,625.5
Final  consumption  of motor  vehicles  290.8
Souirce: McDougall 2001.
TABLE  5.  Tariffs  on Motor  Vehicles  in China  (percent)
Item  1997 rate  Final  rate
Finished  motor vehicles  71  25
Mlotor  vehicle  parts  23  10
Electronic parts  12  10
Average motor  vehicles  and  parts  35  1  5
Soufrce:  China  wTo  accession  schedule,  GTAP  data, and  Office of the
U.S.  Trade  Representative.
relatively  low,  averaging  perhaps  3 percent  during  1995-2002.  Officially,  only
20,000 sedans  were  imported,  though many more were  likely smuggled  into the
country.4 Official policy encouraged the use of domestic parts and favored locally
(regionally)  produced  parts.  Domestic content  rules  applied  to  new investments,
stipulating  80 percent  domestic  content  by  the third  year.  The  effects  of  these
policies are reflected in the low share of imported automotive parts imports in total
production.  Even  after  China's completion  of WTO  accession,  foreign  ownership
will be limited to  50 percent.5
Tariff  rates  are  scheduled  to  come  down  substantially  as  part  of  the  WTO
accession  process:  by 25 percent  on vehicles  and  10 percent on parts on a most
favored nation  basis.  Quotas will  be phased out  by 2006  and will  be reduced  by
15 percent  a  year  until then.  Domestic content  requirements  have  already  been
removed.  (Both  of  these  nontariff  barriers  violate  basic  WTO  rules.)  Other  WTO
obligations  imply free  movement of imported automobiles  (free of import quotas)
4.  Unofficial  estimates  (based  on interviews)  are  that  1 00,000 or more sedans  have been imported  in
recent  years. Many smuggled  cars are  luxury models.
5.  In the  past,  finding partners  often  meant  having to  go to provinces  other  than  those  on  the coast.
These  provinces  often  tried  to  ensure  that  '"huy  local"  conditions  prevailed.  In  the  case  of  taxis  in
Shanghai,  regulations  stipulated  specifications  that  could  be filled  only  by a  Volkswagen  model.92  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  i  8,  NO.  I
within the  Chinese  market.  The internal  barriers  to trade simply  cannot be sus-
tained if China's new wro obligations are to be taken seriously. All these changes in
the structure of protection imply tremendous pressure for a breakdown of internal
barriers for domestic  production  and for rationalization of the domestic industry.
The government realizes  the implications for the structure of the automotive
sector.  Official  and  industry  sources  indicate  an  intention  to  support  only  a
small number  of domestic  production  groups,  perhaps  including  the Shanghai
group  (Volkswagen),  China  First  Auto  Works  (Volkswagen),  Shanghai  GM
(Buick),  and  the  Dongfeng  Group  (Citroen).  These  groups  with  their  foreign
partners already account for more than 70 percent of production  in China. Such
a  sharp  rationalization  will  undoubtedly  be  painful,  but  it  could  allow  the
industry  to  consolidate  production  and  work  its  way  down the  average  cost
curve for vehicle production.
II.  THE  MODELING  FRAMEWORK
A  CGE  model  is  used  to  assess the  possible  impact  of China's  accession  to the
w-ro.  (More  technical  details  and  references  for  the  model  are  provided  in
Francois and Spinanger 2001  and in the technical annex available for download
with  the  model  files.6)  CGE  models  have  become  a  standard  approach  for
analysis of multisector  policy initiatives, such  as the accompanying  w-ro  acces-
sion  (Francois 2000).  Although  the exercises  are hampered  by both the  neces-
sary assumptions  and the quality of available data, their estimates of the direct
and indirect  impact of broad policy  changes  have  proved  helpful  for assessing
existing economic policies  and  formulating new ones.
The Model Data
The  data come  from  a number  of sources.  They are  organized  into 23 sectors
and  25 regions  (table  6).  Details  on the  value-added  chain  linking  fibers  into
textiles  and clothing  production are included  to better capture the initial impact
on the base  scenario of the Agreement  on Textiles and Clothing  (ATC),  which is
scheduled to phase out the remaining  textile and clothing quotas  by 2005.
Data on production and trade are based on national  accounting  data linked
through trade  flows and drawn directly from the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP)  version 5 dataset (McDougall 2001). The dataset is benchmarked to 1997
and  includes  detailed  data  on  national  input-output,  trade,  and  final  demand
structures.  The  basic  database  was  updated  to  better  reflect  actual  import
protection  for goods and services.
Basic  data on current  tariff rates  come  from UN  Conference  on Trade  and
Development and WTO  data on the schedules of applied  and bound tariff rates.
6. The model  files, along  with  the technical  annex  describing the  model,  can  be  downloaded  from
www.intereconomics.com/francois.  The model  is implemented  in GEMNPACK.Francois and Spinanger  93
TABLE  6.  The Regional  and Sectoral  Breakdown  of the CGE  Model
Region  Sector
Primary
Hong  Kong, China  Wool
People's  Republic  of China  Natural  fibers
Taiwan,  China  Primary  food production
Japan  Other  primary production
Korea,  Rep.  of  Sugar
ASEAN5'  Processed  food, tobacco,  and  beverages
Vietnam  Manufacturing
India  Textiles
Bangladesh  Wearing  apparel
Other  South Asian  economiesh  Leather products
Australia  Chemicals,  refinery  products,  rubber,  plastics
New  Zealand  Steel refinery  products
Canada  Nonferrous  metal products
United  States  Motor vehicles  and parts
Mexico  Electronic  machinery  and  equipment
Brazil  Other  machinery  and  equipment
MERCOSURC  Other  manufactured  goods
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  economiesd  Services
Andean  Trade  Pact economiesd  Wholesale  and retail  trade  services
Chiled  Transportation  services  (land,  water,  air)
Other Latin  Americad  Communications  services
European  Union,  15  economies  Construction
Turkey  Finance,  insurance,  and  real estate  services
Africa  and the  Middle East  Other commercial  services
Rest  of world  Other services
aIndonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  Singapore,  and Thailand.
bNepal,  Pakistan,  and  Sri  Lanka.
cIncludes  Argentina,  Paraguay,  and Uruguay.  Brazil  is  represented  separately.
dNot treated in tables  and  diagrams.
Source: Database aggregation  produced  by authors.
These  are  integrated into  the  core  GTAP  database.  They  are supplemented  with
data from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative  and the U.S. International
Trade  Commission  on regional  preference  schemes  in the Western Hemisphere.
Data  on  agricultural  protection,  as  integrated  into  the  GTAP  core  database,  are
based  on estimates  by the Organisation  for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment  and U.S.  Department  of Agriculture.  Estimates on tariffs  and nontariff
barriers are further adjusted to reflect remaining Uruguay Round commitments,
including the  phase-out  of textile  and clothing  quotas  under  the ATC.  Data  on
post-Uruguay  Round tariffs are from recent estimates reported by Francois and
Strutt  (1999),  which  come primarily  from the  WTO'S  integrated  database,  with
supplemental  information  from the World Bank's  recent assessment  of detailed
pre-  and post-Uruguay  Round tariff  schedules.  All  this tariff  information  has
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the estimates  described  in the  technical  annex  and  are  shown in table  7  (the
basic  GTAP  database  includes  no information on trade barriers for services,  for
example).
The basic  GTAP  dataset is benchmarked  to 1997 and reflects applied tariffs in
place  in 1997.  Because  the interest here is with the post-Uruguay  Round world,
a "pre-experiment"  was run on the model to implement the remaining  Uruguay
Round tariff cuts. Most of these cuts were already in place in the 1997 benchmark
TABLE  7.  China's Tariff Rates before  and after World Trade  Organization
Accession,  as  Modeled  (percent)
Sector  Model  base  rates  Accession  rates  New  bound rates
Merchandise
Wool  14.8  42.0  38.0
Natural  fibers  3.1  17.4  13.6
Primary  food production  58.8  58.1  46.8
Other  primary  production  0.5  6.9  5.0
Sugar  29.5  30.0  20.0
Processed  food,  tobacco,  37.7  40.7  23.2
and  beverages
Textiles  25.1  25.4  10.2
Wearing  apparel  31.8  32.8  16.1
Leather  products  12.1  20.9  17.0
Chemicals,  refinery  products,  12.6  14.9  7.2
rubber,  plastics
Steel  refinery  products  9.7  8.9  5.1
Nonferrous  metal  products  7.8  8.2  5.5
Motor vehicles  and parts  34.4  38.7  15.4
Motor  vehicles  70.5  70.5  25.0
Parts  23.4  23.4  10.0
Electronic  machinery  and equipment  11.9  16.9  9.6
Other  machinery  and equipment  12.8  15.4  10.1
Other  manufactured  goods  14.5  22.0  16.3
Services
Wholesale  and retail trade  services  0.0  NA  0.0
Transportation services  4.0  NA  2.0
(land,  water,  air)
Communications  services  9.2  NA  4.6
Construction  13.7  NA  6.8
Finance,  insurance,  and real  8.1  NA  4.0
estate  services
Other commercial  services  48.0  NA  24.0
Other services  25.7  NA  13.0
NA,  not applicable.
Note:  Service  barriers  are  based  on  gravity  equation  estimates.  Accession  rates  reflect  an
assumed  50 percent drop  in cross-border  trading  costs.
Source: China  wTo accession  schedule,  GTAP  data,  and Office of the U.S.  Trade Representative.
Gravity  estimates  are based on trade and macroeconomic  data and cross-country regressions;  see
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dataset. The  data  were  also  adjusted to  reflect  regional  preference  schemes  in
Latin America  (not represented  in the core  GTAP  database).  The  dataset used for
actual  policy  experiments  is  therefore  a  representation  of  a  notional  world
economy  (with  values  in  1997  dollars)  with  full  Uruguay  Round  tariff  cut
implementation.  Experiments  consider  both  the  ATC  phase-out  and  China's
wTo  accession,  with reference  to  this post-Uruguay  Round tariff benchmark.
Model Structure
Except  for  the  automobile  sector,  the  CGE  model  structure  is  standard.  On the
production side,  firms in all sectors minimize costs,  employing domestic factors
of production  (capital, labor, and  land) and intermediate  inputs  from domestic
and foreign sources to produce goods and services. Technologies  are modeled  as
constant  elasticity  of substitution  processes  defined  over  primary  inputs  and
Leontief  processes  defined  over  intermediate  inputs.  Products  from  different
regions are assumed to be imperfect substitutes  in accordance with the Armington
assumption.  Prices  on  goods  and  factors  adjust  until  all  markets  are  simul-
taneously  in  (general)  equilibrium-all  markets  clear.  Although  changes  are
modeled  in  gross  trade  flows,  changes  in  net  international  capital  flows  are
not  (this  does  not  preclude  changes  in the  level  of gross  capital  flows).  Trade
liberalization  in the goods  sectors involves reduction of tariffs and a shift from
model  base  rates  to  the  new  bound  rates.  The  new  bound  rates  are  generally
quite  close  to the  calculations  of average  accession  rates.  Liberalization  in the
service  sector  is  modeled  as  a  reduction  in trading  costs, reflecting  the barrier
reductions in  barriers  reported in table  7.  These  are Samuelson  iceberg  costs.
To  reflect  the  status  quo  in  the  motor  vehicle  sector  in  a  stylized,  though
representative  way,  one  option was  to implement  imperfect  competition  in the
model.  This  was  rejected,  however,  because  it does  not adequately  reflect  the
primary  issue  at  hand.  Government  policy  has  certainly  resulted  in  market
segmentation,  but  there  is  also  price  setting  and  regulation.  The  choice  was
made to focus on realized cost efficiency  for the sector. The cost structure  of the
industry  reflects  the net effect of a  basket of policies.  Like  clothing in India  or
automobiles  in Mexico  before the North American  Free  Trade Agreement,  the
structure  of  the automobile  sector  in  China  reflects  regulated  efficiency-the
impact  of the  general  regulatory  and administrative  environment.  The  critical
issue  is  thus  these  collective  inefficiencies,  which  follow  from  the  full  set  of
industrial  policies.  At the  same  time,  an  implication  of intended  public  policy
seems  to  be  restructuring  and  consolidation,  leading  to  an  improvement  in
regulated  efficiency.
What shape will the gains from changes in regulated efficiency take?  Through
rationalization,  the  industry  may  collectively  move  down  relevant cost  curves.
Although  minimum efficient  scale for  some models  is  about 200,000  units per
plant  (Huang 2002),  a  global norm,  based  on  comparisons  with plant sizes  in
North America  and  Europe,  is  closer  to 350,000  units.  Further  comparison  of
current plant scale  in China  (see table 3) with such a norm  implies that average96  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL,  I8,  NO.  I
costs  are  roughly  20  percent  higher  simply  because of inefficient  scale.7 Data
from interviews  with industry representatives  (Feenstra  and others 2001)  point
to similar  cost savings,  with expectations  of even higher cost reductions in the
range  of  25-30  percent.  A  World  Bank  study  (1993,  p.  57)  describes  quite
succinctly  the expected  gains  from  reaching  minimum efficient  scale  (MES):  "If
this cost-volume  relationship is applied to the Chinese automotive industry, the
passenger  car  segment  has  a cost disadvantage  of 20 to  30 percent  compared
with the international producers having  MES.  This cost disadvantage could be an
understatement,  however,  as there are already eight producers  in the market."
This net cost effect is stressed here and sets the treatment of motor vehicles apart
from that  of other  sectors  in the  model.  The  lower  bound  of these cost  effect
estimates  is used. In particular,  the focus is on potential cost  savings  in the  final
assembly of automobiles due to a higher regulated efficiency level for the industry,
resulting from consolidation and rationalization of policy.8 In addition, the differ-
ential treatment of parts and finished vehicles in the tariff schedule is also tracked.
That  large  gains  can  be  achieved  by  rationalizing  production  and  reducing
costs  was  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  United  States  at  the  beginning  of the
twentieth  century  (figure  2).  In 1914,  "13,000 workers at Ford were  producing
260,720  cars. By comparison, in the rest of the industry, it took 66,350 workers
to  make 286,770"  cars.9 Such  dichotomies  also  exist  across  the  spectrum  of
production  possibilities  in China  today, with  new foreign-built  modern  plants
coexisting  with Mao-era  facilities.  Similar demand factors  also prevailed.  As a
result of Ford's new production  methods, cars in the United States moved  from
being  scarce  goods  to  goods  affordable  by  large  segments  of the population.
China  is already  moving into this phase. The similarity  between  China's motor
vehicle  production  from  1984  to 2002  and that  of the  United  States  between
1900  and  1924,  as shown  in figure 2, would seem to justify such an analogy.
III.  EXPERIMENTS  AND  RESULTS
The experiments  involve full accession  for China and Taiwan, China. The basic
accession  package  involves  the changes  in tariffs  detailed  in table  7.  For auto-
mobiles  the  following  effects  are modeled:
* Tariffs on motor vehicles decrease to 25 percent.
*  Tariffs  on  automobile  parts  are  phased  down  from  an  average  of  23.4
percent to an average  of 10 percent.
7.  The  20  percent  figure  is  based  on  the  distribution  of  current  plants  shown  in  table  3.  An
average  cost  index  for  the  industry  can  be  calculated  by  applying  the  formula  Aln(Average  Cost) =
CDR . Aln(Quiantity),  where  CDR  is  the  inverse  elasticity  of  scale,  defined  as  CDR=(Average Cost-
Marginal Cost)lAuerage Cost, and  is  between  0.125  and  0.135  (the range  of values  found in  engineering
stLdies). If the index is 100 at 350,000 units per plant, current plant structure yields a cost index of roughly 120.
8.  In other  words,  cost savings are modeled  at the assembly  level.
9.  See www.wiley.com/products/subject/business/forbes/ford.html.Francois and Spinanger  97
FIGURE  2.  Annual  Motor Vehicle  Production  in  China  and  the United  States
(thousands)
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* The industry is rationalized.  Implicitly,  this involves  elimination  of internal
regional  barriers  and  consolidation  within  the  domestic  market.  Small,
inefficient  factories  close.  To  quantify  this  effect,  sedan  production  is
taken  as  representative.  Given  the  typical  scale  of domestic  production,
automobile  plants  are  assumed  to  realize  a  20  percent  cost  savings  in
assembly  if they  move  to efficient  scale.  (See note  2 and  the  discussion  in
section  II).  This savings  is modeled  at the assembly  level.
The  overall  sectoral  impacts of the experiments  are presented in table  8,  which
reports changes  in the quantity  of output under alternative  scenarios. Extending
the  ATC  phase-out  to  China  and  Taiwan  implies  a  dramatic  expansion  in
the textile  and  clothing  sectors,  with textiles growing  14  percent  and clothing
50  percent.  There  are  important  general  equilibrium  effects,  as  the  resources
needed for this experiment  are drawn from other parts of the economy, includ-
ing the motor  vehicle  sector.
Especially important for the motor vehicle sector are the results reflecting  the
incremental  impact of China's market access commitments made  as part of wfo
accession  and  shown  in columns  B  and  C of table  8.  Column  B  is  a  business
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TABLE  8.  Impact  on Output of World Trade Organization  Accession  by
China and Taiwan,  China (percentage  change)
Accession  Total  impact  Total
Elimination  without  Accession  without  impact with
of textile  automobile  with  automobile  automobile  automobile
and apparel  sector  sector  sector  sector
quotas  restructuring  restructuring  restructuring  restructuring
Sector  A  B  C  D=A+B  E=A+C
Wool  12.8  18.3  16.8  33.4  31.8
Other  natural  fibers  12.1  17.9  16.4  32.1  30.5
Primary  food  -0.4  -1.0  -0.9  --1.5  -1.3
Other  primary  -2.6  -3.6  -3.3  -6.1  -5.8
production
Sugar  -2.3  -7.9  -8.5  --- 10.0  -10.6
Processed  foods  -1.0  -4.7  -4.7  -5.6  -5.7
Textiles  13.9  32.0  30.6  50.4  48.8
Clothing  50.3  75.5  73.0  163.7  160.0
Leather  goods  -7.2  5.4  3.5  -2.2  -3.9
Chemicals,  rubber,  -2.0  -4.5  -4.3  -6.5  -6.2
and refineries
Primary  steel  -4.0  -9.1  -7.9  -12.8  -11.5
Primary  nonferrous  -5.4  -9.2  -8.9  -14.2  -13.9
metals
Motor  vehicles  -4.1  -36.7  8.0  -39.3  3.5
and parts
Electronics  -5.1  -3.9  -4.4  -8.8  -9.3
Other machinery  -3.8  -5.4  -4.8  -9.0  -8.5
and  equipment
Other manufactures  -2.2  -0.3  0.1  -2.5  -2.0
Wholesale  and  -0.3  1.4  1.9  1.1  1.7
retail  trade
Transport services  -1.9  -2.0  -1.4  -3.9  -3.3
Communications  -0.5  0.1  1.0  -0.5  0.5
Construction  0.8  2.8  4.2  3.6  5.0
Finance,  insurance,  -0.7  -0.4  0.2  -1.1  -0.4
and real  estate
Commercial  services  -0.8  -5.9  -5.4  -6.6  --- 6.2
Other  services  0.0  0.5  1.2  0.5  1.2
Source: Model  estimates;  see table  7.
industry that continues  to be fragmented, with favored  producers in each region,
small  production  runs,  and  high  costs.  Such  an  industry  is  simply  unable  to
compete  with imports. It is hit very hard by imports,  with domestic production
falling 37 percent. Combined with the initial impact of the ATC  phase-out,  there
is a dramatic retrenchment  of the uncompetitive domestic  industry in the face  of
imports  (column D).
By contrast, the scenario with elimination of internal barriers,  rationalization
of plants  (with smaller  plants  being  closed),  and  an efficiency  gain of roughlyFrancois and  /'  n.i:.  99
20 percent as  scale  economies are realized,  production  rises slightly  (3  percent)
and the industry emerges as relatively competitive,  despite the loss of protection
(columns  C and  E).
The  most striking  difference  between  the two  scenarios  is in  the impacts  on
intermediate  parts production  and final  automobile  production  (table 9).  Under
the  scenario  of  business  as  usual,  imports  of parts  rise  slightly,  whereas  their
share  of  the  domestic  market  rises  substantially.  There  is  a  dramatic  surge  in
imports  of  motor  vehicles,  which  displace  more  than  a  third  of  domestic
production.  There  is  a  drop  in  the  overall  market  for  parts  because  of  the
decline  in  domestic  vehicle  production.  Under  the  second  scenario  of rational-
ization  of the  final  assembly  sector,  which  allows the sector  to compete  more
directly  with  imports,  there  is  a  shift  to  imported  intermediates  (rising  to  a
market  share  of  more  than  50  percent),  a  fall  in  domestic  parts  production
(displaced  by imports), and steady overall demand for parts. Although ground is
lost  to  parts  imports,  sales  of domestic  vehicles  remain  steady  in  the  face  of
imports.
China's  wTo  accession  also  affects  value  added  and  trade.  It  is  logical  to
expect some export  response,  both because of the  general liberalization in trade
TABLE  9.  Impact  of World  Trade  Organization  Accession  by  China and
Taiwan,  China,  on China's  Motor  Vehicle  Market
Accession
without  Accession  with
automobile  automobile
Benchmark  sector  sector
Item  1997  restructuring  restructuring
Value (millions of 1997 U.S.  dollars)
Imported  motor vehicles  3,607.7  10,595.7  6,968.0
and  parts,  world prices
Imported  motor  vehicles  4,806.4  12,080.7  7,995.7
and  parts,  internal prices
Imported  parts  1,609.9  2,827.9  5,535.2
Imported  motor vehicles  3,196.5  9,252.8  2,460.5
Domestic  automobiles,  32,812.5  19,401.9  24,249.6
intermediates,  and  parts
Intermediates  and parts  10,896.2  4,494.0  5,189.1
Industrv consumption  of motor  21,625.5  14,698.8  18,785.0
v  ehicles
Final consumption  of motor vehicles  290.8  209.2  275.4
Index and share
Import  share  of total  12.9  38.6  51.6
automobile  parts  (percent  of value)
Index  of vehicle  production  100.00  68.0  102.8
Index  of parts  production  100.00  41.2  56.3
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T A B L E  1 0.  China's Export  Shares,  Baseline  and Two  Scenarios
Total  impact  Total impact
without  with
automobile  automobile
Baseline  sector  sector
Sector  1997  restructuring  restructuring
Primary  0.046  0.033  0.033
Textiles  0.084  0.098  0.097
Wearing  apparel  0.102  0.303  0.298
Motor  vehicles  and parts  0.006  0.004  0.019
Electronic  machinery  and equipment  0.133  0.100  0.099
Other machinery  and  equipment  0.146  0.104  0.103
Other  manufactured  goods  0.397  0.294  0.290
Services  0.087  0.062  0.062
Source: McDougall  2001  (baseline)  and authors'  model  estimates (impact).
and because pressure from imports may force firms to seek other markets.  China
exports  less  that  4  percent  ($1.3  billion  of  production  of  $32  billion)  of  its
production  in  the  sector  based  on  1997  values.  To  put  this  in perspective,
Australia  has  a  comparable  level  of exports  with  an  industry  only  one-third
the size  of China's. The Republic  of Korea's  export share is  10 times as large.
China's  trade is therefore  well below global integration standards,  measured  by
exports.
The model experiments  show that restructuring  accelerates  the export  orien-
tation  of the  automobile  industry,  with  a rapid  growth  in  exports  (table  10).
Exports  rise  by  roughly  $3.8  billion,  or  300  percent,  reaching  roughly
10  percent  of production  by  value.  Although  this  seems  dramatic,  it  needs  to
be  kept  in  perspective.  Automobiles  and  parts  are  a  small  share  of exports
(0.6 percent  in 1997)  and remain small  (up to 2 percent)  even with the growth  in
automobile exports.  Most of the restructuring remains  focused on the domestic
market.
IV.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
Regulatory  reform  and  internal  restructuring  are  critical to the impact  of w-ro
accession on China's motor vehicle sector. Such  restructuring is represented here
by  a  cost  reduction  following  from  consolidation  and  rationalization.  This
representation  is  supported  by  a  comparison  of scale  in  a typical  automobile
plant in China to that in typical plants in North America or Europe  and also  by
firm  survey  responses.  It  is  also  supported  by  earlier  estimates  of the  benefits
from  achieving  minimum  and  efficient  scale  and  radical  restructuring  to
improve  production  efficiency.  The  net  result  is  a movement  of  costs  toward
global  norms.  With  restructuring,  the  final  assembly  industry  can  become
competitive  by  world  standards,  while  the  parts  industry  further  integratesFrancois  and Spinanger  101
with the global industry through exports  (and through higher imports). Without
such restructuring,  however,  the domestic  industry remains  uncompetitive,  and
wTo  accession means  that imports of final vehicles will surge,  though imports  of
parts  will  fall as  production  moves  offshore.
Viewed in total, what do the results show? They highlight  the importance  of
incorporating  the  impact  of  regulatory  regimes  on  costs  when  assessing  the
impact of changes  in trade policy. For China,  restructuring within the domestic
market results in a qualitatively  different impact from tariff reductions. Without
such  restructuring,  the  industry  fails  to  compete  and  contracts  dramatically.
However,  with  restructuring,  the  final  assembly  industry  can  be  made  inter-
nationally  competitive.  In  addition,  the industry  shifts  to  local  assembly,  with
high import content for domestic vehicles.
Two  additional  issues  need  to be  raised.  The  first concerns  China's  popula-
tion  to  motor  vehicles  ratio,  which  is  far  higher  than  that  in  many  other
countries  with  similar  income  levels  (see  table  1).  Because  this  reflects  the
impact  of existing policies,  a  significant  change  in policies  could  shift demand
closer to a normal pattern of consumption, given China's geographic  attributes.
The  second  issue  concerns  further  strengthening  of  demand  for  cars  through
better access to financing. Roughly  75 percent of U.S. and European automobile
purchases  are  financed  through  loans,  but  only  15  percent  of  automobile
purchases  in  China are  financed  this way.  Although  China's protocol  of acces-
sion to the  WTO  stipulates that automobile  finance  will be liberalized,  only draft
legislation  has  been  presented  to  date.'0 To  the  extent  that  this  potential
demand  can  be tapped,  the pressure  on firms  to be  more  productive  and thus
more  competitive  will  be  all the  greater.  This would  be  another  factor  helping
ensure  that the calculated  welfare  gains  will come  about.
The  shortcomings  of  the  analysis  also  need  to  be  highlighted.  The  model
applied  here  is  very  stylized,  although  it  widely  captures  the  real  world.
Although restructuring  has positive  overall  implications  for  the industry,  there
are bound  to be adjustment  costs that are not pointed to in the model.  Even if
value  added  is  preserved  within  the  sector,  there  will  likely  be  a  dramatic
relocation  of  jobs  toward  a  limited  number  of  plants,  with  job  losses  in  the
other,  smaller  plants.  The  current  regional  scattering  of final  automobile  pro-
duction  (table  11)  will  be  replaced  by  a  more  geographically  concentrated
pattern.  Parts  production  will  also  tend  to  concentrate.  To  the  extent  that
parts  suppliers  are  able  to  supply  regional  markets,  this  is likely  to mean  that
existing  clustering  in  coastal  regions  will  intensify,  with  parts  shipments  to
Japan, the  Republic  of Korea,  the  United  States,  and  other regional  centers  of
10.  Nonetheless,  some  major  car  companies  (Volkswagen  and  Ford)  did  reach  agreements  with
Chinese  banks  earlier  this  year  (KP.xz;  2003,  p.  7).  According  to  the  International Herald Tribune
(October  6,  2003)  China  has opened  up this sector  in line  with  its wro commitments.102  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  1 8,  NO.  I
TABLE  1 1.  Location  of Automobile Production  in China, 2002
Foreign production
Producer  Foreign producer  Capacity  (cars/year)  Production
1 SAIC VW  Volkswagen  450,000  278,890
2  SAIC  GM  General  Motors  100,000  111,623
3 FAW VW  Volkswagen  270,000  158,654
4 FAW Toyota  Toyota/Mazda  70,000  30,165
5 Dongfeng  PSA  PSA/Citroen  150,000  84,378
6 Dongfeng  Honda  Honda  60,000  59,024
7 Dongfeng Yulong  NissanNYulong  60,000  38,897
8  Tianjing Toyota  Toyota  30,000  2,147
9 Jlangsu  Nanya  Fiat  100,000  23,393
10  SAIC  Chery  Daewoo  60,000  49,397
11  Zehjiang Jili  Daewoo  (geplant)  150,000  47,443
12  Chongqing  Chang'an  Suzuki  Suzuki/Yanjin  150,000  67,846
13 Chang'an Ford  Ford  50,000  NA
14  Dengfeng Yueda  Kia  Kia  50,000  20,080
15  FAW Hainan  Mazda  50,000  11,989
16 Beijing Hyundai  Hyundai  30,000  1,356
17 China Guizhou  Aviation  Ind.  Wanhong/Chenchang  10,000  1,831
18 Shenyang  Brilliant Junbei  BMW (by mid-2003)  200,000  NA
19  Harbin  Hafei  Mitsubishi  30,000  14,577
20  Shangdong  Yantei  General  Motors  50,000  NA
21  Southeast  Zhonghua  60,000  16,935
22 Beijing Jeep  Daimler-Chrysler  85,000  9,052
23 Jinbei General  Motors  General  Motors  30,000  3,751
24 Hunan Changfeng  Mitsubishi  30,000  15,067
25 Zhengzhou Nissan  Nissan  30,000  NA
26 Rongcheng  Huatai  Hyundai  20,000  NA
27 Jiangxi  Fuqi  Golden  Lion  20,000  NA
28 Tianjing  Huali  Golden  Lion  20,000  NA
29  SAIC  GM  Wuling  General  Motors  150,000  NA
30 Sanjiang  Renault  Renault  30,000  NA
31  Chengdu  FAW  Toyota  5,000  NA
32 Yizhong  SAIC/RDS  10,000  NA
(Continued)
production.
1 '  From an employment  perspective,  output and value added results
closely track the impact on employment.  The results  point to a range of effects
on employment,  from  -40 percent without  restructuring  to  -3  percent  with
restructuring.  This range of effects highlights the importance of rationalizing the
structure  of plants.
11.  European  manufacturers  have  already  established  12  plants  in  China,  and  one  large  U.S.
company (Delphi)  is shifting from Mexico.Francois and Spinanger  103
TABLE  1 1.  Continued
Production  capacity  in  provinces
Province  Capacity  (cars/year)  Production
Anhui  60,000  49,397
Beiing  115,000  10,408
Fujian  80,000  16,935
Guandong  120,000  97,921
Guangxi  Zhuang  150,000  NA
Guizhou  10,000  1,831
Hainan  50,000  11,989
Heilongiang  30,000  14,577
Henan  30,000  NA
Hubei  180,000  84,378
Jiangsu  130,000  38,460
Jilin  340,000  188,819
Liaoming  230,000  3,751
Shandong  80,000  NA
Shanghai  550,000  390,513
Shanxi  50,000  20,080
Sichuan  205,000  67,846
Tianjing  50,000  2,147
Zehjiang  150,000  47,443
Total  2,380,000  1,046,495
Other foreign  companies  Number  of employees  Number of plants
Bosch  3,600  6
Kolbenschmidt  1,500  2
Michelin  4,000  2
ZF/Sachs  2,100  2
Total  11,200  12
NA,  actual  production  was not yet available.
Source: Bessum  2002;  Chinese  Motor  Vehicle  Documentation  Center  2002.
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Antidumping  and Safeguards
Patrick A.  Messerlin
China  finds itself in a  unique  situation on antidumping  and safeguard  issues. It is by
far the main target of antidumping  measures,  but (so far)  one of the smallest users  of
such  measures.  China's World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  accession  protocol  includes
stringent  antidumping  and  safeguard  provisions  that  its  trading  partners  may  use
against its  exports.  The  article  examines  three  related  concerns:  how  quickly  large
developing  economies  can  become  intensive  users  of  antidumping  measures,  an
evolution  raising  concerns  about  China's  recent  antidumping  enforcement,  how
China could  minimize  its exposure  to  foreign  antidumping  cases,  a  recipe  for both
improving  trade  outcomes  and  for  China's  taking  a  leading  role  in  reforming  WTO
antidumping;  and the opportunities  that the  Doha Round  of trade negotiations  offer
to China for negotiating stricter disciplines  both on WTO contingent  protection and on
the  use  by  China's  trading  partners  of  the  special  provisions  included  in  China's
accession protocol.
On November  10,  2001,  China  was  accepted  as  a full  member  in  the  World
Trade  Organization  (wro).  A  few  weeks  earlier,  China's  chief  trade  negotia-
tor,  Long  Yongtu,  had  put  "stricter  rules  on  antidumping"  second  among
China's  priorities  in  the  WTO.  At  that  time  the  United  States  was  still  fighting
to  exclude  antidumping  from  the  topics  to  be  discussed  at  the  WTO  Doha
Ministerial  Meeting  and  the  European  Union  was  adopting  an  ambiguous
position.
In  the  early  stages  of the  negotiations  under  the  Doha  Round  development
agenda,  China  finds  itself  in  a  unique  situation  on antidumping  and  safeguard
issues.  China's  WTO  accession protocol includes  special provisions on antidumping
and safeguards  that its  trading partners  may  use  against  Chinese  exports.  These
include continuing use of "nonmarket economy"  status  in antidumping  investiga-
tions for  15  years  and  use  of a  special  "transitional  product-specific  safeguard"
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provision  for 12 years.'  China is by far the main target of antidumping measures
even though it is one of the smallest users of such measures. But the past decade has
shown how quickly large developing  economies can become intensive users of this
instrument,  and the evolution  of China's  antidumping enforcement  in 2002  and
early 2003 raises concerns  in this respect.
Section  I of this article  describes  the current situation  with respect  to  anti-
dumping.  It is used  massively  by only  10 countries  (4 industrial and  6 develop-
ing),  and there is strong asymmetry,  best illustrated by China, between  countries
enforcing  antidumping  and those targeted  by antidumping  measures.  Section  II
examines  how  China  could  minimize  its  exposure  to  foreign  antidumping
cases-an  option  that would  be  a  recipe  for  both  improving  trade  outcomes
and  for China taking  a  leading  role  in reforming wro  antidumping.  Section  III
analyzes  China's  antidumping  regulations  and  its  first  cases,  including  their
crucial  relationship  with  the  existing  web  of the  U.S.  and  EU  antidumping
cases.  Section  IV examines  the opportunities the Doha  Round offers to China
for negotiating stricter disciplines both on wTO contingent protection and on the
use  of  the  nonmarket  economy  and  transitional  product-specific  safeguard
provisions by China's trading partners. The  conclusion summarizes  the crucial
choices to be made by China in antidumping  and safeguard policy.
I.  THE  CURRENT  SITUATION
During the November  2001  WTO  Doha Ministerial  Meeting,  antidumping  was
perceived  as an issue pitting developing economies,  anxious to discipline the use
of this instrument,  against the United States, which was (and still is) reluctant to
change  its  own  antidumping  regulations.  However,  a  much  more  complex
picture  emerges  from  a  close  examination  of  the  antidumping  measures  in
force at the end  of each year during 1995-2002,  which are notified to the  WTO
Secretariat  by wTo  members.
2
Antidumping Users and Targeted Countries: A  Key  Asymmetry
Examination  of the stock of antidumping measures in force shows two main results
(table 1).  First, the top 10 antidumping users enforce  90 percent of the antidumping
measures  notified  to the wro,  whereas  they represent  70 percent  of world  gross
1.  In spring 2002 the European  Union and the United States declared that they would consider Russia
a  market economy  for  purposes  of antidumping.  However,  the  case  for introduction  of  a transitional
product-specific  safeguard provision in Russia's accession  protocol seems open. It would be interesting to
make  a  parallel  between  the  conditions  imposed on  Japan's  accession  to  the  General  Agreement  on
Tariffs and Trade (iAlT)  and  those imposed on  China in its accession  to the wTo.
2.  Tables  1-3 treat measures taken against  individual EU member states as one aggregated measure  if
adopted at the same time and for the same product (data for 200)2 are still not complete). Table 4 follows
the  notifications  of EU trading  partners,  which  vary  in their  treatment  of the  European Union  (as one
entity  or as a  set  of distinct  member states).Messerlin  107
TABLE  1.  Top  10 Antidumping Users,  1995-2001  (number of
measures  in  force)
Average
number  Average
Country  by value  applied
or group  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  of imports  tarrif
Industrial countries
Australia  78  46  40  49  39  44  59  38  0.77  5.8
Canada  79  78  78  65  72  71  85  83  0.38  4.8
European  Union  140  138  138.  139  159  175  175  183  0.19  4.6
United  States  265  271  271  281  282  202  227  239  0.29  4.3
Developing economies
Argentina  15  30  33  39  45  42  45  60  1.17  13.7
Brazil  21  28  23  28  38  43  49  54  0.51  12.5
India  13  15  24  44  58  94  115  181  1.28  39.6
Mexico  93  92  81  86  80  77  61  55  0.72  12.6
South  Africa  12  29  42  56  87  96  94  80  1.81  15.0
Turkey  37  37  34  34  35  14  16  30  0.61  12.7
All other  50  59  84  102  122  117  97  - 0.04  -
China  - - 0  0  4  8  11  17  0.03  15.8
All countries  803  823  848  923  1,017  975  1,023  - 0.21  -
Note: Measures  in force  include  antidumping  duties and  undertakings  in force  as of December
31  of the year.  -,  Not available.
aAverage  number per  $1,000  of  1997 imports  of the  user  country.
Source: Author's  computations  based  on  WTO  Reports  on  Antidumping  (G/ADP/N  series  at
www.wto.org),  WTO  trade  data,  and  wTo  (2001).
domestic product  (GDP)  and 50 percent of the world trade. Worldwide  antidumping
enforcement is thus highly concentrated  in fewer than a dozen countries.
Second,  the  situation  prevailing  during  the  Uruguay  Round-antidumping
users  were  almost  exclusively  industrial  countries-is no longer true.  Six new
intensive antidumping  users are  developing  economies  (Argentina,  Brazil,  India,
Mexico,  South Africa,  and  Turkey),  and they have  almost  caught  up with  the
four major traditional  users. These new users implemented  more than a third of
the antidumping  measures in force in 2002,  up from less than a  fourth in 1995.
Meanwhile,  the  share  of measures  of the  four  traditional  users  declined  from
more than two-thirds  to half the total number of antidumping measures  in force
during the period.  In another worrisome  sign  of increasing  use  of antidumping
measures,  the remaining  developing economies,  though still small users individ-
ually,  together  doubled  their  global  share  of  measures  in  force  during  the
observation  period.
Examination  of  the  stock  of  antidumping  measures  in  force  by  targeted
country  shows  a  marked  asymmetry  between  antidumping  users  and  targets
(tables  1 and  2).  The  top  10  users  are the  targets of less  than a  third  of all  the
measures in force, and the gap between  using antidumping measures and being a108  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  i8,  NO.  i
TABLE  2.  Top  10 Antidumping  Targets,  1995-2001  (number of
measures  in force)
Average
number
Country  by  value
or group  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  of exportsa
Indutstrial cotuntries
Australia  5  6  5  6  5  5  5  5  0.08
Canada  19  19  19  19  20  18  8  8  0.08
European Union  77  88  89  102  132  149  99  98  0.13
United  States  60  66  66  68  66  62  57  67h  0.09
Developing economies
Argentina  9  8  7  7  7  7  9  8  0.30
Brazil  48  51  52  45  42  43  34  51  0.85
India  15  15  15  21  29  35  42  44  0.72
Mexico  11  15  17  17  19  21  17  17  0.15
South  Africa  7  10  11  11  12  15  16  24  0.39
Turkey  9  9  6  8  10  13  12  18  0.37
All other  543  536  561  619  675  611  724  - 0.29
China  143  148  180  193  202  207  199  212  0.99
All countries  803  823  848  923  1,017  979  1,023  - 0.22
Note: Measures  in force  include  antidumping  duties and undertakings  in  force as of December
31  of this year. -,  Not available.
aAverage  number  per $1,000 of  1997 exports of targeted  country.
bIncomplete  estimate.
Source: Author's  computations  based  on  WTO  Reports  on  Antidumping  (G/ADP/N  series  at
www.wto.org)  and wTo  trade  data.
target  widened  in 2001  and 2002.  In sum, antidumping  is currently  an instru-
ment enforced by a few large countries against the smaller economies  of the rest
of the world. Thus there is little pressure coming  from the rest of the world  to
urge intensive  antidumping  users to restrain their  actions.
For the top 10 antidumping  users, with the exception  of Brazil,  the domestic
interests  that  are  hurt  by  foreign  antidumping  measures  are  smaller  than the
interests that benefit  from antidumping protection.  This reflects the well-known
economic proposition that views protection more as a conflict between domestic
export  interests  and  import-competing  interests  than  as  a  conflict  between
countries.  To capture  this aspect,  the number of foreign antidumping  measures
in  force  against  the  exports of a  top user  can  be  adjusted  by  the  size  of the
country's  exports  (in  thousands  of  U.S.  dollars;  see  table  2).  These  trade-
adjusted  measures  mirror  the  intensity  of  foreign  pressures  imposed  on  the
export  interests  of  a  country,  thus  giving  an  indication  of  the  incentives  of
these  export  interests  to contribute  to the opening of domestic markets.  These
numbers  can then  be compared  with the trade-adjusted  antidumping  measures
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indication  of the  strength  of the  incentives  of  import-competing  interests  to
induce their government  to  use antidumping.  The  observed  imbalance  between
export interests  and import-competing  antidumping  beneficiaries  in the top  10
antidumping  users  suggests  that it  is  unlikely  that domestic  coalitions  in  these
key  users,  which are  also  key  WTO  players,  are  strong  enough  to support  anti-
dumping reforms  in the  WTO.
This  situation  raises  a  question  that  needs  to  be  carefully  examined  in  the
future.  The  data  on  antidumping  measures  in  force  suggest that  antidumping
measures  by  the  six  major  developing  economy  antidumping  users  impose
welfare  costs  on their  own  domestic  economies  that  are  higher  than  the  costs
imposed  on  industrial economies  by their  antidumping  measures,  for two rea-
sons.  First is the marked difference  between  the number  of measures  imposed by
developing  and  industrial  countries  once  adjusted  for trade  size.  The average
number  of measures  in  force  per  $1,000  of goods  imported  (in  1997)  by  an
antidumping user is  a better indicator of the potential harm done  by antidump-
ing  to  the  domestic  economy  than  the  absolute  number  of  measures.  This
indicator is much  higher for developing economies  than for industrial countries,
ranging  from  0.5  for  Brazil  to  1.8  for  South  Africa  and  from  0.2  for  the
European  Union  to  0.4  for  Canada  (with  an  exception,  Australia,  at  0.8).
These  differences  would  be even larger if the number of antidumping  measures
were  adjusted  for  the  number  of  tariff  lines  concerned  because  developing
economies  tend to  cover  many  more  tariff  items with  antidumping  cases  than
do  industrial  countries.  The  second  reason  for  higher  welfare  costs  is  that
available  information  (though not systematic)  suggests that antidumping  duties
enforced  by  developing  countries  are,  on  average,  more  severe  than  those
imposed  by  industrial  countries-and  economic  analysis  shows  that  welfare
costs  increase  more  rapidly than  tariffs  do.
China's Special Situation
China  has  been  the main  target  of antidumping  measures-18  percent  of anti-
dumping  cases  in  1995  and  almost 20 percent  in 2001  and 2002  (see  table  2).
Examination  of the  raw  number  of antidumping  measures  imposed  on Chinese
exports by the top 10 antidumping users and the number of measures adjusted for
trade value between each trade partner and China (the average number of cases per
$100,000 of exports from China to these users)  shows that China is targeted much
more  by  developing  economies  than  by industrial  countries  (table  3).  China  is
almost  exclusively  targeted  by  the  top  antidumping  users,  all  of  them  being
relatively large  economies.
All  this  raises  a  key  question  about  China's  role  in  future  antidumping
activities.  Will China follow the same path as other large  developing economies,
rapidly increasing  the number of antidumping cases  against other countries?  Or
will  China  adopt  a  different  approach,  minimizing  the  use  of  antidumping1 10  THE  WORLD  BANK ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  I 8,  NO.  I
TABLE  3.  Share of Antidumping Measures in Force  against Imports from
China,  1995-2002  (%  of total  antidumping  measures in force  by user country)
Average
number
Average  by value
Country  share  of imports
or group  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  1995-2001  from  Chinaa
Industrial countries
Australia  9.0  4.3  10.0  8.2  7.7  4.5  5.1  7.9  7.0  0.7
Canada  7.6  7.7  10.3  10.8  8.3  8.5  10.6  10.8  9.1  1.8
European Union  20.7  21.7  23.2  23.0  20.8  19.4  19.4  15.8  21.2  1.0
United  States  12.8  13.7  15.1  14.6  14.5  16.5  18.5  18.0  15.1  1.7
Developing economies
Argentina  33.3  20.0  30.3  35.9  31.1  21.4  15.6  20.0  26.8  10.0
Brazil  14.3  14.3  21.7  28.6  28.9  25.6  22.4  20.4  22.3  4.7
India  38.5  46.7  33.3  27.3  32.8  22.3  25.2  27.1  32.3  10.7
Mexico  33.3  28.3  40.7  38.4  36.3  35.1  44.3  41.8  36.6  60.3
South  Africa  8.3  27.6  28.6  23.2  19.5  18.8  19.1  22.5  20.7  12.0
Turkey  13.5  13.5  14.7  17.6  17.1  14.3  25.0  40.0  16.5  4.4
All  other  34.0  28.8  26.2  22.5  18.9  12.8  15.5  - 22.7  -
Total number  143  148  180  193  202  179  199  - 174
Percent  of all  anti-  17.8  18.0  21.2  20.9  19.9  18.3  19.5  - 19.4
dumping  measures
-,  Not available.
aPer  $1,000  of imports  from  China.
Source: Author's computations  based  on wro  Reports  on Antidumping  (G/ADP/N  series  at
www.wto.org)  and wro trade data. The total number of measures  is based on Lindsey and Ikenson
(2001).
measures  and  invest its  negotiating  strength  in the  wTo  in working  for stricter
antidumping  rules,  as  its  chief  trade  negotiator  announced?  Clearly,  China's
decision  will  have  a  decisive  impact  on  the  evolution  of world  antidumping
enforcement  and on wro trade  disciplines more  generally.
II.  MINIMIZING  CHINA'S  EXPOSURE  TO  FOREIGN  ANTIDUMPING
The slow pace  of Wro negotiations  means that China  would  likely not be able
to  get  reforms  of  wro  antidumping  rules  into  play  for  at  least  two  (more
likely  four)  years.  Meanwhile,  it will  be  hard for  Chinese  authorities  to resist
pressures  from  import-competing  firms  in  China  that  demand  more  intensive
use  of antidumping  procedures.  One  possibility:  Could  China adopt measures
minimizing  as  quickly  as  possible  its  exposure  to  foreign  antidumping,  alle-
viating  the  political  costs  of  playing  a  reforming  role  in  wTo  antidumping
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As noted, trade problems are fundamentally domestic conflicts between firms-
between  export-oriented  and  import-competing  industries.  The  country-based
data discussed sheds no light on this deeper aspect  of protection and can even be
misleading.  For  instance,  the  strong asymmetry  between antidumping  users  and
targets shown in tables 1 and 2 could suggest that wTo members would be induced
to  bring  more antidumping  cases  until  the situation  is so bad that wro  members
collectively  adopt  stricter  disciplines  on  antidumping.  Arguments  have  already
been presented  suggesting  that  the top antidumping  users are  unlikely to follow
this path. Taking firms'  behavior into account suggests a darker scenario. Petition-
ing firms-the driving  forces  in antidumping enforcement-may  lodge  antidump-
ing complaints against several key countries to segment the world market  in their
products  (evidence  supporting  this  hypothesis  is  shown  later).  In  that  case  the
growing  use  of antidumping  measures  becomes  not  an  incentive  to  discipline
antidumping  use  but an incentive  for firms to  use the measures  ever  more inten-
sively. Examining these deeper aspects of antidumping protection requires looking
at the distribution of antidumping measures  in force  by sector or product rather
than by country.
A Few "Antidumping-Intensive" Sectors
Antidumping  measures  are  concentrated  in  a  handful  of  Harmonized  Tariff
System  sections  (table  4).  Metals,  chemicals,  machinery  and  electrical  equip-
ment, textiles  and clothing,  and plastics  account for 75 percent of antidumping
measures,  even though  these  sectors  account  for  less than half of world  trade.
These  sectors  are key  sources  of exports  for dynamic  developing  economies  in
the  first stages of industrial  development,  and they tend to have  a high propor-
tion  of  relatively  standard  products  and  oligopolistic  market  structures.
Although  the  metals  and  chemicals  sectors  clearly  have  these  features,  the
other  sectors  require  a  closer  look, with  greater disaggregation.  There  are  few
antidumping  actions in  the machinery  and clothing subsectors  that are charac-
terized  by  many  firms  producing  highly  differentiated  products.  Most  anti-
dumping  actions  are  in  the  electrical  equipment  and  textiles  subsectors  that
are characterized  by relatively  standard products produced  by oligopolistic  firms.
This  pattern  strongly  suggests  that firms  use  antidumping  as  a cheap  and
powerful  instrument  for  segmenting  the  markets  that  ongoing  or  scheduled
trade liberalization is making more  competitive.  It also suggests that antidump-
ing cases  are  likely  to spread  to such  sectors  as  clothing  that will  increasingly
experience  product differentiation  and  imperfect  competition  (based  on trade-
marks,  goodwill,  distribution  channels,  and  the  like).  In  sum,  the  observed
sectoral  pattern  of  antidumping  reflects  the  increasing  "privatization"  of
trade  policy  by  firms  that  have  enough  initial  oligopolistic  power  to  use  the
"procollusion"  bias is embedded  in antidumping regulations-a  key lesson that
should  be  kept  in  mind  when  implementing  these  regulations,  in  China  as
elsewhere.TABLE  4.  Antidumping  Measures in Force  in the World  by Section of Harmonized  System,  1995-2000
Number  antidumping measures  China
Tariff lines
Average  with  tariffs
Growth  index  applied  <10%  as  %
Harmonized  System  Section  1998-2000/  Export  Import  tariff  of total
section  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  share  (%)  1995-97  pattern  pattern  2001  tariff lines
15  Metals,  metal  articles  276  290  305  316  372  401  33.5  117.0  6.7  9.2  9.6  68.6
6  Chemical,  allied  201  203  204  210  217  228  21.6  104.1  4.7  8.0  9.4  78.2
industry  products
16  Machinery,  81  85  94  95  100  81  9.2  116.1  29.2  37.8  14.4  30.0
electrical equip.
11  Textiles,  clothing  48  60  61  54  70  79  6.4  114.2  19.8  7.4  21.0  12.6
7 Plasters,  rubbers  53  54  55  53  66  74  6.1  108.4  3.2  7.3  15.9  18.0
17 Vehicles,  42  40  40  42  43  30  4.0  101.6  3.7  2.8  23.8  43.4
transport equipment
13  Articles  of stone,  34  37  37  42  44  40  4.0  115.5  1.6  0.8  17.7  12.1
plaster,  cement
10 Woodpulp,  paper,  18  17  21  44  44  39  3.1  207.6  0.7  3.1  13.4  26.1
paperboard
4 Prepared  foodstuffs  35  31  29  31  28  27  3.1  88.9  2.1  0.8  28.4  15.72  Vegetable  products  15  19  19  24  23  22  2.1  129.4  2.1  1.9  21.3  29.2
12 Footwear,  headwear  21  16  9  17  13  16  1.6  70.3  4.8  0.2  23.2  0.0
18 Optical,  cinema  14  11  10  9  20  23  1.5  104.0  3.4  3.6  14.3  30.1
instruments
20  Miscellaneous  14  15  14  13  12  14  1.4  89.7  7.1  0.4  20.2  1.2
manufactured  articles
9 Wood,  articles  of wood  6  6  6  5  11  11  0.8  122.2  1.1  1.7  9.8  61.9
1 Live  animals,  animal  4  3  4  6  7  7  0.5  161.9  1.7  1.0  18.9  21.5
products
3  Animal, vegetable  fats,  9  9  9  2  1  1  0.5  44.4  0.1  0.5  40.6  5.9
oils
5  Mineral  products  0  0  0  9  9  9  0.5  - 3.7  10.9  4.1  96.3
19 Arms,  ammunitions  3  3  3  3  0  0  0.2  66.7  0.0  0.0  13.0  0.0
8 Raw  hides,  skins,  0  0  1  1  1  1  0.1  - 3.0  1.4  16.4  25.0
leather products
14 Gems,  jewelry  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0  - 1.0  0.5  12.6  67.2
21  Art objects  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0  - 0.2  0.8  10.9  25.0
Total  874  899  921  976  1,081  1,103  100.0  112.0  100.0  100.0  15.8  38.7
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China's Sensitivity to "Antidum  ping-Intensive" Sectors
Does  China import  a high proportion  of products  from  antidumping-intensive
Harmonized  Tariff System  sections?  If  so,  Chinese  authorities  are  likely  to  be
under strong  pressure to impose  antidumping  measures  on such  goods, thereby
participating  in the worldwide  segmentation  game  that is  the ultimate  goal of
antidumping  enforcement.  The  five  most  antidumping-intensive  Harmonized
Tariff System sections in table 4 make up almost 70 percent of Chinese imports,
opening the possibility that  Chinese firms  or foreign  firms  producing  in  China
could present  antidumping  complaints in order to segment world markets.
China's sensitivity to antidumping-intensive  sectors can also be assessed from
an export perspective.  China's machinery  and electrical equipment  and textiles
and clothing exports  are particularly sensitive to worldwide antidumping  activ-
ity (see table 4).  China  would appear to have been  a target of foreign antidump-
ing measures  much more because  of intrinsic  economic  features  of its  exported
products  (differentiation  level  and  oligopolistic  markets)  than  because  China
was not yet a  WTO  member.
Chinese Policies to Minimize Exposure to Foreign Antidumping
This conclusion  implies that China should not expect to face fewer antidumping
measures  in  the  coming  years  because  of  its  WTO  accession.  Rather,  China
should  expect  to  continue  to  face  a  large  number  of  antidumping  cases.  Of
course,  WTO  membership  gives  China  access  to  the  WTO  dispute  settlement
mechanism,  which could  provide  some  relief to Chinese  exporters  harassed  by
foreign antidumping.  But this  relief will  probably  be  only marginal  and short-
lived.  For instance,  the 2001  WTO  dispute  settlement ruling  banning  use of the
averaging  method  is  already  being  circumvented  by  alternative  procedures
(hastily  developed by creative  petitioners).
A more promising route for minimizing  China's exposure  to foreign antidump-
ing  measures  may  be  China's  own  policies,  beginning  with  its trade  policy.  If
China's  tariffs  in  antidumping-intensive  sectors  remain  high  at  the  end  of  its
accession  period,  it may  not adopt  as  many or  as  severe  antidumping  measures
on  imports  from  the rest of the  world  in these  products  (though  the  analysis  in
section  I  shows  that the  top  developing  economy  antidumping  users  have  not
hesitated to add high antidumping  measures to still unliberalized  trade regimes).
But such a tariff policy, far from ensuring fewer antidumping cases against Chinese
exports, will facilitate new antidumping measures against exports in antidumping-
intensive  sectors. High Chinese tariffs  will permit high prices  in domestic markets
in China, making dumping claims against Chinese exporters easier to prove all the
more because the exports in question  consist mostly  of basic products  (for which
Chinese  exporters  are  likely  to  align  their  prices  to  those  prevailing  in  foreign
markets  because there  are no or small premia for differentiation).
One  way  to  minimize  exposure  to  foreign  antidumping  would  thus  be
to  adopt  uniform  and  moderate  tariffs  to  reduce  distortions  in  the  domesticMesserlin  115
production pattern  (foreign  antidumping investigators  interpret such distortions
as  signs  of dumping).  Although  average  tariffs  for Harmonized  Tariff System
sections  give  very  imperfect  information  on  the  tariff  structure  (peak  tariffs
within  each  section  are  eroded  by  low  tariffs),  they  suggest  that  tariff peaks  in
China  are concentrated  in sectors that are  not antidumping-intensive  activities,
with the exception  of textiles  and clothing  (see  table 4).
A uniform tariff  policy  may  help  China  shift the  composition  of its  exports
away  from  antidumping-intensive  sectors  for another  reason.  Economies  such
as  Hong  Kong  (China),  Japan,  the  Republic  of Korea,  Singapore,  and  Taiwan
(China)  reduced their  exposure  to foreign  antidumping measures  by  upgrading
their exported  products.  One could  even  argue  that foreign  antidumping  meas-
ures  accelerated  the  economic  development  of  these  economies  by  inducing
them  to  shift  production  more  quickly  to  highly  differentiated  products  in
which they  anticipated  having  comparative  advantage.
EU and U.S.  Antidurn ping "Echoing" against China's Exports
Capturing  antidumping  protection  as  a market  segmentation  strategy  by a  few
large  firms  requires  information  at the product  level,  rather  than  at  the  aggre-
gated  section level of table 4. Table  5 provides  such detailed information  for EU
and U.S. antidumping actions against China. More precisely,  it lists EU and U.S.
"echoing"  cases  against  China,  antidumping  cases  that  targeted  the  same  Chi-
nese exports.  The European Union and the United  States are  the top antidump-
ing  users  in  the  absolute  number  of measures  in  force,  and  they  are  the  two
largest  markets  for  Chinese  exports  (15  and 21  percent,  respectively).
Echoing  cases  (58  altogether)  constitute  75  percent  of  antidumping  cases
initiated  against  Chinese  exports  by  the  United  States  and  68  percent  by  the
European Union.  These  cases  generally echoed  each  other within a year  or less.
All  but  three  of these  cases  (cycles,  hammers,  and  pocket  lighters)  resulted  in
antidumping  measures  of some kind.  Such  a large  proportion  of echoing  cases
and the similarity of their outcomes  are signs that antidumping  is a protectionist
instrument  that  petitioners  are  using  in  a  strategic  way  to  segment  the  two
largest world markets.
Thus,  assessment  of the  welfare  costs  of antidumping  measures  should take
into account not only the severity of the measures (the high level of antidumping
duties  or  the  restrictiveness  of quantitative  restrictions)  but  also  the  dramatic
reduction  in  competition  in  importing  markets.  These  indirect  welfare  costs
generated  by  antidumping-caused  collusion  compound  the  direct  welfare  costs
generated  by the  antidumping duties.
Examination  of echoing cases  also shows that U.S. antidumping  duties are  on
average  higher than  EU  duties:  104  percent  compared  with  38  percent.  How-
ever,  comparing  the  measures  closely  is  difficult  because  of  differences  in
regulations  and  the  lack  of  sufficiently  detailed  information.  For  instance,
some  EU  cases  are  terminated  by  the withdrawal  of complaints  by petitioners.
The  effective impact  is hard  to ascertain.  It may  be  limited to  the chilling effectTABLE  5.  EU and U.S.  Echoing  Antidumping  Cases  against Chinese Products,  1980-99
Positive  decisions  Negative  decisions  Antidumping duties  (%)
Initiating country  Dumping
Year  or group  Product  margin,  EU  (%)  EU  U.S.  EU  U.S.  EU  U.S.
1992  EU  Antimony trioxide  43.2  noi
1991  U.S.  Antimony trioxide  N
1988  EU  Barium  chloride  50.1  D  25.8
1982  EU  Barium  chloride  75.0  Ds
1983  U.S.  Barium  chloride  N
1983  U.S.  Barium  chloride  A  14.5
1999  EU  Brushes,  hair  ep
1992  U.S.  Brushes,  hair  T
1986  EU  Brushes,  paint  100.0  Und
1992  EU  Brushes, paint  noi
1985  U.S.  Brushes,  paint  A  127.1
1999  U.S.  Brushes,  paint
1994  EU  Coumarin  50.0  Ds
1994  U.S.  Coumarin  A  160.8
1991  EU  Cycles  30.6  D  30.6
1995  U.S.  Cycles  N
1984  EU  Cycles,  chains  45.0  Und  45.0
1999  EU  Cycles,  forks  withdraw
1999  EU  Cycles,  frames  withdraw
1996  EU  Cycles,  parts  30.6  D  30.6
1999  EU  Cycles,  wheels  withdraw
1992  EU  Ferrosilicon  49.7  D  49.7
1992  U.S.  Ferrosilicon  A  137.7
1995  EU  Furfuryl  alcohol  withdraw
1994  U.S.  Furfuryl alcohol  A  45.3
1999  EU  Glycine  ep
1994  U.S.  Glycine  A  155.9
1985  EU  Handtools:  hammers  no
1990  U.S.  Handtools:  hammers  A  45.41994  U.S.  Lighters,  disposable  N
1990  EU  Lighters,  pocket  16.9  D  16.9
1991  EU  Magnesium  oxide  27.7  Und
1994  U.S.  Magnesium,  alloy  A  79.4
1994  U.S.  Magnesium,  pure  A  108.3
1997  EU  Magnesium,  unwrought  31.7  D +  und  31.7
1994  U.S.  Manganese,  metal  A  143.3
1992  EU  Manganese,  unwrought  withdraw
1996  U.S.  Persulfates
1994  EU  Persulfates,  peroxodisulfates  110.1  D  83.3
1982  U.S.  Polyester,  cotton cloth  A  36.2
1990  EU  Polyester,  yarn  23.5  D  23.5
1986  EU  Potassium  permanganate  94.5  D +  und  28.0
1983  U.S.  Potassium  permanganate  A  39.6
1984  EU  Silicon carbide  31.5  Und
1993  U.S.  Silicon carbide
1989  EU  Silicon,  metal  38.7  Ds  18.7
1991  EU  Silicon,  metal  178.0  Ds
1990  U.S.  Silicon,  metal  A  139.5
1994  EU  Steel,  pipe  or tubes  fittings  58.6  D  58.6
1999  EU  Steel,  pipe or tubes  fittings  49.4  D  49.4
1991  U.S.  Steel,  pipes  A  182.9
1985  U.S.  Steel,  pipes  N
1988  EU  Tungstate,  ammon.  Para.  75.7  noi
1988  EU  Tungsten, carbide  73.1  D+und
1988  EU  Tungsten, metal  powder  noi
1991  U.S.  Tungsten,  ore  A  151.0
1989  EU  Tungsten,  ofes  50.3  D+und
1988  EU  Tungstic,  oxide  and acid  85.8  D+und
Total  58  Average  margins  and  duties  59.2  29  15  5  7  37.8  104.5
Note: EU decisions:  D = ad valorem  duty; Ds = specific duty;  Und = undertaking;  with = withdrawal;  noi = no injury; ep = expired deadline.  U.S. decisions: A =  affirmative;  N =  negative.
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on Chinese exporters,  forced to export  less, or at higher prices, or both, to limit
the risk of facing new antidumping complaints. Or if withdrawals  reflect merely
a  lack of cooperation  by the domestic  industry or a failure to get the minimum
number  of EU  member  states to support  a  proposal  to impose  measures,  they
may  reflect the  fact that EU petitioners  have  been  able to impose  quantity  or
price restraints  on Chinese exports  on a "private" basis-with the corresponding
full-fledged  impact that is to be expected  from these hidden restraints.
III.  CHINA'S  ANTIDUNMPING  ENFORCENIENT:  AT THE  CROSSROADS
The following assessment  of China's antidumping  regulations  and enforcement
is  provisional.  It  is  constrained  by  the  limited  number  of  ongoing  cases
(a substantial  number  of cases  are often needed  for a robust  assessment).
China's Antidumping Regulations
China  adopted  its  first  antidumping  regulations  on  March  25,  1997  and  the
guidelines  necessary  for implementing  the  law  later  the  same  year.  Following
China's  accession  to  the  wTo,  these  old  regulations  were  replaced  by  new
regulations  in January  2002, along with  another  set of guidelines  (see  G/ADP/
N/1/CHN1  and G/ADPIN/1/CHN2  at www.wto.org  and Wang 2003).
China's  regulations  follow  the  usual  structure  of  antidumping  legislation:
proof of the existence and estimate of the magnitude  of dumping and of material
injury and proof of the causal  relation between  dumping and injury.  However,
they  have  four  striking  features.  First,  many  details  are  left  to  the  detailed
guidelines  or  to  case-by-case  practice.  Although  this  is  common  for countries
that are  adopting their  first  antidumping  regulations,  this lack  of detail gener-
ates legal  uncertainty.
Second, China's regulations  include  all  the (well-known)  protectionist  biases
of the  WTO  antidumping  provisions.  Among  these  are  use  of the  concept  of  a
major proportion of the industry as the threshold level  for accepting complaints
(a  condition  that domestic  monopolies,  oligopolies,  or cartels  fit  much  more
easily than competitive  industries); possibility of ex officio  initiation of cases by
the  Chinese  authorities;  screening  of  complaints  by  the  antidumping  office,
exposing the office to strong and hidden pressures  by vested interests; possibility
of withdrawal  by  petitioners,  facilitating private  collusion  between  petitioners
and defendants;  cumulation  of imports, facilitating demonstration  of injury and
widening  the geographical  scope of protective measures;  recourse to constructed
normal values when comparable  prices are unavailable in the exporting country,
enabling manipulation  of costs and reasonable  profit;  a broad definition  of the
confidentiality  of information,  limiting the rights of defendants;  the possibility
of imposing  undertakings  as antidumping  measures  and  the  requirement  that
antidumping  duties  be  borne  by  importers  (the  so-called  no absorption provi-
sion); the possibility of imposing retroactive antidumping duties where there is a
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possibility of taking  "appropriate"  measures  should foreign firms try to circum-
vent the antidumping  measures.
Third, prior to the 2003 government reform,  coordination  of the many admin-
istrative agencies involved  in antidumping investigations was extremely complex.
The Fair Trade Administration for Imports and Exports of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic  Cooperation  (MOFTEC)  received complaints,  decided which to
accept,  and was  involved  in the entire process,  including  investigation.  The State
Economic  and  Trade Commission  joined  MOFTEC  in determining  the existence  of
injury  at the preliminary  stage and conducting the  final investigations.  The Cus-
toms General  Administration  joined  MOFTEC  for some parts of the investigations.
For  the imposition  of antidumping  duties,  MOFTEC  presented  its proposals  to the
Tariff Commission under the State Council, which made the decisions. The merger
of the State Economic  and Trade  Commission and MOFTEC  in early 2003 brought
these two functions  into one ministry.
Fourth, the old regulations included the following Article 40:  "In the event that
any country or region applies  discriminatory antidumping or countervailing meas-
ures  against  the  exports  from  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the  People's
Republic  of China  may,  as the  case  may  be, take  counter-measures  against  the
country  or region in question."  It is not known whether  this provision led to any
cases,  but it clearly opened the possibility for China to use  antidumping  rules as a
retaliatory  instrument.  Article  56  of the  new  regulations  is  only  slightly  more
diplomatic:  "Where  a  country  (region)  discriminatorily  imposes  antidumping
measures  on the exports  from the People's  Republic  of China, China may, on the
basis  of the  actual situations,  take  corresponding  measures  against that country
(region)."
Antidumping Enforcement by China
According to information provided  by MOFTEC  for antidumping cases under the old
regulations  and on China's latest notification (G/ADP/N/105/CHN)  to the WTO  for
the  cases  under  the new regulations,  69  cases  were  initiated  between  1997 and
May 2003  (table 6).  After a  slow start in 1997-98, the number  of cases  increased
rapidly, reaching 24 in 2002 and  11  for the first five months of 2003.  It is unclear
yet whether  this simply reflects  cases that were  in the pipeline for  a long  time  or
whether  China  has  begun  to follow  in  the  footsteps  of  the  six top  developing
economy  antidumping  users  (see  section  I) and  will  soon  become  another  anti-
dumping-intensive  user, endangering  its so far successful liberalization.
Although it is  too early  to know whether China's  initial  antidumping  meas-
ures  are  representative  of future  antidumping enforcement,  a  few  observations
are  in order. First,  antidumping measures have been taken  in almost all cases, a
very high percentage compared  with what is generally  observed  (60-70 percent
in  industrial  countries).  Second,  the  level  of  the  measures  adopted  by  the
Chinese  authorities  is  relatively  high,  although  it  seems  that the  most  recent
measures are less severe than the ones taken under the old regulations.  The main
countries  targeted  are  industrial  and advanced  developing  economies-not  theTABLE  6.  China's Antidumping  Measures  in  Force  and Investigations,  as of June  30, 2003
Provisional antidumping  Definitive antidumping
duties (%)  duties  (%)
Initiation  year  Country  Product  Minimum  Maximum  Minimum  Maximum
Cases initiated under old regulations
1997  Canada  Newsprint  17.1  78.9  9.0  78.0
1997  Korea,  Rep. of  Newsprint  17.1  78.9  9.0  78.0
1997  United  States  Newsprint  17.1  78.9  9.0  78.0
1999  Russia  Steel,  cold-rolled  silicon  11.0  73.0  0.6  62.0
1999  Korea,  Rep.  of  Polyester  film  21.0  72.0  13.0  46.0
1999  Japan  Steel, cold-rolled  stainless  4.0  75.0  17.0  58.0
1999  Korea,  Rep.  of  Steel,  cold-rolled  stainless  4.0  75.0  17.0  58.0
1999  Germany  (EU)  Acrylates  24.0  74.0  0.0  0.0
1999  Japan  Acrylates  24.0  74.0  31.0  69.0
1999  United  States  Acrylates  24.0  74.0  31.0  69.0
2000  U.K.  (EU)  Methylene  chloride  7.0  39.0  6.0  39.0
2000  France  (EU)  Methylene  chloride  28.0  75.0  28.0  75.0
2000  Germany  (EU)  Methylene  chloride  67.0  67.0  66.0  66.0
2000  Netherlands  (EU)  Methylene  chloride  10.0  58.0  9.0  57.0
2000  Korea,  Rep. of  Methylene  chloride  7.0  28.0  4.0  28.0
2000  United  States  Methylene  chloride  49.0  58.0  49.0  58.0
2001  Japan  Polystyrene  a  a  a  a
2001  Korea,  Rep.  of  Polystyrene  a  a  a  a
2001  Thailande  Polystyrene  a  a  a  a
2001  Indonesia  Lysine  a  a  a  a
2001  Korea,  Rep. of  Lysine  a  a  a  a
2001  United  States  Lysine  a  a  a  a
2001  Korea,  Rep. of  Polyester, chips  a  a  a  a
Cases initiated under the new regulations
2001  Korea,  Rep. of  Polyester,  staple  fiber  4.0  48.0  2.0  48.0
2001  Korea, Rep.  of  Pet chips  6.0  52.0  5.0  52.0
2001  Indonesia  Acrylates  11.0  24.0  11.0  24.02001  Korea,  Rep.  of  Acrylates  11.0  20.0  2.0  20.0 2001  Malaysia  Acrylates  13.0  38.0  4.0  38.0 2001  Singapore  Acrylates  46.0  49.0  30.0  49.0 2001  Belgium  (EU)  Caprolactam  6.0  16.0  6.0  16.0 2001  Germany  (EU)  Caprolactam  28.0  38.0  28.0  38.0 2001  Netherlands  (EU)  Caprolactam  9.0  18.0  6.0  18.0 2001  Japan  Caprolactam  5.0  21.0  5.0  18.0 2001  Russia  Caprolactam  6.0  29.0  7.0  16.0 2002  Korea,  Rep.  of  Polyester,  film  - - 0.0  0.0 2002  India  Anhydride,  purified  33.0  33.0  b  b 2002  Japan  Anhydride,  purified  66.0  66.0  b  b 2002  Korea,  Rep.  of  Anhydride,  purified  14.0  33.0  b  b 2002  Japan  Styrene  butadiene  0.0  33.0  b  h 2002  Korea,  Rep.  of  Styrene butadiene  10.0  27.0  b  b 2002  Russia  Styrene  butadiene  16.0  46.0  b  b 2002  Kazakhstan  Steel,  cold-rolled  products  21.0  48.0  b  b 2002  Korea,  Rep.  of  Steel,  cold-rolled  products  9.0  40.0  b  b
- 2002  Russia  Steel,  cold-rolled  products  9.0  29.0  b  b 2002  Taiwan,  China  Steel,  cold-rolled  products  8.0  55.0  b  b 2002  Ukraine  Steel,  cold-rolled  products  12.0  22.0  b  b 2002  Japan  Polyvinyl  chloride  32.0  115.0  b  b 2002  Korea,  Rep.  of  Polyvinyl chloride  10.0  76.0  b  b 2002  Russia  Polyvinyl  chloride  34.0  82.0  b  b 2002  Taiwan,  China  Polyvinyl  chloride  10.0  27.0  b  b 2002  United  States  Polyvinyl  chloride  25.0  83.0  b  b 2002  Japan  Toluene  19.0  49.0  b  b 2002  Korea,  Rep. of  Toluene  6.0  22.0  b  b 2002  United  States  Toluene  23.0  28.0  b  b 2002  Japan  Phenol  7.0  144.0  b  b 2002  Korea,  Rep.  of  Phenol  10.0  10.0  b  b 2002  Taiwan,  China  Phenol  7.0  20.0  b  b 2002  United  States  Phenol  29.0  29.0  b  b 2003  Germany  (EU)  Ethanolamine  b  b  b  b 2003  Iran  Ethanolamine  b  b  b  b
(Continued)TABLE  6.  Continued
Provisional  antidumping  Definitive  antidumping
duties (%)  duties  (°%)
Initiation  vear  Country  Product  Minimum  Maximum  Minimum  NMaximum
2003  Japan  Ethanolamine  b  b  b  b
2003  Malaysia  Ethanolamine  b  b  b  b
2003  Mexico  Ethanolamine  b  b  b  b
2003  Taiwan,  China  Ethanolamine  b  b  b  b
2003  United  States  Ethanolamine  b  b  b  b
2003  European  Union  Chloroform  b  b  b  b
2003  India  Chloroform  b  b  b  b
2003  Korea,  Rep.  of  Chloroform  b  b  b  b
2003  United  States  Chloroform  b  b  b  b
69  All cases  Average  antidumping  duty  17.2  43.4  9.8  23.7
-,  Not available.
aStatus  unknown.
hOngoing  investigations.
Souirce:  China Ministry of Foreign  Trade  and Economic  Cooperation,  WTO  Semi-annual  report (G/ADP/N/I05/CHN,  August 22,  2003, www.wto.org).Messerlin  123
same  pattern  observed  for  the  other  developing  economy  antidumping  users.
Third, the pattern for cases initiated  since 2001  is closer to that observed for the
other intensive  antidumping  users.  This  is most clearly  illustrated  by  the  steel
cases  (echoing  the  EU  and  U.S.  safeguards)  and  the  ethanolamine  cases
(observed in several  other antidumping  users).
The  increasingly  similar  product  pattern  suggests  that  China's  antidumping
enforcement  is  beginning  to  join  the  ongoing  process  of  segmenting  world
markets  through  antidumping  activity.  It  also  raises  issues  of the  progressive
capture  of China's  trade  policy  by  firms, similar to  what  is observed  in the  10
major  antidumping  users.  In  this  context  it  would  be  important  to  know
whether  petitioners  are  Chinese  firms  (private  or  state-owned)  or  firms  with
strong  links  with  foreign  firms  (joint  ventures,  technical  relations,  vertical
integration)  that are experienced  in the  "art"  of antidumping.
IV.  CHINA'S  OPTIONS IN  THE  WTO  NEGOTIATIONS  ON
CONTINGENT  PROTECTION
In its antidumping  enforcement,  China needs to take  into accoant an  issue that
the six  top developing  economy  antidumping  users  have  not had to  deal with:
China's wTo  accession protocol incorporates specific provisions  on antidumping
and safeguards  (for a legal  analysis,  see Vermulst 2000).  Seemingly a  handicap,
these special provisions can  be turned  into an instrument of positive change. The
special  provision  on antidumping could  induce  China  to negotiate  in the  Doha
Round  a  more  economically  sound  interpretation  of the  specific  provisions  on
antidumping.  That  could  create  strong  incentives  in  China  for  restraining  its
own use of antidumping  and for fighting for stricter WTO rules on antidumping.
It could  give  China's trading  partners  strong  incentives  to ease  their  transition
period of accession.  The special provision  on safeguards  is more  difficult to deal
with. This provision is so much  at odds with the spirit and  rules;  of the WTO  that
its use  will raise  a large  systemic  risk for the entire  WTO.
Linking China's Effective Liberalization to Better Treatment of Its
Exports by Antidiunmping Users
China's  protocol  of  accession  allows  its  trading  partners  to  use  "nonmarket
economy"  status  in  their  investigations  against  allegedly  duamped  Chinese
exports  for  15  years (until  2017). That status  allows antidumping  investigators
to use proxies for estimating the home market prices or costs of Chinese exports
in determining whether  dumping took place. Such proxies make the existence of
dumping  much  easier to prove  than the  rules  for market  economies,  and they
inflate the magnitude  of the estimated  antidumping  margins cornpared  to those
(already high)  imposed on market economies.
A  summary  of the  information  available  for 208  EU  and  U.S.  antidumping
cases initiated  between 1995  and 1998  gives a sense of the intrinsic biases  of the
nonmarket  economy procedure  (table  7;  Lindsey  1999;  Messer]lin  2000b).  The124  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  18,  NO.  I
TABLE  7.  Do Antidumping  Investigations  Really  Look at Dumping?
U.S.  cases (1995-98)  EU cases  (1995-97)
Basis  of estimated  Number  Average  Number  Average
normal values  cases  dumping  cases  dumping
of exports  examined  margins  (%)  examined  margins  (%)
Price  comparisons  only  5  3.2  8  22.7
Price  comparisons  and  33  14.2  33  24.4
constructed  values
Constructed  values  20  25.1  12  25.1
Nonmarket  economies  47  40.0  12  45.6
Best available  facts  36  95.6  2  74.5
All cases examined  141  44.7  67  29.6
Source: Lindsey  (1999)  for U.S. cases;  Messerlin  (2000a)  for EU cases.
further  from  pure  price  comparisons  the  methodology  used  for  estimating
dumping margins, the higher are the estimated  margins:  from 3 percent  (United
States)  and  22  percent  (European  Union)  under  pure  price  comparisons  to  25
percent under various  constructed-value  methods. Use of nonmarket economy
status is clearly  linked to the highest dumping margins found (40 percent in the
United  States and 46 percent  in the European Union).3
It  is  almost  impossible  to  eliminate  a  provision  included  in  a  country's
protocol  of  accession.  But  during  the  Doha  Round  it  may  be  possible  to
negotiate  an  economically  sound interpretation  of the  use  of the  nonmarket
economy status  by  wro  members.  China  and  its  trading partners  have a  com-
mon interest in establishing the strongest possible link between China's effective
liberalization  and  elimination  of  the  use  of  nonmarket  economy  status  by
foreign  antidumping  authorities.  What  is at issue is  not  the  elimination  of the
nonmarket  economy provision  itself (impossible  to obtain)  but  its effective  use
in the  future.4
The argument aims  at mobilizing export interests in both China  and the rest
of the world during China's period of accession  to the WTO.  Chinese exporters,
3.  For instance, under nonmarket economy status, it is possible to use industrial countries (such as the
United  States or  Sweden)  as  reference  countries  for  China.  That introduces  systemic errors  about  the
product  and the production  process. For instance, it makes no sense to consider, without deep economic
analysis, the calcium metal produced in small quantities by a U.S. monopolist for its own use as similar to
the calcium  metal  produced  by China and  Russia  in large  quantities  for  sales on  international  markets.
The U.S.  product  is likely  to  have characteristics  in  terms of quality  and  availability  that make  it very
different from the Russian or Chinese calcium metal, and it is sold and bought in a  market structure  that
is very  different  from the  markets  of its Russian  and Chinese  counterparts.  In the same  vein, trying to
estimate production  costs by combining input  prices in industrial countries  and input quantities used  in a
developing economy makes  little economic  sense.
4.  EU and  U.S.  antidumping  authorities  have  already  adopted  more  liberal  interpretations  in  some
cases  than  the  protocol  allows.  In  the  European  Union,  for  example,  the  authorities  have  accepted
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knowing  that  they  will  face  less  unfair  treatment  (no  use  of  the  nonmarket
economy status)  in foreign  antidumping cases  if China is  effectively opening  its
markets  in  accordance  with  its  accession  protocol,  will  be  motivated  to
monitor  China's  liberalization  more  closely  and  support  it  more  strongly,
including  through  stricter  use  of  antidumping  regulations.  Foreign  exporters,
for their part, will  support stricter use  of antidumping  regulatons by their own
authorities,  especially  with  respect  to  use  of  nonmarket  economy  status,  if
they  believe  that  they  will  get  more  effective  and  stable  access  to  Chinese
markets.
This  could  be  achieved  by  implementing  the  following  simple  rule.  Foreign
antidumping  investigators  will  automatically  grant  market  economy  status  to
Chinese  exporters  of any product that meets the three following conditions.
* The  Chinese most-favored-nation  tariff  on the product involved  is moder-
ate  (say,  10 percent  or lower).  This threshold  tariff will  be one  of the core
components  of a more  economically  sound interpretation  of China's  non-
market economy status to be agreed on during the Doha Round. It could be
stable over  time, or it could increase  as time passes-showing  an increasing
confidence  in  the  ongoing  liberalization  process  among  China's  trading
partners.
* No  "core gray-area  measures"  are imposed on the product by the  Chinese
authorities.  The  list  of  core  gray-area  measures  to  be  introduced  in  the
interpretation  agreement  should  also  be  negotiated  during  the  Doha
Round.  The  list should be  short  (say,  specific  tariffs,  quantitative  restric-
tions,  and  minimum  prices),  and  only  the listed measures  should  be  con-
sidered part of the conditions.
*  State-owned  monopolies  shall  not  engage  in  distributing  the  competing
foreign  and  domestic  varieties  of the  product  in  question.  Chinese  state-
owned  monopoly  producers  are  acceptable  because  as  economic  analysis
shows,  a protection  granted  exclusively  by a moderate  tariff eliminates  the
risk of monopoly power of the domestic  sole producer.
In 2001,  38 percent  of China's tariff lines had ad valorem  tariffs lower than
10  percent  (see  table  4).  (The  fact  that  the  Chinese  tariff  schedule  has  only
roughly  7,000 tariff  lines  suggests  that it  does not offer  many  opportunities  to
create narrow  niches  of protection  for carefully defined  tariff items.) Applying
the  three  conditions  would  thus  substantially  reinforce  the  rights  of  Chinese
exporters  in the antidumping cases  lodged in the two Harmonized  Tariff System
sections with the  largest number of antidumping  cases.  (But China should  take
the  initiative  to improve the  situation  in the  other  antidumping-intensive  Har-
monized  Tariff System sections,  in particular  in textiles and clothing.)
These  three  conditions  make  it  unlikely  that  Chinese  exporters  would  dump
except  for  economically  sound  reasons  (differences  in demand  pattern, need  to
meet  foreign  demand,  or to make  Chinese products  known in  foreign  markets).
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benefit  of market  economy  status  in  any  antidumping  investigations  faced  by
Chinese exports meeting these conditions.5
Negotiations  on improved  implementation  of nonmarket economy status for
China should be as swift as possible. These conditions can easily be defined on a
tariff  line  (Harmonized  Tariff  System)  basis.  For  instance,  China could  notify
the  WTO on a regular  basis of the tariff lines  for which these conditions are met
(this  can  easily  be  included  in  the  general monitoring  procedures  for China's
accession).  Cross-notifications  by  China's  trading  partners  could  be  added  to
the process, under the condition that they not slow the process. Finally, weaker
variants  of the suggestions  could  be considered,  if necessary.  For instance,  the
nonmarket  economy  status  could  be  eliminated  for notified  goods  only  after,
say,  one  year,  instead  of  immediately.  However,  it  is worth  noting  that  any
weakening of the suggested approach may have huge costs  in terms of decreas-
ing  incentives  for  export interests  in  both China  and the rest  of the world  to
support the transition process of China's accession to the wro.
Stricter Rules on Antidumping
The desire of China's chief trade negotiator, Long Yongtu,  to introduce stricter
rules on  antidumping  is  a  natural  extension  of the  negotiations  on use  of the
nonmarket  economy  status  proposed  here  because  of  the  focus  on the  anti-
dumping  rules  faced  by  allegedly  dumped  exports  from  market  economies.
China's  efforts  to  introduce  stricter  rules  on  wTo  antidumping  could  follow
either of two very different approaches.
A  cautious  approach  would  be to table  a  series  of proposals  or to support
those  already  tabled  in  Geneva  for improving  WTO-based  antidumping  regula-
tions  at  the  margin.  For  instance,  the  following  suggestions,  derived  from
proposals  tabled  in  1999  by  the  Swedish  Kommerzkollegium  (1999),  could
receive China's  support:
*  Dumping should  be the  principal cause  of material  injury.
*  Double protection  (for instance, antidumping  measures imposed on top of
quantitative  restrictions)  should not be  allowed.
*  Measures  should last five years at most (implying stronger  limits to review).
*  Repeated initiations  in a short period of time should not be allowed.
*  Cumulation  of  imports  from  different  countries  should  be  banned  or
severely  restricted,  unless  they  come  from  the  same  firms  or subsidiaries
of the  same firms.
*  Aggregation  of products  under the one single product procedure should be
severely restricted.
5.  It could  be argued that  market forces  in  China  for these  relatively  unprotected  products  could be
distorted  by Chinese  regulations  on  inputs  for  such  goods  (subsidies,  for  instance).  But  there  are  WTO
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* All zeroing  practices  (using only export transactions  that have been found
to  be  dumped  in  calculating  dumping  margins)  should  be  banned  (all
export transactions  should be  included  in the investigation).
* Antidumping authorities  should  produce  disclosure  documents.
* Use of the de minimis rule should be expanded in an economically sound way.
Alternatively,  China  could  adopt  a  bolder  approach.  Antidumping  could
take,  as  often  as  possible,  the  form  of  negotiated  "quantitative  thresholds"
(Messerlin  2000a).  wTo  members  could  agree  that  no  antidumping  measure
should be  imposed in  cases where the  level of injury losses  is less than an agreed
threshold  of  the  complainants'  revenues  for  the  year(s)  used  as  the  reference
(predumping) period.  An approach  based  on quantitative  thresholds  is concep-
tually equivalent  to tariffication.  It tends to give a sense of the magnitude of the
concessions  granted  by both  sides, bringing  antidumping  more  in line  with the
usual  WTO  negotiating techniques.  It is also flexible  enough to permit incremen-
tal  reforms,  to  deliver  the  progressive  liberalization  that  wrio  members  are
looking  for, through progressive  increases  in the thresholds.  This would  avoid
the  current  deadlock  of binary  choices  between  fully  enforcing  antidumping
regulations  and rejecting  them totally.
The Transitional  Product-Specific Safeguard Provision
China's protocol  of accession  includes  a transitional  product-specific  safeguard
mechanism,  which makes it much easier for wTo  members to impose safeguard
measures  against  China's  exports  until 2014  (for  a  detailed  description from  a
legal  perspective  see  Andersen  and  Lau  2001).  In  China's  case,  all  the  terms
defining the use of safeguard actions in the traditional  GATT-WTCO  context  (under
Article  XIX)  have  been  weakened.  There  is  no  requirement  of  unforeseen
circumstances  and no most-favored-nation  requirement.  Only "material"  rather
than "serious"  injury needs to be demonstrated.  There are fewer factors related
to the condition  of the domestic industry,  and the causal link between increased
imports and  injury is weaker.
The  most important  difference-and  potentially  the most devastating  for the
wro-is  that wro  members  are  given  the  right,  never  before  offered,  to  use  a
trade-diversion  clause.  As  soon  as one  wro  member  implements  a  transitional
product-specific  safeguard  measure  against Chinese  exports,  all other members
can enforce  a similar  measure at almost no procedural  cost (no  investigation,  no
prior  notification,  no  input  from  Chinese  parties).  The  trade-diversion  clause
thus  means  that  countries  do  not  have  to  provide  proof  substantiating  the
allegation  that Chinese  exports  will  be  diverted from  the first closed  market to
the  rest  of the world.
All these features put the transitional product-specific  safeguard at odds with
the usual WTO  concerns about a fair balance between rights and obligations. The
provision  is  so  unbalanced  that  its  use  could  easily  trigger  in  China  feelings
similar to those provoked  by the unequal  treaties of the  nineteenth  century. The1 28  THE  WORLD  BANK  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  VOL.  1 8,  NO.  I
transitional  product-specific  safeguard  represents  a  serious  systemic risk to the
WTO  regime.
Although it could be argued that the transitional product-specific safeguard is
such  a politically  aggressive instrument that it would never  be used, this  seems
unlikely. Because of its politically  explosive content, this safeguard is unlikely to
be initiated  by any but a very large  industrial country WTO  member (the United
States,  the European  Union,  or Japan).  But once  the provision has  been  trig-
gered,  other  WTO  members  that  could  benefit  from  the  trade-diversion  clause
will  likely do so.
How can China reduce the risk that the transitional product-specific  safeguard
provision will be invoked? One possibility would be for them to negotiate the same
kind of preemptive approach  as recommended  for the nonmarket economy provi-
sion during the Doha Round. WTO members could  agree not to use the transitional
product-specific  safeguard  provision as long as  Chinese products  meet the  three
conditions  presented  for use  of the nonmarket  economy  option and  to use  the
normal wro safeguard provision under  Article XIX  instead.
Unifying Contingent Protection  in the wro
Putting  antidumping and safeguards  on a par would makes a lot of sense from
the  perspective  of  the  global  wro  architecture.  Most  wro  members  use  anti-
dumping measures  as  a substitute  for safeguard  actions for dealing  with indus-
tries  in  difficulty.  The  transitional  product-specific  safeguard  provision
strengthens  China's  stake  in  seeking  substantial  improvement  in  the  whole
WTO  contingent  protection  regime-both  antidumping  and  safeguards.  During
the Doha Round, China could try to expand the negotiations  on antidumping to
safeguards  (so far not explicitly  included  in the Doha  negotiating  program)  to
make the entire contingent  protection regime of the wro more consistent.
One  promising approach  would be to tie together  the concept  of temporary
protection  embedded in safeguards  and the basic concept  of renegotiation  under
GATT  Article  XXVIII  (Messerlin  2000a).  Thus,  for  instance,  at the end of the
second  period  of enforcing  a safeguard  measure  under the current safeguards
agreement (based on GATT  Article  XIX),  the country would  be required either to
renegotiate  the  tariff on  the product  subjected  to  safeguard  measures  or  elim-
inate the  safeguard  measure  (shifting to antidumping  or other trade  remedies
should  be prohibited,  in recognition  that all instruments of contingent  protec-
tion are substitutable).  This mandatory aspect would  help reform safeguard and
antidumping  procedures  back to the transitory protection they were  meant to be
instead of the permanent  protection  they have  become.
The  possibility  remains  that  an integrated  approach  to  antidumping,  safe-
guards,  and  transitional  product-specific  safeguard  measures  would  face
entrenched  hostility  from  wTo  members,  in particular from  the top  10  users of
antidumping provisions.  China would then be forced to rely on threats of some
kind  of  retaliation.  The  least  aggressive  approach  would  be  for  China  to
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as  soon  as a  wTo  member  notifies the  WTO  Secretariat  of its intention  to use  the
transitional  product-specific  safeguard  provision.  Lawyers  tend  to overstate  the
benefits  of  such  an  approach  by  ignoring  the  full  development  of  the  trade
conflicts-that  is, the political  bickering that follows  dispute  settlement  cases  (it
is  almost certain  that dispute  settlement  cases  dealing  with  the  transitional  pro-
duct-specific  safeguard  would  leave  the  two  parties  in  a  particularly  difficult
political  situation).  A  more  aggressive  approach  by  China  would  be  based  on
Article 56 of the new regulations, as discussed earlier. However, such an approach
should not ignore the basic principle  of deterrence:  trade deterrence,  like nuclear
deterrence,  works as long as it remains a threat-it must stop short of action.
V.  CONCL[JSION
Two  findings  of this  analysis  are  particularly  important  for  China.  First,  the
countries  that stand to gain most from  better discipline on antidumping  are the
handful  of developing  economies  that have been intensive users  of antidumping
since the  1995 Uruguay  Round. Because  the antidumping  measures imposed  by
these  developing  economies  tend  to  be  more  frequent  and  severe  than  those
imposed  by industrial countries,  these actions hurt developing  economies  much
more than  industrial  country-imposed  antidumping  measures  harm industrial
countries'  economies.  If  China  wants  to  continue  to  enjoy  successful  liberal-
ization,  it must avoid  becoming an  intensive  user  of antidumping.
Second,  there  are  few  economic  or  political  forces  to  act  as  automatic
restraints  on the current  situation of antidumping  enforcement.  Major users  of
antidumping  measures have  few  incentives  to reform  their very  discriminatory
use  of the  antidumping  instrument,  whereas  smaller  countries  have few  incen-
tives  to use  the antidumping  instrument  in a retaliatory  way.
As a  result,  China  is at  a crossroads.  One way  leads to more  intensive  use of
antidumping  for several  reasons:  as a retaliatory  instrument  against foreign  anti-
dumping, as a tool for China's progressive integration into the worldwide collusive
dimension  of antidumping  (used as  an instrument for  segmenting world  markets
for the benefit of large firms), and as a backdoor entry to old-fashioned  protection,
even at the risk of unraveling  its scheduled trade liberalization.
Another way leads to a guiding role  for China in arguing for  stricter rules on
the use  of antidumping.  As a small antidumping user and a key target of foreign
antidumping,  China will  be one of the main beneficiaries  of such a move, which
will also help them negotiate an economically sound interpretation of the special
provisions  on antidumping  and safeguards  included  in its  WTO  accession  proto-
col.  This new  interpretation  should  be  based  on China  meeting  a  few  key  and
economically  sound  conditions:  low  tariffs,  no  core  gray-area  measures,  no
distribution  monopolies  (see  section  IV).  This  interpretation  is motivated  by
strong economic and political  arguments.  China  and its trading partners have a
common  interest  in  establishing  the  strongest  possible  links  between  China's
effective  trade  liberalization  and agreement  not to use  these  special  provisions1 30  THE  WORID  BANK  ECONOMIHC  REVIEW,  VOL.  18,  NO.  I
against Chinese exporters.  This interpretation  seeks to mobilize export  interests
in both China  and the rest of the world to their mutual gain during  the difficult
implementation  period of China's accession  to the WTO.
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